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Part 1. Introduction and Definitions 
Chapter 1.1. Purpose and Scope of the Research 
«Often,  the  campaigns of  indigenous communit ies  are  misjudged as  the  
ignorance of  “primit ives” unschooled in  modern economic real i t ies .  But  make 
no mistake.  We are  not  peoples  of  the  past  –  we are  your  contemporaries  and 
in  some ways may be your  guides  towards more sustainable  futures  in  twenty-
f irs t  century»1.  
The new means of human action and the footprint humankind has on the Earth, 
necessarily require, as Hans Jonas pointed out, the creation of a new ethic2.  What 
he refers to as the traditional ethic3 is not anymore suitable to guide human 
behaviour because it  is not shaped around the understanding of the threat 
humankind has become for nature. It  is indispensable, he argues, a shift toward an 
ethic of responsibility4 that understands nature as something given in custody to 
the humankind, something towards which we have a role of custodianship. An 
ethic that the anthropologist Darrel Posey calls a new global environmental ethic  
able to reverse the devastating cycle that industrialized societies have imposed on 
the Planet5.  
The present work does not expect to answer to the call for the creation of a new 
ethic. It  instead wants to suggest that there are different traditional ethics  that 
may help humankind to find new solutions and methods. As Posey writes, «one 
approach is to listen to indigenous and traditional leaders who have become 
effective leaders in the environment and human rights movement»6. Rather than 
having to create something new, their traditional ethics  require us to move in 
space, and be inspired by those peoples and communities, our contemporaries, 
whose ethic and legal traditions place humankind in a custodianship role towards 
nature.  
This thesis explores the meaning and significance of the theoretical construct7 of 
biocultural rights8 as theorized by Kabir Bavikatte, and partially by Daniel 
                                                
1 (Posey ,  1999a) .  This  c i ta t ion  i s  the  c los ing  of  the  Doctora l  Thes is  by  S .K.  Bavika t te  (2011,  p .  
242)  tha t  so  much has  insp i red  my ideas  and  work .  Here  I  “appropr ia te”  th is  c i ta t ion  as  the  
opening  of  my thes is  as  a  symbol  of  my apprec ia t ion  for  h is  work  and  as  an  auspice  for  mine .  
2 (Hans  Jonas ,  1990,  p .  12) .  
3 (Hans  Jonas ,  1990,  p .  7 ) .  
4 (Hans  Jonas ,  1990,  p .  XXVIII ) .  
5 (Posey ,  1999a) .  
6 (Posey ,  1999a) .  
7 I  re fer  to  b iocul tura l  r igh ts  as  a  theore t ica l  cons truc t  because  they  cannot  as  ye t  be  regarded  
as  r igh ts  recognized  in  in te rna t ional  law.  Bavika t te  and  Robinson  argue  tha t  they  are  in  the  
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Robinson. They have recently introduced the term to describe a basket of group 
rights aimed at protecting the stewardship role that certain indigenous peoples and 
local communities  have towards the environment and, they argue, that is emerging 
from the interpretation of the texts and negotiating documents of multilateral 
environmental agreements.  The theoretical construct of biocultural rights, as 
proposed by Bavikatte, suggests strategies for claims inspired by non-mainstream 
ethics aimed at benefiting peoples, communities and the environment. It  is not yet 
the product of a new ethic but it  could be a step towards the creation of a new 
relationships between humankind and the environment.  
Biocultural rights still  need to be fully understood because they appear as sui 
generis  human rights carrying certain characteristics that are typical of human 
rights discourse as well as others that are difficult to fit  into usual categories. 
Biocultural rights seem to confer (using a Hohfeldian terminology9) claims, 
liberties, immunities and powers to their holders but also, unlike human rights 
usually do, duties, liabilities and disabilities. This is due to the fact that 
biocultural rights originate from environmentally related documents and therefore 
protect not solely the interests of their holders but also those of other subjects. 
The idea of human rights with attached duties and intrinsic limits for their holders 
may appear incompatible with the very famous description of human rights as 
trumps  proposed by Ronald Dworkin10.  Is it  really incompatible? Who are the other 
subjects whose interests are protected and what are such interests? Are these other 
subjects in a position to act as claimants to uphold their interests?  
This thesis will also explore the position of local communities and indigenous 
peoples within the concept of biocultural rights. Both categories are referenced in 
the texts interpreted by Bavikatte and Robinson, but the rights of the two groups 
are not equally recognized in international law, so they currently receive 
differential treatments. How would the recognition of biocultural rights in 
international law influence communities and peoples? Would the two categories be 
influenced in the same way? Would such recognition be favourable or detrimental 
for each of the two categories? 
                                                                                                                                                            
process  of  be ing  recognized  but  fur ther  research  i s  needed to  de termine  whether  b iocul tura l  
r igh ts  a re  “emerging”  ( in  the  process  of  be ing  recognised)  r igh ts  in  in te rna t ional  law,  or  
whether  b iocul tura l  r igh ts  a re  s t i l l  a t  the  s tage  of  a  pol i t ica l  idea l  to  be  pursued .   
8 The  te rm is  insp i red  by  the  te rm biocul tura l  d ivers i ty  tha t  was  used  by  Darre l  Posey  (Posey ,  
1999b)  to  descr ibe  the  idea  of  long- te rm sus ta inable  and  mutua l ly  benef ic ia l  re la t ionships  
be tween cer ta in  communi t ies  and  peoples  and  the  environment .  
9 (Hohfe ld ,  1919) .   
10 (Dworkin ,  1984) .  
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This thesis analyses some of the unresolved issues of Bavikatte’s construction 
attempting to provide a rational interpretation of his work. In particular, the 
thesis, after describing Bavikatte’s work, reveals some non-explicit implications 
of Bavikatte’s definition, analyses the internal elements of biocultural rights 
(right-holders, duty-holders, foundations, beneficiaries), and it  finally tries to 
point out the potential positive and negative consequences of formulating claims 
for biocultural r ights in international and national law. Due to the broad nature of 
the discussion on biocultural rights, and to their complexity, some specific issues 
will not be explored. It  is here hoped to explore them in more detail in the future. 
It  should be borne in mind that it  is a theoretical thesis, an exercise in 
jurisprudence, and not a thesis in international law. A comprehensive analysis of 
the potential advantages and downturns of biocultural rights should be combined 
with an examination of international law, court cases, international negotiations, 
and on-the-ground experience. 
The environmental focus of this research means in no way to justify the 
mistreatment of peoples or communities that have not preserved sustainable 
lifestyles. One thing is to claim for the recognition of differentiated rights and 
another is to claim for the mistreatment of those that do not fall  within the specific 
category to whom those rights are recognized. As recognizing specific rights to 
indigenous peoples shall not be understood as threatening the rights of non-
indigenous minorities, the call for recognition of biocultural rights for those that 
do have certain environment-related-features shall in no way be assumed to be a 
justification to threaten the rights of those peoples and communities that do not. 
Part 5 is dedicated to a case study on biocultural rights. It  reports the still  
undergoing case of the Khwe, a San indigenous group living in the Bwabwata 
National Park, in the West Caprivi,  Namibia. The Khwe are among the very few 
indigenous peoples living in a National Park in Southern Africa and are currently 
struggling for the recognition of the rights over natural resources necessary for the 
maintenance of their traditional livelihoods and cultural practices.  As part of my 
period as a visiting researcher at Natural Justice: lawyers for the Environment  (a 
South African Non-Governmental Organization), I helped to organize and to run 
the First Workshop with Custodians Committee of Elders & Youth with the Khwe 
of Bwabwata. The workshop aimed at consulting the Khwe in order to daft a 
Biocultural Community Protocol, a tool created to help indigenous peoples and 
local communities to ask for the recognition of their rights over natural resources 
and traditional knowledge. The claims of the Khwe are an interesting case study 
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for the present thesis because they can be framed within the theoretical construct 
of biocultural rights. The Khwe, in fact,  seem conscious to be claiming for a 
basket of rights (i .e. right to access, use, manage and protect their traditional lands 
and natural resources), which embraces a cluster of responsibilities towards the 
environment. 
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Chapter 1.2. The Conservation of the Environment 
Before moving to the discussion about the definition of indigenous peoples and 
local communities, it  is here needed to spend a few words on the main terms of the 
debate about the conservation of the environment. 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment11 is a useful compass within the dynamics 
of environmental issues, in particular for what concerns the linkages between 
human wellbeing and ecosystem services. An ecosystem is defined as a «dynamic 
complex of plant, animal, and microorganism communities and the non-living 
environment interacting as a functional unit»12 and its size can range from 
microbial systems to the whole Earth13.  Ecosystem services are the sum of the 
benefits people obtain from ecosystems, at the local and global level.  They can 
include «provisioning services  such as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating 
services  that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural 
services  that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting 
services  such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling»14.  All the 
services that the environment provides to humankind are dependent on the health 
and the diversity of an ecosystem: the richer its biological diversity – biodiversity 
– is,  the better services it  may provide. Biodiversity is the term used to describe 
the «variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia ,  
terrestrial,  marine, and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of 
which they are a part;  this includes diversity within species and of ecosystems»15.  
Hence, the conservation of biodiversity and the protection of healthy ecosystems 
are fundamental assets for the wellbeing and survival of humankind. 
Today, ecosystems and their diversity are under anthropogenic threat more then 
ever before. Anthropogenic threats range from habitat destruction, habitat 
fragmentation and degradation,  climate change, overexploitation, introduction of 
invasive species, and circulation of “exotic” diseases16.  The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment argues that the degradation of ecosystems and the loss of biodiversity 
primarily affect the poorest layers of society and contribute to the increase of 
world inequalities and conflicts17 and hinder the achievement of the Millennium 
                                                
11 The  Mil lennium Ecosys tem Assessment  i s  an  assessment  car r ied  out  f rom 2001 to  2005 by  
more  than  1360 exper ts  about  the  s ta te  and  t rend  of  the  ecosys tems of  the  wor ld  and  of  the  
serv ices  they  provide  to  human be ings .  For  more  info  v is i t :  www.mil lenniumassessment .org . 
12 (Chopara ,  Leemans ,  Kumar ,  &  Simons ,  2005,  p .  v i i ) .  
13 (Macer ,  2011,  p .  5 ) .  
14 (Chopara  e t  a l . ,  2005,  p .  v i i ) .  
15 Ar t ic le  2  of  the  Convent ion  on  Bio logica l  Divers i ty .   
16 (Pr imack & Carotenuto ,  2003,  p .  111) .  
17 (Mil lennium Ecosys tem Assessment ,  2005,  p .  2 ) .  
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Development Goals18 precisely in those regions that mostly need it19.  Degraded 
ecosystems cannot provide the services needed to improve health,  eradicate 
hunger, etc. On the contrary, «the sound management of ecosystem services 
provides cost-effective opportunities for addressing multiple development goals in 
synergic manner»20.  The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment is clear: a drastic 
change is needed in the management and use of ecosystems and their biotic and 
abiotic elements. A shift towards sustainable practices is needed otherwise 
«degradation of ecosystem services could grow significantly worse during the first 
half of this century and represents a barrier to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals»21.  
                                                
18 The  Mil lennium Development  Goals  a re  a  se t  o f  e ight  ta rge ts  tha t  were  agreed  a t  the  Uni ted  
Nat ions  in  2010 (Genera l  Assembly  Resolu t ion  A/RES/55/2)  as  par t  o f  a  g lobal  par tnersh ip  to  
reduce  ex t reme pover ty  by  2015.  
19 (Mil lennium Ecosys tem Assessment ,  2005,  p .  2 ) .  
20 (Mil lennium Ecosys tem Assessment ,  2005,  p .  2 ) .  
21 (Chopara  e t  a l . ,  2005,  p .  2 ) .  
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Chapter 1.3. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities 
1.3.1. Critical Analysis of Definitions 
The concept of biocultural rights refers to both indigenous peoples and local 
communities. Bavikatte and Robinson, the two authors that suggest the emergence 
of biocultural rights, gathered the two groups under the same umbrella of rights 
making no distinction between them. However, the border between the two terms is 
blurred, so I rather maintain them together but separate in order to be able to 
differentiate, when needed, between one and the other. In fact,  while indigenous 
peoples can claim a range of internationally recognized rights, local communities 
have mostly not yet been recognized as rights-holders in international law22.  Given 
the complexities hidden behind the use of such terms, it  is important to briefly 
explore the current debate on their definitions.     
Indigenous peoples 
The problem of defining indigenous peoples is not only a matter of academic 
writing. The definition has implications because it  is used by governments and 
Courts to decide which people are indigenous and which are not. Researchers must 
therefore be very careful when they propose precise definitions, as it  may 
influence the attribution of rights to a certain people or another.  
Most papers, books and reports regarding indigenous peoples affirm that there are 
more than 370 million people living in 90 different countries that can be included 
under the term indigenous peoples23.  However, as Niezen24 argues, this estimate is 
problematic not only because of the lack of regular and systematic national census 
of indigenous communities but also because of the yet unresolved difficulties 
concerning the definition of the term itself.  Currently there is no universally 
recognized definition, but several different ones, overlapping only in parts.  The 
most commonly cited definition is the one proposed by Martínez Cobo in the Study 
of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations25,  commissioned 
by the United Nations (UN) in 1986.  
                                                
22 (Harry  Jonas ,  Makagon,  &  Shrumm, 2012,  p .  101) .  
23 (Uni ted  Nat ions ,  2009) .  
24 (Niezen ,  2003,  p .  224) .  
25 Mar t ínez  Cobo was  the  Specia l  Rappor teur  of  the  Sub-Commiss ion  on  Prevent ion  of  
Discr iminat ion  and  Pro tec t ion  of  Minor i t ies .  The  S tudy was  the  f i r s t  ex tens ive  research  
commiss ioned  by  the  UN on the  ind igenous  i ssue  and  was  adopted  a t  the  52 n d  meet ing  of  the  UN 
Economic  and  Socia l  Counci l ,  on  11  March  1986.  
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«Indigenous communit ies ,  peoples  and nat ions are  those which,  having a  
his tor ical  cont inui ty  with  pre- invasion and pre-colonial  societ ies  that  
developed on their  terr i tor ies ,  consider  themselves  dis t inct  f rom other  sectors  
of  the  societ ies  now prevai l ing in  those terr i tor ies ,  or  par ts  of  them. They 
form at  present  non-dominant  sectors  of  society  and are  determined to  
preserve,  develop and transmit  to  future  generat ions their  ancestra l  terr i tor ies ,  
and their  e thnic  ident i ty ,  as  the  basis  of  their  cont inued exis tence as  peoples ,  
in  accordance with  their  own cul tural  pat terns ,  social  inst i tu t ions and legal  
systems»26.  
Being the most cited it  is also one of the most criticized definitions. Most 
critiques focus on its reference to pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies. The 
definition is accused to be under-inclusive, because it  a priori  excludes those 
peoples that live in territories that have not undergone colonialist invasions. It  
remains doubtful whether it  also excludes those peoples that have been displaced 
and hence do not have anymore a connection to their original ancestral territories. 
The more recent (2009) definition proposed by James Anaya, the previous UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, focuses on continuous 
connections with ancestral lands but it  specifically includes those peoples 
struggling to regain access to such lands: «They are indigenous  because their 
ancestral roots are embedded in the lands on which they live, or would like to live, 
much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living in the 
same lands or in close proximity»27.  
At the other end of the issue of inclusiveness of the definition lies the fear of 
African and Asian States for an over-inclusiveness of the term. These States are 
frightened by the potential raise of an uncontrolled number of communities 
claiming indigenous status28.  Their fear is not lacking foundations given that,  
during colonial times, the term indigenous  was used to describe the whole native 
population as opposite to colonizers; it  referred to the idea of “who came first” .  In 
this sense, while the term would be appropriate for the Americas and Oceania29,  i t  
would not for Asia and Africa because all non-European-descendants Africans and 
Asians would be considered indigenous 30.  
                                                
26 (Uni ted  Nat ions  Commiss ion  on  Human Rights ,  1986,  para .  279) .  
27 (Anaya ,  2009,  p .  1 ) .  
28 (Afr ican  Commiss ion  on  Human and  Peoples’  Rights ,  2010) .  
29 (Anaya ,  2009,  p .  137) .  
30 (Afr ican  Commiss ion  on  Human and  Peoples’  Rights ,  2003) .  
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The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples31 (UNDRIP), adopted by the 
Unite Nations General Assembly in 2007, after more than 20 years of negotiations, 
fell  short of shedding a clear light32 on the definition of the term indigenous 
peoples33.  The UNDRIP chose, as the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Population34,  an “open door” policy35:  alike the Working Group accepted 
submissions and interventions by groups claiming  their indigenous status36,  the 
UNDRIP has chosen self-identification  as the core criteria to qualify for 
indigenous  status. Rather then providing a definition, UNDRIP revives a vicious 
circle of the Martínez Cobo Study37: «the right of indigenous peoples themselves to 
define what and who is indigenous»38.  Nevertheless, the Declaration proposes, in 
different articles, some key characteristics of indigenous peoples: a history of 
common injustices as a result of colonization and land dispossession39; language, 
traditional practices, knowledge, and legal and cultural institutions distinct from 
those dominant in the national State where they reside40;  and knowledge, culture 
and practices that contribute to the sustainable use and management of the 
environment41.  The peculiar features of indigenous’ cultures, institutions and 
traditions had already been central in the description of who indigenous peoples 
are in the 1989 International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention Number 169 
                                                
31 UNDRIP,  unl ike  Mar t ínez  Cobo’s  def in i t ion ,  re fers  to  ind igenous  peoples ,  ra ther  than  to  
communi t ies  or  na t ions .  The  use  of  the  te rm peoples  in  the  UNDRIP has  been  a  very  impor tan t  
achievement  because  unt i l  then  there  was  no  in terna t ional  ins t rument  recogniz ing  them as  
peoples  (Xanthaki ,  2007,  p .  133) .  Ind igenous  representa t ives  have  much ins is ted  for  the  use  of  
the  te rm peoples ,  as  a  p lura l ,  because  peoples  a re  subjec ts  of  in te rna t ional  law,  and  in  par t icu lar  
a re  subjec ts  whose  r ight  to  se l f -de terminat ion  i s  recognized  by  the  UN Char ter  (a r t .  1 .3)  and  by  
the  two 1966 In terna t ional  Covenant  on  Civ i l  and  Pol i t ica l  Rights  and  on  Economic ,  Socia l  and  
Cul tura l  Rights  (a r t .  1 .1) .  Therefore  « i t  symbol izes  not  jus t  the  bas ic  human  r igh ts  to  which  a l l  
ind iv iduals  a re  en t i t led ,  bu t  a lso  land ,  te r r i to r ia l  and  co l lec t ive  r igh ts ,  subsumed under  the  r igh t  
to  se l f -de terminat ion» (Posey ,  1999a) .  This  poin t  wi l l  be  d iscussed  fur ther  in  sec t ion  2 .3 .3 .  on  
the  r igh t  to  se l f -de terminat ion .   
32 (Err ico ,  2007) .  
33 (Afr ican  Commiss ion  on  Human and  Peoples’  Rights ,  2010) .  
34 The  Working  Group on  Indigenous  Popula t ions  was  es tab l ished  pursuant  to  reso lu t ion  1982/34  
of  the  Economic  and  Socia l  Counci l  as  a  subs id iary  organ  of  the  Sub-Commiss ion  on  the  
Promot ion  and  Pro tec t ion  of  Human Rights  (an  advisory  body of  the  Commiss ion  on  Human 
Rights ) .  In  2006,  when the  Commiss ion  on  Human Rights  was  rep laced  by  the  Human Rights  
Counci l ,  the  funct ions  of  the  Working  Group were  taken  over  by  the  UN Permanent  Forum on 
Indigenous  Issues ,  under  the  Economic  and  Socia l  Counci l .  
35 (Niezen ,  2003,  p .  21) .  
36 (Wil l iams,  1990,  c i ted  in  Anaya ,  2009,  p .  19) .  
37 (Anaya ,  2009,  p .  28) .  
38 (Uni ted  Nat ions  Commiss ion  on  Human Rights ,  1986,  par .  369) .   
39 UNDRIP,  Preamble .   
40 UNDRIP,  a r t .  5 ,  11 ,  12 ,  13 ,  20 ,  27 ,  31 ,  and  34 .  
41 UNDRIP,  Preamble .  
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on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights42.  Article 1 of ILO 169 defines 
indigenous peoples as: 
«tr ibal  peoples  in  independent  countr ies  whose social ,  cul tural  and economic 
condit ions dis t inguish them from other  sect ions of  the  nat ional  community ,  
and whose s ta tus  is  regulated wholly  or  par t ia l ly  by their  own customs or  
t radi t ions or  by special  laws or  regulat ions».  
Another recognized common characteristic of indigenous peoples is a past,  and 
often present, of struggles against «State-sponsored genocide, forced settlement, 
relocation, political marginalization, and various formal attempts at cultural 
destruction»43.  The struggle to exit disadvantaged conditions and the constant 
struggle against national States drives indigenous peoples close to ethnic 
minorities. The distinction is not completely accepted, and there still  are States 
using minority language  to refer to indigenous peoples44.  Interestingly, although 
indigenous peoples are mostly isolated and small communities, Niezen draws a 
line between the two categories – minorities and indigenous – underlying the 
global width of the indigenous movement that acts in international fora  as a single 
worldwide community rather than as many self-centred ones45.  Another distinction 
that can be noted concerns the type of self-determination claimed. Indigenous 
peoples have mainly focused their claims on the internal  right to self-
determination while ethnic minorities more often claim for the recognition of the 
external  right to self-determination46.  Indigenous peoples have not used the term 
self-determination as a synonym for secession, and have interpreted it  as a right to 
be exercised within  the national state where they reside. It  is presented in the 
UNDRIP as a prerequisite for their right to be equal but different 47:  the right to 
maintain cultural,  religious and economic traditions and social institutions 
separate from those of the dominant part of the society48.  
                                                
42 From now on  refer red  to  as  “ ILO 169” .   
43 (Niezen ,  2003,  p .  3 ) .  And a lso ,  as  Anaya  (2009,  p .  1 )  no tes ,  « indigenous  peoples  of  today  
charac ter is t ica l ly  ex is t  under  condi t ions  of  severe  d isadvantage  re la t ive  to  o thers  wi th in  the  
S ta tes  cons t ruc ted  around them».  
44 (Xanthaki ,  2007,  p .  133) .  
45 To  descr ibe  th is  g lobal  movement  Niezen  has  in t roduced  the  te rm ind igenism  as  the  
express ion  of  a  g lobal  ident i ty  cons t ruc ted  upon a  common h is tory  of  suf fer ing  and  
margina l iza t ion  and  around the  common s t ruggle  for  a  g lobal  change  and  the  recogni t ion  of  
cer ta in  r igh ts  (Niezen ,  2003) .  
46 See  be low a t  2 .3 .3 .  
47 Ar t .  2  of  the  Uni ted  Nat ions  Declara t ion  on  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples .   
48 The  problem of  which  peoples  a re  ind igenous  a lso  encompasses  the  problem of  who is  
ind igenous  in  ind iv idual  te rms .  Should  i t  be  judged  on  the  ground of  t r ibe-membersh ip ,  b lood-
quantum or  behaviour?  Dif feren t  peoples  and  d i f fe ren t  countr ies  have  g iven  very  d iverse  
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Drawing on the characteristic features used in the different definitions explored 
above, with the larger term indigenous peoples I will refer to those groups that can 
be said to present the following characteristics: 
-  Self-identification as indigenous peoples. 
-  Link to pre-colonial society; 
-  Strong link to a certain land and its natural resources; 
-  Cultural,  legal,  spiritual and economic traditions different from mainstream 
society; 
-  Determination to preserve, develop and transmit distinct traditions and 
lands; 
-  Past,  and often present, of marginalization and oppression; 
 
Local communities 
The definition of the term local communities  has not undergone an equally massive 
proliferation as indigenous peoples .  Their first  acknowledgment in international 
law is found in article 8j of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)49.  The 
CBD, echoing Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration50,  addresses «indigenous and 
local communities  embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation of 
the environment»51 (emphasis added) as holders of rights over their traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources. The language used underlines the 
importance of the link with biodiversity and lands, regardless of whether the 
interested subjects can be strictly qualified as indigenous peoples or simply as 
local communities. The term local community has since appeared in many other 
international documents issued by UN bodies, UN treaties and other international 
organisations, as for example, in resolutions of the Conference of the Parties and 
Guidelines of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, resolutions, policy documents 
and guidelines of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)52.  In all  of these documents, local 
                                                                                                                                                            
answers .  Thei r  ana lys is ,  even  though very  in teres t ing ,  wi l l  no t  be  dea l t  wi th  in  the  present  
work .  For  fur ther  informat ion ,  see  (Brown,  2003) .  
49 (Harry  Jonas ,  Makagon,  &  Shrumm, 2013,  p .  24) .  
50 Pr inc ip le  22:  «Indigenous  people  and  the i r  communi t ies  and  o ther  loca l  communi t ies  have  a  
v i ta l  ro le  in  environmenta l  management  and  development  because  of  the i r  knowledge  and  
t rad i t iona l  prac t ices .   S ta tes  should  recognize  and  duly  suppor t  the i r  ident i ty ,  cu l ture  and  
in teres ts  and  enable  the i r  e f fec t ive  par t ic ipa t ion  in  the  achievement  of  sus ta inable  
development» .  The  Rio  Declara t ion  was  adopted  a t  the  UN Conference  on  the  Environment  and  
Development ,  a lso  known as  the  Ear th  Summit ,  in  Rio  de  Janei ro  in  1972.  
51 Ar t .  8 j  o f  the  CBD. 
52 (Borr in i -Feyerabend,  Kothar i ,  &  Oviedo ,  2004,  p .  12) .  
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communities are conceptualised as coming within the framework of consideration 
because of their relationship with the environment, whether this be lands, seeds, 
trees, animal, plants, rivers, deserts,  wet and dry lands. Local communities do not 
come into play in the rights discourse simply because of their existence as 
communities, but precisely because of their role in the conservation of important 
natural resources. In 2011 the CBD Conference of the Parties convened an Ad-hoc 
Expert Meeting to identify the core characteristics of local communities53.  The list 
that was agreed on is «broad and inclusive, and allow[s] for a clustering of unique 
cultural,  ecological and social circumstances to each community»54.  Many of the 
listed characteristics are very similar to those used to identify indigenous peoples: 
i .e.  self-identification; strong link to traditional lands; set of cultural (including 
linguistic),  legal,  spiritual and economic traditions different from mainstream 
society; dynamic and evolving traditional practices and knowledge passed from 
generation to generation; past,  and often present, of marginalization and 
oppression55.  Besides these common characteristics, the CBD working group kept 
the focus on the importance of characteristics linked to environmental 
sustainability. The Working Group suggests that in order to classify as local 
community ,  a community needs to have «lifestyles linked to traditions associated 
with natural cycles», to have a «sustainable use of nature and biodiversity» and to 
hold «technology/knowledge/innovations/practices associated with the sustainable 
use and conservation of biological diversity», «spiritual and cultural values of 
biodiversity and territories», and «foods and food preparation systems and 
traditional medicines […] closely connected to biodiversity/environment»56.  
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has recently issued two very attention-
grabbing judgments. In the two cases, the Court treated local communities 
composed of descendants of African slaves as holders of the same rights 
recognized to indigenous peoples57.  Specifically, in the 2005 Moiwana Village v. 
Suriname58 case, the Court recognized the Moiwana community members, that 
settled in late 19t h  century59,  as the legitimate owners of their ancestral territory60 
regardless of the lack of legal title, following the same rationale used for the case 
                                                
53 (UNEP/CBD/WG8J/7 /8 /Add.1 ,  2011) .  
54 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  25) .  
55 Ext rac t  f rom (UNEP/CBD/WG8J/7 /8 /Add.1 ,  2011,  pp .  12–13) .  
56 (UNEP/CBD/WG8J/7 /8 /Add.1 ,  2011,  pp .  12–13)  
57 (Antkowiak ,  2007) .  
58 Moiwana Vi l lage  v .  Sur iname,  In ter -Am.  C.H.R. ,  No 124,  Ser .  C  (2005) .  
59 Moiwana Vi l lage  v .  Sur iname,  par .  132 .  
60 Moiwana Vi l lage  v .  Sur iname,  par .  128 .  
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Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua61,  that dealt with 
indigenous peoples. Referring to the ex-slave community, the Court «held that,  in 
the case of indigenous communities who have occupied their ancestral lands in 
accordance with customary practices – yet who lack real title to the property – 
mere possession of the land should suffice to obtain official recognition of their 
communal ownership»62.  Again, in the 2007 Saramaka People v. Suriname63 case, 
the Court recalled the previous case and recognized to the Saramaka people, also 
descendants of black slaves, the collective ownership of their ancestral land 
applying its precedents regarding indigenous peoples64.  In the two decisions the 
Court recognizes specific rights to ancestral lands to those communities that 
«regulate themselves [. . .]  by their own norms, customs and/or traditions [. . .][and 
whose] social,  cultural and economic characteristics are different from other 
sections of the national community»65,  regardless of the fact that they cannot be 
classified as indigenous to those lands.  
Notwithstanding all of these documents that attempt to identify local communities, 
the question what are local communities  remains a complex and nuanced one.  The 
CBD and the other related documents expect a community to be sustainable in 
order to classify as a local community .  In fact,  while the central characteristic that 
indigenous peoples need to have in order to qualify as holders of indigenous rights 
is to descend from pre-colonial and pre-invasion societies, local communities most 
often need to be environmentally sustainable to qualify as holders of certain local 
communities’ rights. In the words of Jonas et al.:  
«[…] once a  person ident if ies  him or  herself  as  Indigenous,  they can exercise  
cer ta in  r ights  under  internat ional  law regardless  of  the  type of  l i fes tyle  they 
lead.  Indigenous peoples  do not  have to  show that  they are  conserving and 
susta inably using biodivers i ty  as  a  prerequis i te  for  being able  to  c la im 
indigenous peoples’  r ights .  In  contrast ,  the  r ights  of  “ local  communit ies”  are  
general ly  dependent ,  as  in  CBD Art ic le  8( j) ,  on whether  their  l i fes tyles  are  
“relevant  for  the  conservat ion and sustainable  use of  biological  divers i ty”».  66 
The texts quoted above blur the distinction between definition of local 
communities and requirements to be holders of certain rights .  For the purpose of 
                                                
61 Mayagna  (Sumo)  Awas  Tingni  Communi ty  v .  Nicaragua ,  In ter-Am.  C.H.R. ,  No.79 ,  Ser .  C  
(2001) .   
62 Moiwana Vi l lage  v .  Sur iname,  par  131 .  
63 Saramaka People  v .  Sur iname,  Iner-Am.  C.H.R. ,  No.  172 ,  Ser .C  (2007) .  
64 Saramaka People  v .  Sur iname,  par .  86 .  
65 Mayagna  (Sumo)  Awas  Tingni  Communi ty  v .  Nicaragua ,  par  84 .  
66 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  26) .  
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this work, it  is considered more appropriate to distinguish between the two 
concepts: i .e.  between the definition of local communities and the characteristics 
they need to have to hold local communities’ rights. The definition of local 
communities here used, hence, does not need to include environmental 
sustainability and can focus simply of socio-cultural characteristics: small groups 
of people that identify themselves as a community, that live at low population 
densities and regulate themselves by their own norms and traditions, and that have 
a long-standing social and cultural organization that binds them together to a 
defined land and its natural resources and that distinguish them from other, more 
affirmed and less marginalized, sectors of the national society.  
Conclusions 
For both terms, indigenous peoples  and local communities ,  there will be particular 
cases of groups inappropriately falling within or outside their scope. For the 
purpose of this work the two terms indigenous peoples and local communities 
(IPLCs) will often be used together and, when needed, due differences will be 
underlined. 
Nevertheless, in the biocultural rights discourse, IPLCs come into play for their 
role as ‘conservationists’ of local ecosystems and the element for the 
identification of the holders of biocultural rights is not the identification of a 
group as an indigenous people or a local community. It  is rather the existence of a 
special connection with the environment. Posey has encountered a similar problem 
in his work on Traditional Resources Rights67 and has decided to stress the 
importance of such special connection with the environment as the main feature to 
identify the subjects holders of rights.  
«The debate  over  who is  indigenous should not  s ide- track the important  task 
of  valuing local  communit ies  [ . . . ]  and to  rekindle  and enhance the spir i tual  
and cul tural  values  that  cul tures  have used effect ively  to  conserve 
biodivers i ty»68.  
Such focus may lead to expand the discourse, as Michelle Cocks suggests69,  to 
include in the discourse about biocultural diversity (that concerns the mutually 
beneficial interaction between cultural and biological diversity), also less 
“exotic”70 communities that have migrated to peri-urban or urban areas and that 
                                                
67 See  be low a t  4 .1 .5 .  
68 (Posey ,  1999a) .  
69 (Cocks ,  2006) .  
70 (Cocks ,  2006,  p .  190) .  
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have maintained a «nature-related sense of cultural identity»71.  She argues that a 
community does not need to «live geographically close to natural environment for 
it  to hold spiritual,  social,  and cultural value»72 and that the theory on biocultural 
diversity should extend to include also more varied social groups73.  While it  is true 
that for the discourse on biocultural diversity (the focus of her article) that seeks 
to show the heterogeneous relationships between human culture and nature it  
would be appropriate to expand the scope of research to such urban and peri-urban 
communities, it  would not be appropriate to expand the discourse about biocultural 
rights to such communities. In fact,  biocultural rights concern the management and 
conservation of lands and territories that are still  considered very rich in 
biodiversity. Biocultural rights, in their current formulation, concern those 
territories that could for example qualify for the inclusion in protected areas and 
that are particularly important for the survival of certain habitats or species. Those 
communities that live in urban or peri-urban areas may be holders of very 
important traditional ecological knowledge concerning medicinal and other uses of 
plants and animals parts,  and may attach spiritual or religious values to such 
practices and species. However, such communities do not fall  within the realm of 
biocultural rights because they do not manage, nor actively seek to manage, whole 
lands and ecosystems in sustainable ways. 
 
 
                                                
71 (Cocks ,  2006,  p .  191  and  195) .  
72 (Cocks ,  2006,  p .  194) .  
73 (Cocks ,  2006,  p .  195) .  
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Part 2. Rights: Instruments and Theories   
Chapter 2.1. The Structure of Rights 
Since we are attempting to analyse the content and implications of a new concept 
within human rights discourse, we first need to convey on and lay out an 
understanding of the structure of rights and of the meaning of their constitutive 
elements. For this purpose the present work with draw on the framework of legal 
relations and correlations proposed by Wesley N. Hohfeld74,  briefly laid out75 in the 
following section. Hohfeld’s theory is here used as a set of practical tools and is 
not fully embraced. When needed, distance will be taken from Hohfeld’s positions 
and concepts and theories more suitable for the purpose of this work will be 
employed. 
2.1.1. Hohfeld Theory 
Hohfeld drew a framework of the legal concepts that he saw implied in the broader 
and ambiguous concept of rights ,  a term that he thought too often used 
inappropriately and confusedly in legal discourse to refer to very different 
concepts76.  He distilled a set of four legal positions that he sees as composing the 
concept of rights and that are logically, and necessarily, correlated to four other 
legal positions. Here follows a brief reconstruction of his work slightly adapted to 
the needs of this thesis (for example, Hohfeld makes no reference to rights of 
groups of people). 
Claim-right77 - Hohfeldian  Duty78 
P has a  c la im-right  against  Q if  Q has  the duty to  do X for  P.  Where P is  a  person 
or  a  group,  X is  the  content  of  the  r ight  and Q is  a  person,  or  a  group,  that  holds  the 
corresponding duty.   
In  Hohfeld’s  s t ructure ,  the  r ight-holder  may also be the person ent i t led to  claim  for  
the  enforcement  of  her  r ight  but  i t  may also not  be so 79.  
 
                                                
74 (Hohfe ld ,  1919) .  
75 The  in t roduct ion  to  Hohfe ld  f ramework  is  drawn most ly  form Celano  (2001) ,  Kramer  (1998b)  
and  Waldron  (1984) ,  tha t  draw on  Hohfe ld  (1919) .   
76 (Celano ,  2001,  p .  8 ;  S immonds ,  2008,  p .  296) .  
77 Hohfe ld  uses  in te rchangeably  the  te rm c la im  and  the  te rm r ight .  I  wi l l  use  the  te rm 
Hohfe ld ian  c la im.   
78 I  wi l l  a lways  re fer  to  duty  as  unders tood  by  Hohfe ld  us ing  the  express ion  “Hohfe ld ian  duty” .  
79 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998b,  p .  9 ) .  
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Liberty - No-right 
P has a  l iber ty against  Q in  re la t ion to  X,  i f  P  has  no duty towards Q to  do X.  Q 
may be another  person or  a  group of  people .  Unless  i t  is  connected with  a  
Hohfeldian duty on Q,  P can f ind interference in  doing or  not  doing X by those 
same people  that  have no-r ight  towards her  in  re la t ion to  X.  So,  fol lowing an 
example by Kramer 80,  P  may have the l iber ty ,  against  Q,  to  express  her  pol i t ical  
opinions.  So Q has no r ight  to  P’s  not  expressing her  pol i t ical  opinion.  However ,  
P’s  l iber ty  does not  comprehend Q’s  duty to  refrain  from act ions that  may 
negat ively  interfere  with  P’s  l iber ty ,  such as  for  example making a  lot  or  noise  to  
cover  P’s  voice.   
Power - Liability 
P has a  power towards Q if  P  can change Q’s  legal  posi t ions.  So when Q is  in  a  
posi t ion of  l iabi l i ty  towards P,  Q is  subject  to  the  wil l  of  P  for  what  concerns a  
cer ta in  legal  posi t ion.   
For  example,  i f  Q is  a  debtor  to  P,  P  may have the power to  c lear  out  the  debt ,  and 
therefore  change the posi t ion of  duty of  Q.  In  this  case P was in  a  posi t ion of  
l iabi l i ty  towards herself  too,  because she can change her  posi t ion of  r ight-holder  
towards Q.    
Immunity - Disability 
P has an immunity  towards Q (or  toward himself)  i f  Q has  no power,  so  is  unable ,  
to  modify a  legal  posi t ion of  P .  Fundamental  r ights are  of ten def ined as  inal ienable  
and inviolable  r ights ,  meaning that  no one,  not  even the State  or  the  r ight-holder  
himself ,  can withdraw them. In  Hohfeldian terms,  the  holder  of  such r ights  is  in  a  
posi t ion of  immunity  in  regards to  his  fundamental  r ights .   
The first four legal positions (claim-right, liberty, power and immunity) describe 
positive legal positions of their holders and are to be understood, in Hohfeld 
theory, as rights against specific persons, «thus, each Hohfeldian right resolves 
one issue only, as between two parties only»81.  
The first two correlated legal positions are, in Hohfeld scheme, first-order 
relations that have direct consequences on people’s behaviour. The two following 
couples are second-order relations that have a direct influence on entitlements 
(such as property and debts) but not on people’s behaviour82.  
                                                
80 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998b,  p .  11) .  
81 (S immonds ,  2008,  p .  297) .  
82 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998b,  p .  20) .  
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All the above-mentioned legal positions necessarily imply their corresponding 
positions, as none can exist without the other. From each legal position stems the 
corresponding legal position on a certain person or group. Therefore, if  in a legal 
system there is a norm recognizing one of such legal positions, the corresponding 
legal position exists,  even in the absence of a norm explicitly recognizing it83.  This 
way of perceiving the correlation between legal positions is called static  vision of 
rights. For the supporters of this vision, rights are determined Hohfeldian 
positions, or, most frequently, clusters of them84. Single positions can be micro-
rights, but as such they may have very little use to their holders85.  In fact,  most 
rights are compositions of Hohfeldian positions. As seen above, P’s liberty  to 
express her political opinions may become very little thing if not correlated with 
other positions, as for example: the right  to physical integrity, whose correlated 
Hohfeldian  duty  on fellow citizens and on the State obliges them not to harm P 
while she is expressing her political opinion; the immunity  towards the State’s 
decision to change the law and wipe P’s liberty away; the right to meet with other 
people to talk, and the corresponding duty of the State not to arrest gathering 
people. Another example, the right of property, is provided by Simmonds: «an 
owner of a land […] typically enjoys (inter alia) the claim-right that others should 
not trespass on his land, the liberty to walk upon his land, the power to transfer 
title to others, and an immunity against having his title altered or transferred by 
the act of another»86.  
                                                
83 (P ino ,  2013,  pp .  230–231) .  
84 (P ino ,  2013,  p .  236) .  
85 (P ino ,  2013,  p .  236) .  
86 (S immonds ,  2008,  p .  296 ,  no te  14) .  
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Chapter 2.2. Theories of Rights 
Hohfeld framework is a description of what rights may be composed of, but it  
makes no reference to the content that rights should or should not have and to 
what justifies their being recognized as such. In contemporary jurisprudence, two 
main theories have been developed in the attempt to answer to the broad question 
of the justification of rights: the Will (or Choice) Theory and the Interest (or 
Benefit) Theory. 
2.2.1. Will (Choice) Theory  
The underpinning of the Will Theory of rights is the importance of individual 
choices. In Herbert L.A. Hart’s version of the theory, that he developed in mid 
1900, «a legal right is a legally respected choice»87,  meaning that the law creates a 
sphere where the right-holder can freely and autonomously choose about another 
person’ duty88.  Each right can be composed of one or many Hohfeldian positions 
(claim, liberty, power, immunity) and by their corresponding positions 
(Hohfeldian duty, no-right, liability, disability). Holding a right is like having an 
opportunity89:  the right-holder can decide whether or not the duty-bearer shall 
perform the duty, so being a «small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is owed»90.   
The Will Theory supports, like Hohfeld’s framework, a static  vision of rights. To 
each right there is a determined corresponding duty, or a number of corresponding 
duties, imposed on a determined person or group of people. If the duty ceases to 
exist then the right does as well.  The power of the right-holder to claim the 
enforcement or the waive of the duty, and his choice over it ,  is exactly the value 
that,  for the Will Theory is to be protected. The ability to enforce or waive 
someone’s duty is the origin, the point,  the justification of each right. So for 
example, if  P has the right to have brought coffee every morning by Q, the 
protection granted from the recognition of the right is over the ability of P to 
require coffee from Q and to dismiss her from her duty (for one morning or for all  
of them). The existence of one single justification for all  rights makes the Will 
Theory a monist theory of rights, in opposition to the Interest Theory, that will be 
sketched out in next section.   
                                                
87 (Har t ,  1973,  pp .188-189,  c i ted  in  Celano ,  2001,  p .  20) .  
88 (P ino ,  2013,  p .  241) .  
89 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998a ,  p .  2 ) .  
90 (Har t ,  1973,  pp .  183-184,  c i ted  in  Celano ,  2001,  p .  21) .  
26 
 
Many different versions of the Choice Theory have been developed, and they all 
build on the following principles:  
-  for X to be a right-holder it  is necessary and sufficient that she can demand 
or waive the enforcement of the right91.  So the claimant and the right-holder 
necessarily overlap; 
-  rights do not necessarily, nor sufficiently, protect an interest or the 
wellbeing of the right-holder92,  other than her power to exercise control over 
the corresponding duty93.  So X, the right-holder, may or may not benefit 
from the realization of the duty. 
Its focus on choice-making makes the theory ill  suited to accept as rights-holders 
all  those subjects that cannot, legally or empirically, make decisions on their own. 
Therefore, children, mentally ill  and animals cannot be conceived as right-bearers 
because they cannot decide on the waiving or enforcing of a duty. Truth is that the 
classification of animals as rights-holders is very controversial,  but it  is even more 
controversial to affirm that children and mentally ill  people have no rights. This 
issue has not gone silent in the writings of adherents to the Will Theory. Many 
have replied to this criticism affirming that it  is sufficient that some other person 
is entitled, on children’s behalf,  to enforce or waive their rights94.  However, it  
disregards the fact that those entitled to act on the child’s behalf are most likely 
the bearer of most duties against her (parents or guardians), which creates quite a 
strong clash of interests.  Moreover many rights are today considered (morally and 
in many countries legally) un-disposable by anyone at all .  And here comes along 
another shortcoming of the Will Theory. It  cannot account for the existence of 
certain rights that are considered so important and vital that their holder cannot 
dispose of them, and cannot exercise this sovereign power on the duty bearer. In 
modern constitutional democracies, for example, there are sets of rights, as the 
right to freedom of expression and to freedom of religion, that are considered un-
disposable neither by the State nor by their holders. These rights are what is 
usually called fundamental or human rights: rights that defend interests of human 
beings so important that they cannot be disposed of by the State nor by their 
holders. For the Will Theory, once a right is secured as un-disposable, it  ceases to 
                                                
91 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998b,  p .  62) .  
92 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998a ,  p .  2 ) .  
93 (Celano ,  2001,  p .  27) .  
94 (MacCormick ,  1976,  p .  77) .  
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be a right, leading to the paradox, in Kramer’s words, that: «rights are no longer 
rights when they protect crucial interests unyieldingly»95.  
2.2.2. Interest (Benefit) Theory 
The Interest Theory, considered the main opponent to the Will/Choice Theory, has 
been developed initially by J. Bentham and then built  up by many other authors 
(among which David Lyons, Joseph Raz, Neil MacCormick, Matthew Kramer).  
The Interest Theory grows around the importance attributed to the interests of the 
right-holder. Rights are understood as means of protection of certain interests of 
their holders and are justified by the existence of an interest that is considered 
worth of protection96.  So for MacCormick: «having rights is having one’s interest 
protected in certain ways by the imposition of (legal or moral) normative 
constraints on the acts and activities of other people with respect to the object of 
one’s interest»97.  Raz defines rights as «legally protected interests»98 and writes 
that «X has a right if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, 
an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some 
other person(s) to be under a duty»99.  Who can be holders of rights? Which Xs “can 
have rights”? Raz argues that «an individual is capable of having rights if and only 
if either his wellbeing is of ultimate value»100.  That X’s wellbeing is of ultimate 
value means that X’s interests have an intrinsic value detached from their potential 
instrumental values101.  This view, Raz underlines, «does not commit one to 
individualism»102 because also «States, corporations and groups»103 as well as «the 
public»104 «may be rights-holders»105.  
For the Interest Theory, there is no need for the right-holder to be able to require 
the enforcing or waiving of the duty stemming from her right. Hence, the Interest 
Theory is able to embrace the idea of children and mentally ill  people as rights-
holders, because the ability to waive or demand the enforcement of a duty is not a 
requisite. It  can also account for the idea of unyielding rights, once more because 
there is no need for a right-holder to be able to give away her right.  
                                                
95 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998b,  p .  74) .  
96 (P ino ,  2013,  p .  241) .  
97 (MacCormick ,  1976,  p .  75) .  
98 (Raz ,  1984,  p .  12) .  
99 (Raz ,  1988,  p .  166) .  
100 (Raz ,  1988,  p .  166) .  
101 (Raz ,  1988,  p .  177) .  
102 (Raz ,  1988,  p .  180) .  
103 (Raz ,  1988,  p .  180) .  More  on  group r ights  a t  2 .3 .3 .  
104 (Raz ,  1988,  p .  179) .  
105 (Raz ,  1988,  p .  180) .  
28 
 
How do we distinguish in the Interest Theory a pure beneficiary of a duty, from a 
proper right holder? The right-holder is the subject whose interest justifies  the 
existence of the corresponding duty. Her interest is considered sufficiently 
important to cause the raise of a duty on someone else. The fulfilment of the duty 
may also benefit other subjects, but the fact that they benefit from the fulfilment 
of the duty does not justify the existence of the right (and consequently of the 
duty). If the interest of the right-holder ceases to be, the whole right ceases to be, 
and so all the corresponding duties and the benefits stemming from its existence106.  
So, for MacCormick, a right arises when a certain treatment or good is so 
important for the needs, interests or desires of the members of a certain group that 
it  shall be secured to them and it  would be legally and/or morally wrong to deny 
that good or treatment107,  regardless of the advantages or disadvantaged to someone 
else108.  The interests of the members of the group are the reason for the creation of 
the duty. The duty shall not arise from some other end, the instrumental value 
above mentioned, and then, accidentally, promote the interest of the group. 
MacCormick’s example with children and turkeys makes things very clear. We can 
say that there is a duty on a farmer to feed both his sons and turkeys: turkeys are 
to be fed to get fat and be eaten for Christmas, while kids are to be fed because it  
is a very important interest they have. The feeding occurs for the turkeys because 
their wellbeing is a means to an end – the Christmas lunch – while it  occurs for the 
children because their wellbeing is an end in itself109 (unless maybe we are talking 
about Hansel and Gretel being fed by a witch).  
So in the Interest Theory the point,  the justification for the existence of a right is 
not the protection of individual choices, but the protection of a specific range of 
interests (range that may change in each different legal system, culture or moral 
conception). The Interest Theory is in fact a pluralist theory, meaning that rights 
can be justified on the ground of different interests and values110.  The central idea 
of the Will Theory can be embraced by the Interest Theory by recognizing that,  
among the interests of the right-holder, there can also lay the interest of making a 
free and autonomous choice on the waiving or enforcing of the corresponding duty 
                                                
106 Bentham proposes  a  d i f fe ren t  ru le  to  d is t inguish  s imple  benef ic ia r ies  f rom rea l  r igh t -holders .  
He proposes  to  look  a t  the  e f fec ts  of  the  lack  of  compl iance  of  the  duty-bearer ,  Q ,  toward  P .  I f  
we can  es tab l ish  tha t  the  Q has  not  under taken  her  obl iga t ion  s imply  by  looking  a t  P’s  
de t r iment ,  then ,  for  Bentham,  P  i s  to  be  cons idered  a  r igh t -holder  (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998b,  
p .  81) .   
107 (Celano ,  2001,  pp .  37–38) .  
108 (MacCormick ,  1976,  p .  80) .  
109 (MacCormick ,  1976,  p .  80) .  
110 (Celano ,  2001,  p .  41) .  
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(hybridization of the two theories of rights)111.  To go back to the right of P to have 
brought coffee every morning by Q, the justification may be found in different 
interests of P. It  may be the interest of P to have Q doing something for her every 
morning, or it  may be the interest of P to have coffee every morning, or it  can be 
the interest of P to require the enforcement or to dismiss the duty of Q. Depending 
on the protected interest,  the right may react differently to the change of 
circumstances, something that may not happen in the Will Theory. As we saw, in 
the Will Theory, protection is granted on, and only on, the specific duty of Q 
towards P. If there is no Q, there is no right of P that can be fulfilled. In the 
Interest Theory instead, if for example, the protected interest is for P to have 
coffee every morning, if Q is away, P’s right could be fulfilled by Z bringing 
coffee every morning or even by P being donated a coffee maker for her office. 
For many authors, among which Raz112 and MacCormick113,  P can be said to hold a 
right even if there is no specified duty-bearer yet,  as long as some interest of P is 
recognized worth of determining duties and obligations on others (whether they 
are enforceable or not)114.  For  other  authors  instead, as for Bentham, P can be said 
to hold a right if,  and only if,  Q, the holder of the duty, has already been 
specified115.   
Kramer distilled what he considers the essential elements of the Interest theory, 
common to all its different versions. 
-  For P to hold a right, it  is necessary but not sufficient that the right 
preserves one or more interests of P116.  So every right-holder is a beneficiary 
of a duty, yet,  not all  beneficiaries are right-holders117.   
-  The duty due to P has to be “generally supportive”118 of P’s interests in order 
for P to be considered a right-holder and not simply the subject of someone 
else’s duty. So the duty shall benefit the right-holder, increasing her 
(material,  spiritual) wellbeing. Of course this assumption requires an 
evaluative analysis of what is good and what is bad for a person. For this 
reason, Kramer uses the expression “generally” supportive and not “always” 
supportive. Some people may, in fact,  perceive one of their legal rights as 
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detrimental to their interests. Or it  may also be the case that,  in a particular 
situation, a right may actually have negative consequences for the right-
holder119.  So, rights are “normally” advantageous, but they may not always 
be so120.   
-  For P to be a right-holder it  is not necessary that P can demand or waive the 
enforcement of the right121.  So a right-holder may or may not also be a 
claim-holder. 
2.2.1. Analysis of Rights 
The Theory of Rights that is going to be adopted in the present work is the Interest 
Theory of rights, both because it  seems to be for the moment the mostly accepted 
one, and because it  seems the most appropriate to analyse the theoretical construct 
of biocultural rights. Biocultrual rights, in fact,  are built  around the aim to protect 
two different interests which are the justifications of biocultural rights. This 
analysis will be hybridized with Hohfeld theory. Hohfeldian legal positions will be 
used as the bricks inside rights. Rights will be considered justifications for the 
existence of clusters of Hohfeldian positions whose content may change depending 
on the situation, rather than as static pre-sets of legal positions necessary linked to 
their correlatives122.   
Pino describes rights as having a triad structure composed by: the subjects who 
hold the right, the subjects that hold the corresponding legal position (may it  be a 
duty, a lack-of-right, an immunity or a disability) and the content of the right123.  
For the purpose of the present analysis, two more elements are taken in 
consideration: the claimants and the protected interest(s).  Each of these elements 
will be briefly described, and then biocultural rights will be analysed using these 
elements and the difficulties and controversies of this process will be observed. 
Protected interests 
The protected interests are the values that underpin each right. They are the 
justification it  stems from, they are their raison d’être .  The right, with its cluster 
                                                
119 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998b,  p .  97) .  
120 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998b,  p .  93) .  
121 (Mat thew H Kramer ,  1998b,  p .  62) .  
122 As  S immonds  wr i tes  expla in ing  Raz’s  and  MacCormick’s  pos i t ions  concern ing  Hohfe ld  
theory :  «  […] a  r igh t  i s  a  weighty  in te res ts  which  may be  pro tec ted ,  in  appropr ia te  
c i rcumstances ,  by  an  ar ray  of  Hohfe ld ian  c la im-r ights ,  l iber t ies ,  powers  and  immuni t ies :  in  
e f fec t ,  Hohfe ld  confuses  “ r ights”  wi th  spec i f ic  devices  whereby  they  are  pro tec ted» (S immonds ,  
2008,  pp .  305–306) .  
123 (P ino ,  2013,  p .  229) .  
31 
 
of Hohfeldian positions, exists to protect the interest of a person, a group of 
people, a minority, the whole human population, future generations, and for some 
scholars, animal, plants, or the planet.   
It  is also important to notice that the interests might, and most often do, conflict 
with the interests protected by other rights124.  
Right-holders 
The right holder is the person, or group of people, to whom the right is 
recognized. She is the holder of the interests that are protected by the right. She 
may or may not be also the claimant and may or may not be the sole beneficiary of 
the realization of the right.  
Claimants 
The claimants are those empowered to require the enforcing or the waiving of a 
right. They may also be right-holders, but for the Interest Theory they do not need 
to.  
Duty-bearers 
The duty-bearer is the person, or group of people, who shall or shall not perform 
an act or provide/not provide a good for the benefit of the right-holder. The duty-
bearer of a right might or might not be already specified.  
Content of the right 
The content of the right is the set of actions that the duty-bearer shall or shall not 
perform, and/or a good and/or a way things ought to be. The content of a right has 
to be something normally beneficial for the right-holder, though in some cases it  
might happen that the content of the right harms the interests of the right-holder.  
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Chapter 2.3. A Special Type of Rights: Human Rights 
2.3.1. What are Human Rights? 
Certain rights are considered to have a particular status, to be special and 
somehow more powerful than others. This is the status commonly recognized to 
“human rights” or “fundamental rights”. Literature on human rights is wide and 
heterogeneous, as there still  seems to be little agreement on their definition, 
content and, in some cases, on their very existence. 
In order to provide a brief account of human rights, it  is wise to walk back to their 
origins. The idea of human rights emerged, in the form we know today, between 
the XVII and XVIII centuries within the European struggles against the privileges 
of the ancien régime .  They were used as rhetorical arguments based upon three 
“new” ideas: 1) the idea that all  human beings, because they are human beings, are 
holders of certain rights; 2) the idea that such rights are fundamentally important; 
3) and the idea that the holder of such fundamentally important rights is himself 
the reason for the existence of the State. Looking more in detail at these three 
ideas, it  is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the notion of human rights 
as we know it today, and it  may help us examine the concept of biocultural rights.  
1) Human rights are rights «that we have simply in virtue of being human»125,  and 
not because of other characteristics one might have - race, citizenship, gender, 
class, etc. All such characteristics are considered accidental and irrelevant for the 
recognition of human rights. This plea stems from the XVII centuries Natural Law 
philosophers and lies at the core of the French and American revolutions. Natural 
characteristics, such as talent, beauty and skills,  are considered irrelevant for the 
attribution of human rights: all  human beings equally hold such rights, in the same 
way and to the same degree126.  This brings out two of the main characteristics of 
human rights: their being universal (applicable to everyone) and egalitarian (the 
same for everyone). 
2) Certain rights are fundamentally important. Following what John Tasioulas calls 
the orthodox  conception of human rights127,  human rights are moral rights held by 
all human beings that concern interests and goods, essential to protect the core of 
being human. For James Griffin human rights are protections of human standing, 
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of personhood128.  For Alan Gewirth human rights are the necessary conditions for 
human agency, the central characteristic of being human129:  agents need them to 
pursue their purposes130.  Precisely because they protect very important interests, 
they need a special protection. They do not appear as normal rights, but as 
specially secured ones which, as such, are: inviolable ,  their violation is never 
justified; inalienable ,  they cannot be waived nor transferred to others, not even 
with the consent of the holder; imprescriptible ,  they do not cease to be even if 
their holder does not exercise them or is not aware of them131.  
Following the political  conception132 instead, human rights are not moral entities, 
but political entities. They are rights that «set the limits to the sovereignty of 
States»133 and are a sufficient reason to act against violations in the international 
arena, even at the cost of the sovereignty of States. This conception rests on the 
assumptions that human rights lack a foundation in a moral concern and do not 
belong to people solely in virtue of their being human134.  Human rights are seen as 
dependent on the contingencies of national and international systems135 and as 
deriving from relationships between people as participants in global politics136.  
They are understood as standards to be respected and to be used to judge 
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institutions of modern societies137.  This conception links us to the next idea, 
concerning the relationship between human rights and States.  
3) Human rights are the justification for the existence of the State, or other 
governing bodies, and are, as such, the criteria to evaluate its legitimacy138.  This 
idea was clearly professed by the French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du 
citoyen ,  1789, that stated that «the purpose of all  political association is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man», and by the 
American Declaration of Independence, 1776, where governments are said to be 
established to ensure to all people the inalienable rights conferred by the Creator. 
Soon after the revolutions this idea was pushed aside, at least in Europe, by the 
success of the Rechtsstaat ,  that placed the legitimacy and source of the law in the 
State itself.  Human rights became subject to the will of the State, existing only if 
recognized by it .  The Law and the State gained priority over rights and 
individuals. After the end of World War II,  the model of the Rechtsstaat  was 
abandoned in favour of a new model, that found legitimation and reason for being 
precisely in the protection of human rights: the Constitutional State. In their new 
raise, human rights become trumps139 against the power of State: they are 
individual claims vis à vis States, used to protect individuals against the excesses 
and degenerations of the power of the State. And they become the justification of 
the very existence of the State. This change in the role of human rights vis à vis  
States is what Noberto Bobbio, in his article Il primato dei diritti  sui doveri ,  
refers to as a Copernican Revolution140.  Recalling Kant’s use of the term, Bobbio 
describes it  as the inversion of the point of observation, from the perspective of 
duties to the perspective of rights141.  He recognizes an intrinsic correlation 
between rights and duties but, he argues, there is always one of the two that is 
prevailing over the other: as a father over a son, or the head over the tail  of a coin. 
Up until the above-mentioned Revolutions, and again during the ruling of the 
Rechtsstaat ,  the history of human politics has been characterized by the prevalence 
of duties over rights142.  «At the beginning», he writes, «there is always a code of 
duties (or obligations), not of rights»143.  Laws established what shall be done and 
what shall not be done for the sake of the State, of the community. Duties and 
obligations were not imposed for the benefit of individuals, to guarantee the 
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respect of their interests, but instead to safeguard the whole of society. In this 
holistic perspective, society is a unit whose conservation and wellbeing comes 
before the interest of individuals. Bobbio brings the example of laws against 
murders, aimed at protecting the integrity and the peace of the group rather than 
the lives of human beings – which is why such laws often did not forbid the killing 
of outsiders144.  
Bobbio’s Copernican Revolution  is completed with the advent of Constitutional 
Democracies, where the holistic perspective is replaced by an individualistic  
perception of society. Here the single human being has a value in itself that must 
be preserved through the respect of her human rights. The State changes its role: 
from guardian of society as a whole, it  becomes, at least in theory, guardian of the 
individual and his human rights. Duties hence turn into the tail  of the coin, and 
serve as tools for the realization of rights, the head.  
Similarly, Lombardi Vallauri describes a transition from man as a subject of the 
Law to man as the raison d’être  of the Law that culminates with Constitutional 
Democracies. Luigi Lombardi Vallauri sets this transition at the end of the Middle 
Age and the beginning of what he calls modern technological scientism (or 
materialism)145:  the ideology of dominance of man over the world, natural,  
psychological and social.  While the ancient man found himself in front of an 
unchangeable world that originated from something superior to humans, modern 
man, thanks to the power of science and technology, perceives the world and 
nature as something that can be modified as he pleases. Under the ancient vision, 
just like nature and the world are unchangeable products of a superior being, Law 
is as well.  Law is revelation, a manifestation of divine wisdom. Law is natural.  
And, as all revelations, it  is incontestable and un-modifiable. In the hands of kings 
and Emperors, Law sets duties and obligations on individuals, which shall be 
respected for the sake of the State and of the society. With the coming of modern 
age, and of technological scientism, Lombardi Vallauri describes a man that begins 
to consider himself powerful over nature and independent from divinity. Law 
ceases to be a revelation, stemming from someone superior to man. It  becomes the 
product of human authority and its will,  and as such it  can be contested and 
modified. Men, unlike nature-divinity, can be wrong, and can become oppressive 
trough unreasonable uses of Law. Hence it  comes the need to find ways to limit 
human authority and its rule. Such limits are found, for Lombardi Vallauri,  in 
Constitutional Democracies, whose central principle is the limitation of sovereign 
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power146 trough the imposition of instruments aimed at protecting human rights. 
Human rights, as remedies against humans’ error, were not needed until  the power 
and the law were perceived as being in the hands of nature-divinity. They come 
into being when the sovereign power is not anymore bound to the respect of the 
divine will and men need to be protected from the excesses of other men’s power.  
2.3.2. Some Issues Concerning Human Rights 
From the merging of these ideas, human rights emerge as rights that protect 
particularly important human interests. So important to be recognized equally to 
all human beings because they protect the specific features of each human subject,  
regardless of his or her ethnicity, citizenship, gender, age, class, social status, 
physical and mental condition, etc. They are so important to be considered 
inviolable, inalienable and imprescriptible. And so important that no State or other 
governing body may be considered legitimate if persistently violating them or 
allowing their violation; so important to be the raison d’être  of the State – in 
particular of Constitutional Democracies –, and to trump over political and 
economic considerations. In Dworkin elaboration, human rights are cards, trumps, 
which win over considerations of general interests147.  Rights protect human interest 
considered so fundamental to be entitled to change the course of political 
decisions. Those individual interests trump  over the interest of the community as a 
whole148 and lead to decisions different from those that collective goals would have 
led to149.  
Conflicting human rights 
Are human rights really inviolable? Is their violation never justified? Prima facie ,  
after our brief account of their relevance for human beings one may think it  
obvious to argue that they should be treated, always, as inviolable. Nevertheless, 
we must be able to face a situation of conflict not only between human rights and 
policies, or other kinds of interests, but also between human rights themselves. 
Which means that the interests justifying two or more rights cannot be protected 
simultaneously or/and that the duties implied by two or more rights cannot be 
performed simultaneously150.  
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What to do when rights conflict? The most diffuse technique  to face such 
conflicts,  widely used in constitutional argumentations, is balancing151.  It  is a 
process of weighting rights against each other in order to decide which should 
prevail over the other and to what extent each shall be restricted. Two main 
objections have been raised against balancing. The first objection concerns the 
technique of balancing itself.  It  is a non-rational technique, it  is a rhetoric 
technique, which may be used to reach almost any result152.  It  simply hides value-
decisions under an appearance of correctness, «it is nothing more than an arbitrary 
and rash Solomonic settlement»153.  Robert Alexy has proposed a system of 
rationalized balancing that,  even if it  cannot make predictable all  its results,  shows 
how balancing somehow constrains to a rational process154.  He suggests a systems 
based on the principle of proportionality, which requires to treat rights as 
“optimization requirements”155 and which is composed of three sub-principles: 
principles of suitability, necessity, and proportionality strictu sensu156.  However, 
balancing remains a process that cannot be turned in completely technical because 
it  will always include a less predictable, and not based on simple logic, side: the 
moral judgement on the weight of the conflicting rights. This problem is linked to 
a second type of critique that is advanced against balancing: human rights are 
objective entities and decisions about them should be treated as either right or 
wrong157.  Balancing instead is a process of weighting between values, that does not 
lead to right or wrong results,  because it  moves in the realm of subjectivity, where 
things depend on points of view, and in particular depend on value-judgments 
about which right is more important and which is to be restricted the most. 
Whether or not we can accept the fact that balancing is a technique that concerns 
values, interests, benefits and weights158 depends on our conception of the 
relationship among human rights, on which two main theories have been 
developed.  
-  Irenist  theories159:  fundamental rights are a coherent and ordered system, hence 
there are no real conflicts between them.  
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- Monist declination: the human rights system can be read under one principle 
that gives us answers about which right prevails on the others in a certain 
situation; 
- Minimum core declination: human rights are only a small core of rights, which 
is precise, determined, binding and non-conflicting. This declination usually 
excludes social rights and new generation rights. 
-  Illusory conflict declination: the real meanings of rights are not conflicting. 
They only appear as such because of their theoretical formulations. 
-  Pluralist  theories160:  human rights are not a coherent system with a determined 
order or a fixed hierarchy. Hence conflicts are real. 
For irenist theories balancing may lead to revealing the real true hierarchy existing 
between two or more rights, or to unveiling the fact that the conflict is illusory, or 
to reminding which the real core rights are161.  Pluralist theories instead regard 
balancing as a necessary technique, required to determine, case by case, the most 
appropriate hierarchy among conflicting interests and to determine which rights 
bend for another. Pluralist theories seem to be more appropriate to describe the 
realities of human rights. Rights are the results of complex historical and cultural 
processes that reflect heterogeneous values, ideals, and interests. They are not the 
product of a reasoned system created to be comprehensive and coherent. Hence, 
choosing a pluralist conception, balancing of rights and interests is necessary, 
even though it  may appear as a shortcut to resolve moral problems162.  
Everyone’s rights?  
Is it  adequate to think of human rights as blankly universal ,  i .e.  identical for every 
person, whatever internal and external characteristics they might have? Debate on 
this question is still  wide open on many fronts, as many challenge the idea that 
human rights are independent from epoch, culture and place, and challenge the 
idea that human rights are only and always individual-centred. The practice and 
rhetoric of human rights have evolved in ways that partially overcome such blank 
universality .  Bobbio describes this evolution as being characterized by four main 
steps that end with the current specialization ,  as opposite to universalization ,  of 
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human rights163.  Initially, he says, in the XVII century’s Europe, the Natural Law 
theory abolished differences between citizens and non-citizens, and between 
people belonging to different social classes through the myth of the state of 
nature,  and declared all human beings (or at least all  those perceived as such) 
holders of the same rights. During the Revolutions and in the two following 
centuries human rights become legal rights, embedded in Constitutions, and 
therefore lose their theoretical universality and are restricted only to the citizens 
of the State. After World War II,  and in particular since the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenants 
(1966), human rights encountered a new wave of universalization .  They became 
part of the global political agenda and turned into standards for assessments, 
criticism, aspiration and evaluation of political and economic organizations164,  to 
the point of becoming, as Charles Beitz argues, a global concern ,  whose 
«systematic violation in a society over a period of time could justify some 
appropriate form of remedial action by agents outside of the society where the 
violation occurs»165.  
The last of the steps described by Bobbio witnesses the ri-emergence of 
differences  in human rights rhetoric166.  Differences become the justification for the 
recognition of different rights to certain categories. Human beings, all  recognized 
as equal holders of dignity and personhood, are perceived as holders of specific 
needs on the ground of gender, age, and other conditions, precisely to uphold their 
dignity and personhood. At the international level,  many Declarations and 
Conventions are adopted to promote the rights of women, children, minorities, 
disabled, and, among them, indigenous peoples. 
Is it  possible to consider these rights as human  rights? Aren’t the latter,  by 
definition, rights belonging to all  humans? It does not help to think that every 
person was a child, everyone can become aged and might acquire some disabilities. 
It  is in fact quite unlikely (though maybe not impossible) for a man to become a 
woman or for a Londoner to turn into an indigenous community member. However, 
these specific rights ultimately protect very important interests essential for the 
dignity and personhood of these specific people. In order to protect and uphold 
dignity and personhood, certain people have special needs and interests to be 
guarded. For example, the women’s rights movement started in the second half of 
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the XIX century with the request to abolish all differences between men and 
women, so to all  be recognized the same rights167.  In the XX century, the movement 
changed strategy and began to underline gender differences in order to obtain the 
recognition of specific rights, rights which might be meaningless for men (as those 
connected to pregnancy) but which are essential for the protection of women’s 
dignity and personhood. The same can be said for indigenous peoples’ rights. They 
are rights reserved to a specific category of people, and may appear as 
discriminating towards all other human beings. But it  is exactly the particular 
characteristics of indigenous peoples that have led to the recognition of certain 
specific  human rights to protect and uphold their dignity and personhood168.  
Critics to human rights 
The critique of the universalism of human rights does not end with the recognition 
of differentiated rights for different categories of human beings. Another 
important question that has been raised concerns whether it  is appropriate to talk 
about human rights in the global arena, where cultures are very heterogeneous and 
differ deeply from Western 169 culture, where the concept of human rights  has 
evolved. The world is made of cultures where the content and sometimes even the 
concept of human rights appear theoretically and practically problematic170.  Those 
who challenge the idea of human rights as applicable to everyone everywhere, 
referred to as relativists ,  accuse supporters of the opposite approach to promote a 
system created by Western countries to perpetuate their political and cultural 
hegemony trough the imposition of alien ideas on different legal and cultural 
systems.  
For example, Ronal Niezen171 argues that indigenous peoples «challenge the 
exclusively individualistic approach to human rights and stand apart from the 
usual prescription of human rights on the basis of individual protection»172.  The 
engagement of indigenous peoples in a global movement for the recognition of 
rights is considered by Niezen a political strategy in order to fight the political,  
economic and cultural dominance of States. In order to do so, indigenous peoples 
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have had to learn to use Western  instruments and speak their language, i .e.  the 
language of written law and human rights. Human rights have been conceived 
since their beginning as individual rights, as means for the protection of certain 
interests and needs of individual subjects173.  They are individual rights recognized 
to all  individuals but as single, self-standing entities. Indigenous claims, instead, 
focus on collective human rights,  or group rights, as an instrument for the 
protection of peoplehood 174,  rather than of personhood. This transformation may 
indeed influence the mainstream debate on human rights, for instance joining other 
movements that promote a shift towards collective, rather than individual, rights, 
such as communitarianism175.  
In the last 20 years there has been a return of the centrality of the idea of 
community. The political philosophers that have been called, mostly by their 
critics176,  communitarians ,  have rediscovered the existence and importance of 
communities, as something to be preserved and enhanced because of their role in 
the construction of the identity of human beings.  Communities are perceived as the 
locus  of development of human beings through the sharing of common practices, 
social understandings and cultural traditions177.  This set of shared assets is 
perceived as the ground for the construction of common values, principles and 
ideas of justice. Communitarians refuse the idea of the existence of one single 
theory of justice, abstract from any community and applicable, universally ,  to all  
human beings. 
Communitarians do not have aspirations towards the neutrality of the State, 
common in liberal philosophers and politicians. In liberal philosophers theories, 
the neutral State should promote the self-determination of its citizens. Each 
individual is considered free to self-determine its path to wellbeing, to follow its 
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preferences, regardless of common practices178.  Individuals can question roles 
generated by economic, social,  religious, sexual or other relationships179.  Along 
with the Kantian view, each person shall pursue her own ends, and be an end in 
herself.  Communitarians, instead, picture a State that leads its citizens towards a 
certain way of life, the way that conforms to the shared conception of “good life”, 
the way that follows the common practices, beliefs and principles of the 
community. The purpose of individual actions is not ones’ private good but the 
common good of the community. Therefore social roles and rules shall be accepted 
and followed, not questioned – especially not to the extent of harming the survival 
of the community and of its way of life. But what is the «scope and scale of the 
community they refer to»180? Is it  possible to divide the world in distinct cultures, 
one for every community and therefore deduct the roles and rules that each person 
shall follow from such a division? Jeremy Waldron argues that it  is more 
appropriate to describe each person as belonging to a mix of cultures, that he calls 
a “cosmopolitan community”181.   
In order to learn from communitarian theories without assenting completely to 
them, Will Kymlicka suggests looking at them as involving two different strains. 
A first conservative strain that looks backward, to a past where society functioned 
better and had not yet been eroded by the «increasingly aggressive assertion of 
individual and group diversity […] such as feminism, gay rights and 
multiculturalism»182 that undermine the sense of community. This first strain is a 
camouflage of traditional conservatism, necessary clashing with the recognition of 
individual autonomy and freedom183.  The second strain, instead, does not rest on 
“illiberal values”184.  It  is concerned with the survival of «bonds of ethical 
community in an era of individual choice»; it  accepts that we live in multicultural 
societies and attempts to give centrality to culture and community other then to 
individual wills and desires. This second strain of communitarianism, though often 
blended with the first strain, is very valuable because it  raises important questions 
in the debate on human rights. 
For the purpose of this thesis it  not necessary to part for or against communitarian, 
relativist or universalist thesis. It  was although necessary to give a brief account 
of them in order to place biocultural rights in the current human rights debate.  
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2.3.3. Groups’ Rights as Human Rights 
From individual rights to groups’ rights 
Regardless of their many critiques, the challenges communitarians have posed to 
the liberal conception of human rights have fuelled the debate on new ways to 
understand human rights. Particularly relevant for this research is the idea of 
human rights as group rights. From the moment the role that communities play for 
the development and wellbeing of each individual subject has gained centrality, it  
has been advanced a call to provide communities themselves some type of 
protection in the form of collective, or group, rights.  
As we saw above, human rights are born as universal individual rights, recognized 
to every person, regardless of other characteristics. However, they then 
encompassed rights of specific categories of people, as women, children and 
indigenous peoples: hence rights that belong to certain groups of people, rather 
then to everyone. The term group rights describes «rights held by a group as a 
group rather than by its members severally»185.  They shall not be confused with the 
rights held only by the members of a certain group and not by the rest of 
humankind. So for example women’s rights are not rights of women as a group but 
rather are individual rights ascribed to a category of people, a group, that share 
certain characteristics considered relevant for the entitlement of certain rights. 
The relevance of their special rights does not stem from their being a group but 
rather from being individuals with particular characteristics. An imaginary last 
woman on Earth would still  be a woman whose interests would need to be 
protected by reference to special women rights.  
The key questions concerning groups and rights are: 1) can groups be right-
holders; 2) may group rights threaten the rights of individuals? 
1) The first question can be split  into two parts: whether groups have the 
necessary characteristics to be right-holders; and whether group rights protect 
something that goes beyond the sum of the interests of the group members, or are 
«ultimately reducible to the interests of their individual members»186.  
For what concerns the first issue, James Nickel suggests that most ethnic groups, 
in particular those without territories, lack two requisites to be right holders: 
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effective agency  and clear identity 187.  They, Nickel argues, are often not able, as a 
group to form and pursue goals and evaluate actions and strategies, gather 
information and recognizing and following norms188;  and they often do not have 
clear boundaries, hence it  not being possible to determine who is a member and 
who is not. However he does not completely discharge the idea that certain groups 
may have such requisites and may therefore be right-holders. In particular, he 
suggests that ethnic minorities, such as indigenous peoples, may have such 
characterises even though they, especially at the beginning of their struggles to 
obtain recognition, might not yet be able to fully exercise them without the 
support of external agents (such as non-governmental organizations and 
international agencies).  
For what concerns the second issue, Vernon Van Dyke suggests that certain group 
rights might be reducible to the individual rights of their members, while others, 
such as the right to self-determination, cannot be reduced and belong to “groups as 
corporate units”189.  It  is illogic and unjust,  he argues, to recognize the existence of 
rights and duties of States while not those of ethnic communities190 because certain 
communities have interests that are not the mere aggregation of the interests of 
their members. Michael Hartney argues the opposite. For him, all  group rights are 
reducible to individual rights. The right to self-determination is a good to be 
preserved because it  benefits the members of the group whose self-determination 
is recognized191.  Hartney argues that «only the lives of individual human beings 
have ultimate value, and [therefore] collective entities derive their value from 
their contribution to the lives of individual human beings»192.   
It  might always be possible to find an individual interest correlative to a group 
interest,  or a community interest.  The right to self-determination does benefit also 
the single members of a community. What matters however, when we talk about 
group rights, is not to make sure that there are not individual interests protected 
thereby. What really matters is to understand if a certain group right is more than 
the sum of the rights of its members. The right to self-determination, for instance, 
has a different meaning if attributed to a community or to a person. An individual 
right to self-determination concerns the right to determine the path of his or her 
life. The right to self-determination of a group, instead, concerns the control over 
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the destiny of the collective life of the group, not the mere sum of the lives of its 
members193.  If one or more members of the group (self-)determine to leave the 
group, they are not exercising the right to self-determination of the group, but 
their own right. If the assembly or the leader of the group (self-)determine to 
dismiss the group, or to change its name or location, or to adopt new rules, they 
are exercising the right to self-determination of the group and are doing things 
that no single member has the right to do. Group rights are rights that belong to a 
certain community regardless of who the members are: if  one or more members 
leave the group or new people join it ,  the holder of the group rights remains 
unchanged because it  is the group itself,  not its members194.  
2) The second question concerns the fact that if groups have rights not reducible to 
the rights of their members, then these two sets of rights may be in conflict195 and 
the rights of the individuals within the group may be threatened196.  In order to 
overcome this potential conflict and in order to protect the centrality of individual 
rights, Kymlicka suggests to look at group rights predominantly as rights directed 
outwardly - as protection from other groups - rather then inwardly – towards the 
members of the groups197.  This especially when dealing with non-voluntary groups 
whose membership is not properly chosen, such as ethnic and linguistic groups. 
While it  is true that group rights, especially if directed towards the members of a 
group, can be source of oppression and unjust treatments, it  is also true that it  
depends on the content of the rights198 and on the structure of the group. As Peter 
Jones notes, «the right of a group collectively to make decisions that bind its 
members severally is a simple description of democracy»199.  There is no logical 
impossibility to affirm that groups can hold rights, also directed inwardly. 
Moreover, it  should be kept in mind that also individual rights may conflict with 
other individual rights, and that forms of balancing are needed just as much as 
they are needed to regulate potential conflicts between group rights and individual 
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rights, or between the rights of different groups. Finally, as Jones notes, there are 
certain individual rights that need group rights to be pursued successfully200.  For 
example the right of a member of an indigenous people to enjoy a life in a 
flourishing indigenous community that pursues its own ends on the ground of its 
customary laws and spiritual beliefs, needs the recognition and enforcement of the 
group right to self-determination. 
Are there certain types of groups that are more than others in the position to be 
justly entitled such rights? Usually, ethnic groups (including cultural minorities) 
are the focus of group rights discussion. Thomas Pogge argues that ethnic groups 
should not be favoured in the distribution of group-specific rights over groups of 
other types201.  Moving from «the ideal of treating all citizens as equals, regardless 
of their identifications and affiliations»202 he opposes treating some types of 
groups as «more valuable then others». Pogge suggests that group-specific rights 
«can be justified as compensation for unfair disadvantages that groups and their 
members suffer in comparison to others»203,  regardless of whether they are ethnic 
or non-ethnic groups. Anaya, responds to Pogge’s suggestion underlining that 
«effective realization of equality requires in many instances differential treatment 
of ethnic groups in ways not necessary for, or even relevant to, other types of 
groups»204.  Ethnic groups, Anaya argues, are «defined substantially by distinctive 
cultural attributes»205 and the flourishing of diverse cultures is a value protected by 
human rights law206.  Because of their diversity, that may extend to encompass 
political economic realms207,  minority cultural groups are in fact in particularly 
vulnerable positions and for this reason need special protection. The most relevant 
group right of ethnic minorities, and in particular of indigenous peoples, is the 
right to self-determination. A brief account of the rights to self-determination of 
indigenous peoples given in the next section. 
Group rights and indigenous peoples: the right to self-determination  
The the UN Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights208 
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recognize the right to self-determination to all  peoples. However, who are the 
“peoples” to whom the right is recognized and what does the right entail is not yet 
clear in the international political arena209.   
Anaya identifies self-determination with «a universe of human rights precepts 
concerned broadly with peoples, including indigenous peoples, and grounded in 
the idea that all  are equally entitled to control their own destinies»210.  The right to 
self-determination of indigenous peoples has been object of many studies, in 
particular since the 1986 UN Study on the Problems of Discriminations Against 
Indigenous Peoples. «Indigenous representatives have repeatedly stressed that they 
view the recognition of their right to self-determination as essential for their 
survival»211.  As Anaya very simply and clearly explains: «today indigenous peoples 
seek to roll back the inequalities lingering from historical patterns and defeat the 
contemporary barriers to the ability to flourish as distinct communities on lands to 
which their cultures remain attached»212.  The two most common arguments used by 
indigenous peoples to ask for the recognition of self-determination rights are: its 
recognition is a «formal proclamation of denouncing the policies of destruction 
and assimilation that they have experiences in the past»213;  and self-determination 
is necessary for the diversity of their cultures to continue to flourish and develop 
along with their cultural,  social,  legal and economic principles and endogenous 
paths. For what concerns local communities it  is instead necessary to draw a 
separation line. Almost all  studies have focused on self-determination of 
indigenous peoples rather then local communities because the latter have only 
recently appeared in the international political and legal arena. As will be analysed 
below214,  local communities are still  usually referred to as holders of rights only in 
relation to their role as environmental stewards215.  Hence there still  is little work 
on local communities’ right to self-determination. Even though, as done by the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights, local communities have sometimes been 
associated to indigenous peoples as rights-holders, most legal and political 
documents refer only to the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples. As 
underlined below216,  biocultural rights could be used as a tool to extend certain 
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aspects of the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples to local 
communities. However, this section focuses only on the right to self-determination 
of indigenous peoples. 
The term, because of its immediate association with decolonization and 
independence movements, is often associated with secessionism, militaristic and 
peace threatening ethno-nationalism, and conflicts between minorities217.  A wide 
open recognition of the right to self-determination to all peoples would endanger 
the political stability and territorial integrity of States as it  would justify claims – 
also military claims – for independence and secession all around the globe. Many 
States have in fact revealed the fear that also the recognition of the right to self-
determination to indigenous peoples may threat their territorial integrity218.  For 
this reasons, many indigenous rights’ advocates, among which predominantly 
Anaya, have underlined that indigenous peoples have been pushing for a different 
type of self-determination that does not entails secession and independence219.  
Self-determination is called for as the overarching right, the prerequisite for the 
realization of all  other indigenous rights, but not in the form commonly known as 
external  self-determination, the act by which a people regulates its international 
status free from alien rule. Indigenous peoples have, instead, predominantly been 
claiming for internal  self-determination. Internal self-determination is aimed at 
asserting identities, preserving languages, cultures, and practices and at 
maintaining traditional governance structures220.  Looking at it  closely, as suggested 
by Anaya, the dichotomy internal/external self-determination is sometimes ill-
suited to picture the calls of indigenous peoples. External self-determination is not 
really relevant for indigenous peoples and internal self-determination is too 
narrowly focused on political participation to the government of a State221.  Instead, 
indigenous peoples are precisely those communities that do not necessarily fall 
within the borders of States, and find themselves across borders of different 
States. For this reason, Anaya argues that indigenous peoples need a special type 
of self-determination that goes beyond the relationship vis à vis  national States. 
The UNDRIP suggests ways of understanding self-determination in line with the 
ILO Convention 169, which recognizes indigenous aspirations «to exercise control 
over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to 
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the 
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framework of the States in which they live»222,  but which does not recognise self-
determination rights. Article 3 of the UNDRIP describes the right to self-
determination of indigenous peoples as the right to determine their political status 
and pursue their economic, social and cultural development goals without the need 
to create independent States. Moreover, UNDRIP underlines rights of indigenous 
peoples as members  of the States where they reside: right to citizenship (art.  6),  
right to consultation before adoption and implementation of legislations and 
policies that may affect them (art.  19223).  Article 5 brings together self-
determination and State sovereignty affirming that the right to distinct institutions 
does not impede their right to participate to State institutions224.  And finally, the 
closing article explicitly refuses any action that may dismember the territorial or 
political integrity of sovereign states (art.  46225).  
Anaya suggests to look at the right to self-determination as composed of five core 
elements, without which it  cannot be fully realized: non-discrimination, cultural 
integrity, access to lands and resources, social welfare and development, self-
government. 
Non-discrimination .  This principle is recognized in most international declarations 
and convention on human rights: the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the 
International Covenants, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discriminations, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Minorities. It  is the foundation of the protection of the rights of minority groups226,  
because it  requires the recognition of equal rights to all ,  including minorities, and 
because it  calls for the recognition of special rights  to minorities. Non-
discrimination  moves from the assumption that only through the recognition of 
such rights minorities can be assured to have de facto  equal protection for their 
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d is t inc t  po l i t ica l ,  lega l ,  economic ,  soc ia l  and  cu l tura l  ins t i tu t ions ,  whi le  re ta in ing  the i r  r igh t  to  
par t ic ipa te  fu l ly ,  i f  they  so  choose ,  in  the  pol i t ica l ,  economic ,  soc ia l  and  cu l tura l  l i fe  of  the  
S ta te» .  
225 Ar t ic le  46  UNDRIP:  «Noth ing  in  th is  Declara t ion  may be  in te rpre ted  as  imply ing  for  any  
S ta te ,  people ,  g roup or  person  any  r igh t  to  engage  in  any  ac t iv i ty  or  to  perform any ac t  contrary  
to  the  Char te r  of  the  Uni ted  Nat ions  or  cons t rued  as  au thor iz ing  or  encouraging  any  ac t ion  
which  would  d ismember  or  impair ,  to ta l ly  or  in  par t ,  the  te r r i to r ia l  in tegr i ty  or  po l i t ica l  un i ty  of  
sovere ign  and  independent  S ta tes» .  
226 (Bloch ,  2001,  p .  376) .  
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interests, needs and identity and «for the preservation of those characteristics and 
traditions which distinguish them from the majority of the population»227.  
Cultural integrity .  It  addresses the need of every person to take part in the cultural 
life of her own community, to participate to its development, to use and practice 
its language, religion, art,  customs and scientific and literary production228.  In 
particular, articles 8, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 31229 of UNDRIP call to the respect of 
indigenous cultural heritage (which includes: knowledge of lands and their natural 
components, practices, arts,  literature, religion, rites, philosophy) and demands 
States to respect and protect it  from forced assimilation. 
Access to lands and resources. Access to lands and natural resources is the 
essential for the realization of not only all other aspects of the right to self-
determination of indigenous peoples, but of their survival230.  Because of their 
special connection with them, lands and natural resources cannot be treated as 
«fungible with cash»231.  As Article 13(1) of ILO Convention 169 states, 
«governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual 
values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, 
or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the 
collective aspects of this relationship». Indigenous rights to lands and natural 
resources are in fact not understood as private property claims, but rather as 
claims for collective property232.  And they shall entail,  not only the respect of 
existing relationships with ancestral lands, but also, where possible, the relocation 
of evicted communities. 
Social welfare and development .  It  entails those economic and social-welfare 
rights - such as right to health, to an adequate standard of living and the right to 
education (that shall not limit the right to pass on traditional knowledge through 
                                                
227 (Bloch ,  2001,  p .  377) .  
228 These  r igh ts  a re  l i s ted  in  a r t ic le  27  of  the  Universa l  Declara t ion  of  Human Rights ;  a r t ic le  15  
of  the  In terna t ional  Covenant  on  Economic ,  Socia l  and  Cul tura l  Rights ;  a r t ic le  13c  of  the  
Convent ion  on  the  El iminat ion  of  Al l  Forms of  Discr iminat ion  agains t  Women;  a r t ic le  31  of  the  
Convent ion  on  the  Rights  of  the  Chi ld ;  and  ar t ic le  4  of  the  UN Declara t ion  on  the  Rights  of  
Persons  Belonging  to  Nat ional  or  E thnic ,  Rel ig ious  and  Linguis t ic  Minor i t ies .  
229 Ar t ic le  31  UNDRIP:   «Indigenous  peoples  have  the  r igh t  to  main ta in ,  cont ro l ,  p ro tec t  and  
develop  the i r  cu l tura l  her i tage ,  t rad i t iona l  knowledge  and  t rad i t iona l  cu l tura l  express ions ,  as  
wel l  as  the  manifes ta t ions  of  the i r  sc iences ,  technologies  and  cu l tures ,  inc luding  human and  
genet ic  resources ,  seeds ,  medic ines ,  knowledge  of  the  proper t ies  of  fauna  and  f lora ,  o ra l  
t rad i t ions ,  l i te ra tures ,  des igns ,  spor ts  and  t rad i t iona l  games  and  v isua l  and  performing  ar ts .  
They  a lso  have  the  r igh t  to  main ta in ,  cont ro l ,  p ro tec t  and  develop  the i r  in te l lec tua l  proper ty  
over  such  cu l tura l  her i tage ,  t rad i t ional  knowledge ,  and  t rad i t ional  cu l tura l  express ions».  
230 (Anaya ,  1996,  p .  104) .  
231 (Anaya ,  1996,  p .  105) .  
232 (Anaya ,  1996,  p .  106)  
51 
 
customary teaching techniques) - needed to maintain and develop traditional 
practices essential to the culture of an ethnic community233.  These rights shall be 
the basis for the realization of the right to development of each indigenous people 
defined by the Declaration on the Right to Development – adopted in 1986 by the 
UN General Assembly - as the right to «participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social,  cultural and political development, in which all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized»234.  
Self-government .  Anaya identified two strains of indigenous peoples self-
government235.   The first strain relates to the possibility of each people to regulate 
its internal matters through the use of customary laws and institutions. Autonomy 
is essential for the continuation and development of distinct cultural identities, 
traditional practices and traditional knowledge. Rules and norms imposed by 
outside institutions undermine the preservation of internal practices. The second 
strain concerns freedom from imposition of decisions taken by external actors and 
concerning matters that can influence the community. 
The right to self-determination, so heterogeneously composed, is the building 
ground for all  other indigenous rights to be realized. As Cormac Cullinan writes, 
indigenous peoples «have not been asking for the dominant culture to extend 
certain human rights to them [but instead] to limit and reduce the extent of its 
influence and power and allow the indigenous communities to self-regulate to a 
greater extent»236.  
                                                
233 (Bloch ,  2001,  p .  379) .  
234 Ar t ic le  1  of  the  UN Declara t ion  on  the  Right  to  Development .  
235 (Anaya ,  1996,  p .  151)  
236 (Cul l inan ,  2002) .  
52 
 
Part 3.  Human Rights, the Environment and Indigenous Peoples 
and Local Communities 
Chapter 3.1. Conservation of the Environment and Human Rights: a Brief 
Historical Account 
As briefly touched on above237,  the conservation of the environment is one interests 
protected by the theoretical construct of biocultural rights. Deprived of it ,  the 
discussion would still  be focused on indigenous rights as a type of minorities’ 
rights. These two elements, human rights and environment conservation, may 
prima facie  appear risky to compose as «environmentalists and human rights 
advocates have seldom been the cosiest bed-fellows»238.  Nevertheless, today the 
protection of the environment has been widely recognized to be an essential 
element for the fulfilment of certain (if not all)  human rights. But we shall not 
forget that conservation practices have not always been (nor are) respectful of 
human rights and have often happened to hinder their realization239.  In this 
complex system of interdependence, the position of indigenous peoples and local 
communities has changed radically trough history: from evicted for conservation 
purposes ( fortress conservation240),  to holders of rights to be balanced with 
conservation goals, to valuable allies in conservation activities (community-based 
conservation241).  The following sections will take us briefly trough the relationship 
between human rights and the environment. Last step - concerned with the 
contribution of IPLCs to conservation - after a brief focus on the roots of IPLC 
relationships (and perceived relationships) with the environment, will  accompany 
us to the idea of biocultural rights, which builds, precisely, on the role that IPLCs 
may have for the conservation of the environment.  
3.1.1. Interdependent Interests: Human Rights and the Environment 
In the mid XIX century, States and peoples started to understand that technologies 
and development could cause harms to the environment. Initially, environmental 
protection agreements and laws that were created to avoid such damages were 
mostly aimed at defending economic interests over certain species and areas. 
Conservation activities were driven by considerations over single elements of 
                                                
237 See  1 .1 .  
238 (Rajan ,  2011,  p .  106) .  
239 (Sunder land ,  Campese ,  Gre iber ,  &  Oviedo,  2009,  p .  XVII) .  
240 See  be low a t  3 .1 .2 .  
241 See  be low a t  3 .1 .3 .  
53 
 
ecosystems, and did not focus on whole landscapes and on species’ interactions242.  
As a response to the growing environmental crisis,  in 1968 the UN General 
Assembly formally recognized the interdependence between environmental 
protection and basic human rights243.  Four years later,  in the Stockholm 
Declaration, issuing from the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment, 
conservation of the environment was presented as essential to man’s well-being 
and «to the enjoyment of basic human rights – even the right to life itself»244.  They 
began to be perceived as «interrelated fundamental goals of the global 
community»245 under the understanding that human impact on the environment was 
to be monitored and reduced, otherwise future as well  as present generations 
would have not been able to respond to their needs and to live healthy and safe 
lives. In 2009 the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights reminded that «while 
the universal human rights treaties do not refer to a specific right to a safe and 
healthy environment, the United Nations human rights treaty bodies all  recognize 
the intrinsic link between the environment and the realization of a range of human 
rights»246.   
To picture the relevance of environmental conservation for human rights 
protection we can look at the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and at the two 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC) to identify some 
recognized human rights that can have no fulfilment without a certain quality of 
environment247.  Overexploitation and land degradation increase environmental 
hazards, therefore threatening the right to life and security of the person248,  and, 
consequently, the right to family249.  If air,  soils and water are polluted there can be 
no full respect of the right to a standard of living adequate for health, to the 
healthy development of the child250,  to hygiene251,  to well-being252,  and to a healthy 
work environment253.  Moreover, there can be no respect of the right to food254.  To 
                                                
242 (Meine ,  2010,  p .  10) .  
243 (UNGA Resolu t ion  2398 (XXII) ,  c i ted  in  Sands ,  Pee l ,  Fabra ,  &  MacKenzie ,  2012,  p .  777).   
244 (Uni ted  Nat ions ,  1972) .  
245 (Gre iber ,  2009,  p .  5 ) .  
246 (Repor t  of  the  OHCHR on the  Rela t ionship  Between Cl imate  Change  and  Human Rights ,  UN 
Doc.  A/HRC/10/61 ,  15  January  2009,  para .  18 ,  c i ted  in  Boyle ,  2012) .  
247 Of  course ,  i t  i s  poss ib le  to  look  for  those  human r ights  in  need  for  a  cer ta in  leve l  of  
environmenta l  pro tec t ion  in  any  o ther  in te rna t ional ,  reg ional  or  na t ional  human r ights  
document .   
248 UDHR, ar t .  3 ;  ICCPR,  ar t .  6 (1)  and  9(1) .  
249 UDHR, ar t .  16(3) ;  ICCPR,  ar t .  23 ;  ICESCR,  ar t .  10(1) .  
250 ICESCR,  ar t .  12  (2)a .   
251 ICESCR,  ar t .  12(2)b .   
252 UDHR, ar t .  25(1) ;  ICESCR,  ar t .  12(1) .  
253 UDHR, ar t .  23 ;  ICESCR,  ar t .  7b .  
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fulfil  the latter it  is also necessary the conservation of a certain level of 
biodiversity as it  is the key to guarantee food security255.  Therefore, «soil 
depletion, deforestation, overexploitation, and pollution represent a direct threat 
to»256 human rights and contribute to the maintenance and exacerbation of poverty. 
There can neither be realization of the right to participate to social and cultural 
activities257 and to profess religion258 if  pollution, wastes and ecosystems 
degradation make access to natural environments impossible or dangerous. So 
harming the right to rest and leisure as well259.  The right to self-determination and 
development of peoples necessitates that wealth and natural resources are not 
polluted, exhausted or gone extinct260.  Finally, quality of the environment is 
particularly important for the respect of the right of minorities, especially those 
physically isolated, to enjoy their own culture, religion and language261.   
3.1.2. Conflicting Interests: Human Rights and the Environment 
While the acknowledgement of the link between environmental protection and 
human rights is now strongly recognized, its implementation has been and still  is 
hugely controversial.  «For just as the human rights protagonist has often given the 
impression that he or she does not care about the natural world, so too have some 
environmentalists seemed at times to despite people»262 and to value birds more 
than people263.  While it  would be unfair to condemn all conservation projects, there 
are in fact many that have caused social and cultural negative impacts264 -  
particularly on IPLCs - displacing communities from their lands, reducing or 
halting access to natural resources important for essential services (livelihoods, 
housing, building materials,  water sources)265.  
Back to the Mesopotamia of the first millennium B.C., there are examples of lands 
enclosed for species protection266.  Since the creation of the first national park, the 
Yellowstone National Park in Montana, in 1872, conservation of the environment, 
                                                                                                                                                            
254 ICESCR,  ar t .  11 .  
255 (World  Resources  Ins t i tu te ,  2005,  p .  4 ) .  
256 (World  Resources  Ins t i tu te ,  2005,  p .  14) .  
257 UDHR, ar t .  27(1) ;  ICESCR,  ar t .  15(1) .   
258 ICCPR,  a r t .  18(1) .  
259 UDHR, ar t .  24 ;  ICESCR,  ar t .  7d .  
260 ICCPR and ICESCR,  Ar t  1 .  
261 ICCPR,  a r t .  27 .   
262 (Gear ty ,  2010,  p .  21) .  See  a lso  Alcorn  (2008) .   
263 (Diamond,  2005,  p .  441) .  
264 (Brechin ,  Wilshusen ,  For twangler ,  &  West ,  2002,  p .  45) .  
265 (Campese ,  2009,  p .  7 ) .  
266 (More l ,  2010,  p .  174) .  
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and in particularly protected areas conservation, has been institutionalized as 
being, by definition, separated from human life. In the attempt to conserve what is 
left pristine267,  or to recreate what was once pristine, people have been fenced out 
and kept away from protected areas and natural resources, regardless of their needs 
and of their real impact on it .  People have long been perceived as a threat for 
conservation268,  as their interests were perceived as necessarily conflicting with 
those of ecosystems: environmental protection is about reducing the use of natural 
resources, peoples and communities use resources for their livelihoods, therefore 
their presence runs against conservation objectives. The vast use of land for the 
creation of national parks in America, Australia and Asia was made possible by 
the eradication of indigenous peoples through forced removal or decimation269 on 
the ground of the tragedy of the commons theory270.  This approach to conservation 
has been named fortress conservation271 because it  excluded local people from 
conservation-oriented areas. Fortress conservation created thousands of 
conservation refugees 272,  mostly composed by indigenous peoples. One of the most 
famous examples is that of the Yellowstone National Park that was established on 
a Crow, Blackfeet,  and Shoshone-Bannock territory273,  causing the eviction of 
seven indigenous tribes.  
Looking at the issue from the opposite perspective we shall ask whether “human 
rights help or hinder the environment”274.  The most common answer is that they are 
bound to hinder it .  «The subject of human rights is [. . .]  a field that is concerned 
                                                
267 The  meaning  of  the  te rm pris t ine ,  as  of  the  te rm conservat ion ,  a re  themselves  qui te  
controvers ia l .  Dif feren t  d isc ip l ines  have  g iven  d i f fe ren t  def in i t ions .  I f  conservat ion  i s  
unders tood  as  «ac t ions  tha t  prevent  or  mi t iga te  b iodivers i ty  loos  and  are  des igned  to  do  so» 
(Hames ,  2007,  p .  180) ,  i t  re fers  only  to  in ten t ional ,  p lanned  in tervent ions  and  excludes  those  
prac t ices  tha t  s imply  happen  to  have  conserva t ion  ef fec ts .  The  la t te r  prac t ices  however ,  do  fa l l  
wi th in  the  rea lm of  sus ta inabi l i ty :  p rac t ices  tha t  «meet  the  needs  of  the  present  wi thout  
compromis ing  the  ab i l i ty  of  fu ture  genera t ions  to  meet  the i r  own needs» (World  Commiss ion  on  
Environment  and  Development ,  1987) .  Pris t ine ,  ins tead ,  i s  re fer red  to  ecosys tems untouched  by  
human ac t iv i t ies ,  as  opposed  to  human- inf luenced  ones .  This  d ichotomy has  been  contes ted  by  
ind igenous  peoples  and  an thropologis ts ,  a rchaeologis ts  and  h is tor ica l  eco logis ts  because  many 
landscapes  once  cons idered  pris t ine  had  in  fac t  been  modif ied  by  human ac t iv i t ies  in  the  pas t  
(Claus ,  Kai ,  &  Sat te r f ie ld ,  2010,  p .  266) ,  and  were ,  in  fac t ,  the  resu l t  o f  the  in terac t ions  
be tween humans  and  na ture ,  as  i t  was  recognized  by  UNESCO with  the  adopt ion  of  the  World  
Her i tage  Convent ion  tha t  re fers  to  cul tura l  landscapes  (Posey ,  1995,  p .  9 ) .  For  some authors  
(Agrawal  & Gibson,  1999,  p .  632;  Posey ,  1999b,  p .  7 ) ,  s ince  i t s  appearance  on  the  Ear th ,  man 
has  modif ied  so  many ecosys tems tha t  i t  i s  imposs ib le  and  poin t less  to  d is t inguish  be tween  rea l  
and  apparent  pris t ine  ecosys tems.  
268 (Claus  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  268) .  
269 (Claus  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  263) .  
270 See  be low a t  3 .2 .2 .  
271 (Maff i ,  2014,  p .  4 ) .  
272 (Maff i ,  2014,  p .  4 ) .  
273 (Sobrevi la ,  2008,  p .  6 ) .  
274 (Gear ty ,  2010) .   
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not only with humans but also with the rights that flow from being humans, rather 
than from being anything else: not an animal, or a fish for example, and certainly 
not a tree or a habitat or a lake, no matter how magnificent»275.  
The need to reduce the exploitation of natural resources for the sake of 
conservation is usually received by the call of the poorest layers of society and of 
developing countries against the creation of limits to their right to use natural 
resources to exit their state of poverty. People need to use natural resources to 
survive, develop and prosper at very different levels. Local and rural communities 
need to have access to local resources to respond to their immediate needs, States 
need to use natural resources to increase their State-income and (hopefully) better 
respond to the needs of their populations. When conservation programs are 
implemented disregarding the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities 
over their lands and resources, poverty is exacerbated and indigenous peoples’ 
survival as distinct cultural groups is threatened276.   
3.1.3. Conservation Allies: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities 
Conservation without communities involvement has turned out less efficient or 
even detrimental for biodiversity conservation277 because indigenous peoples and 
local communities «serve numerous and important roles in protecting and 
maintaining natural areas»278.  Moreover, conservation programs that disregard the 
rights of indigenous peoples and local communities have often turned out to be 
more expensive because of costs for displacements, compensations (when they are 
afforded) and creation of alternative livelihoods; harder to enforce due to the 
conflicts with the affected communities; not benefiting from the communities’ 
traditional knowledge about the local environment; and having to face the fact that 
when communities are excluded from use of resources they lose interest in their 
long term conservation and are more likely to use resources unsustainably279.  For 
example, the decision to evict indigenous communities from the Yellowstone 
National Park brought a considerable increase in the cost of creation and 
maintenance of the Park. Many battles occurred between indigenous groups and 
park managers, killing about 300 people. So only after the intervention of the USA 
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Army, 30 years after the beginning of the struggle, the area could start to earn 
money from tourism280.  
In the 1970s the fortress conservation  approach  (also known as Yellowstone 
model281,  authoritarian protectionism282,  or fences and fines  approach) started to be 
rethought trough. This change in approach was driven by the increased recognition 
of the needs and rights of developing countries and local peoples and by the 
understanding of its,  frequent, ineffectiveness283.  Policy makers, conservationists 
and non-governmental organizations (NGO) began to pay more attention to 
communities and to their role for conservation and started to develop, when 
possible, community-based or rights-based conservation projects284.  Since then, 
many studies have concentrated on the best approaches to community-based-
conservation285 and, more recently, there is the increasing understanding of the 
need to involve communities as active participants since the beginning of each 
conservation project,  as holders of know-how and rights, rather than as passive 
stakeholders. This has led many to redefine environmental conservation in a more 
social fashion 286 with the aim to embrace, beside ecological goals, also social and 
political elements (such as: human dignity, legitimacy, governance, accountability, 
adaptation and learning, and non local forces287) and to balance conservation goals 
with the respect of the right to participation in policymaking, the right to self-
representation and autonomy, and the right to sovereignty288.  
International actions such as the Man and the Biosphere Programme (1970), the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972), and the World 
Conservation Strategy of the International Union for Natural Conservation (1980) 
are clear signs of this change in attitude289.  Today, many international 
organizations working on conservation issues, such as the IUCN, the World 
Wildlife Fund, Conservation International, the United Nations Environmental 
Program and the Nature Conservancy, recognize the role of indigenous peoples for 
the conservation of biodiversity290.  In particular, the IUCN has had a very central 
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role in stressing for a new way to manage protected areas that involves rather than 
excludes local communities. The IUCN World Conservation Congress has passed 
several resolutions on indigenous peoples in relation to issues such as protected 
areas, traditional biodiversity knowledge, forests, marine and coastal areas, and 
mining291.  
While it  is too early to treat it  as a one-direction change, as cases of evictions of 
indigenous peoples for conservation purposes are still  routine  and many still  
question the effectiveness of rights-based approaches, it  is true that indigenous 
peoples have, at least the theory and rhetoric of conservation, started to move from 
the role of the passive victims to the role of (potential) allies.  
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Chapter 3.2. From Myth to Reality: Noble Savages and Ideological Traps  
3.2.1. IPLCs and the Conservation of the Environment 
The above section is based on the assumption that there exist IPLCs that have 
preserved environmentally sustainable lifestyles292 and worldviews that allow them 
to live in biodiversity-rich areas without hampering the conservation of those 
areas and, in some cases, contributing to it.  This assumption is questioned 
below293,  but as an introductory matter it  is conceded that even if with many 
dissenting voices, scholars, international institutions and States are increasingly 
recognizing the role of IPLCs in the conservation of ecosystems294.  IPLCs 
contribute to the conservation of biodiversity by safeguarding their very diverse 
ecosystems, using species sustainably, practicing techniques that maintain 
equilibrium among species, and selecting new varieties of domestic plants and 
animals295.   
The idea of the existence of a long-term sustainable and mutually beneficial 
relationship between certain communities and peoples and the environment was 
framed by Posey296 under the term biocultural diversity297.  The term refers to the 
existence of an inextricable link  between cultural and biological diversity, as 
explained in the 1988 Declaration of Belém of the International Society of 
Ethnobiology298.  It  indicates «the idea that maintaining and restoring the diversity 
of life means sustaining both biodiversity and cultures, because the two are 
interrelated ad mutually supportive»299.  The map below shows a significant 
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essent ia l  to  face  such  var ia t ions  because  each  spec ies  may reac t  d i f fe ren t ly  to  changes  and  
whi le  one  var ie ty  may become unavai lab le  and  o ther  may ac t  as  a  subs t i tu te .  
296 (Posey ,  1999a) .  
297 This  te rm has  been  used  in terchangeably  wi th  the  te rm biocul tura l  her i tage .  
298 (Maff i ,  2007,  p .  267) .  The  Declara t ion  of  Bélem was  adopted  a t  the  f i r s t  congress  of  the  
In terna t ional  Socie ty  of  E thnobio logy  as  an  expl ic i t  recogni t ion  of  the  obl iga t ion  of  sc ien t is t s  
and  environmenta l i s t s  to  compensa te  ind igenous  peoples  for  the  u t i l iza t ion  of  the i r  knowledge  
and  b io logica l  resources  and  to  address  the i r  needs .  For  more  info  on  the  Declara t ion  and  on  the  
In terna t ional  Socie ty  of  E thnobio logy  v is i t :  h t tp : / /e thnobio logy.ne t / .   
299 (Maff i  &  Woodley ,  2010,  p .  1 ) .  
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correlation between the presence of biocultural diversity and indigenous peoples in 
the world. The map shows the relative measure of countries’ biocultural diversity 
through the use of five indicators: number of languages, religions, ethnic groups 
(for the cultural diversity component) and number of bird and mammal species and 
number of plant species (for the biological diversity component)300.  It  was 
estimated that indigenous peoples’ territories cover today about the 22% of the 
planet and that within these territories 80% of the total biodiversity of the planet 
is held301.  
!   
Index  o f  b iocul tura l  d ivers i ty  IBCD-RICH.  (Loh & Harmon,  2005)302 
Ethnobiological and ethnoecological research provides evidence of the biocultural 
diversity of IPLCs: vast knowledge about the ecosystems of their lands and their 
biotic and a-biotic elements303;  centrality of the environment in their practices and 
                                                
300 (Loh & Harmon,  2005,  p .  236) .  
301 (Sobrevi la ,  2008) .  This  es t imate  does  not  inc lude  the  te r r i to r ies  occupied  and  managed  by  
loca l  communi t ies  because  of  the  lack  of  da ta .    
302 As  a l l  types  of  maps  obta ined  us ing  proxies  and  non-comprehens ive  da ta ,  they  should  be  
regarded  as  proxies  themselves .  However ,  the  core  a reas  here  ident i f ied  over lap  wi th  those  tha t  
have  been  ident i f ied  in  o ther  works  tha t  have  used  d i f fe ren t  ind ica tors  (Maff i ,  2005,  p .  605) .  
303 The  re levance  of  a-b io t ic  e lements  might  be  underes t imated  by  the  use  of  the  te rm bio-
cul tura l .  For  th is  reason  some have  proposed  the  use  of  the  te rm eco-cul tura l  d ivers i ty  (Harry  
Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2012,  n .  3 ) .  Even  though eco-cul tura l  d ivers i ty  i s  more  appropr ia te  to  descr ibe  the  
type  of  re la t ionship  tha t  IPLCs have  wi th  the i r  te r r i to r ies ,  in  th is  work  the  te rm b io-cul tura l  
d ivers i ty  wi l l  be  prefer red  in  order  to  remain  cons is ten t  wi th  most  l i te ra ture  on  the  top ic .   
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beliefs304;  social,  cultural305,  spiritual,  economic and political practices shaped 
around the ecological elements of the territories where IPLCs reside, their 
nomadic routes, and their sacred sites306.  IPLC territories have recently been 
gathered under the term “Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities’ Conserved 
Territories and Areas (ICCAs)”, defined as the «natural and/or modified 
ecosystems containing significant biodiversity values [. . .]  conserved by indigenous 
peoples and local communities, both sedentary and mobile, through customary 
laws or other effective means»307.  ICCAs diverge from the protected area model 
because they do not rest on a centralized management whose objective is precisely, 
and centrally, the conservation of the environment of a certain territory. IPLCs’ 
territories, whether gathered under the name ICCAs or not, propose «a diversity of 
approaches to human interaction with the environment, entrusting stewardship  
[emphasis added] of particular ecosystems to the finely tuned cultural expertise 
that indigenous peoples have developed through millennial relationships with their 
ancestral lands»308.  Those peoples and communities that have lived and continue to 
live away from mainstream societies and their markets and cities «know their lives 
and immediate futures – as well as the well-being of future generations – depend 
upon the environments in which they live and the biodiversity upon which they 
depend»309.  They directly rely on local ecosystem services for their livelihoods, 
building materials and medicines. And their cultural and spiritual practices are 
built  around natural sites, plants, animals, rivers and streams, shores. Hence, they 
know that the degradation of their surrounding ecosystem and the loss of 
biodiversity would profoundly threaten their survival and their culture310.  Instead, 
industrial societies, whose peoples live mostly in cities, obtain their livelihoods 
from many different sources spread around the world and distribute their wastes 
away from their lands. Therefore, the overexploitation and destruction of one 
resource or ecosystem does not appear significant, because «they turn to 
another»311 and easily «forget that as biological beings [they] are as dependent on 
clean air and water, uncontaminated soil and biodiversity as any other creature»312.  
                                                
304 (S l ikkerveer ,  1999) .  
305 (Dutf ie ld ,  1999,  p .  550) .  Par t icu lar  a t ten t ion  has  been  g iven  to  the  corre la t ion  of  l inguis t ic  
d ivers i ty  and  b io logica l  d ivers i ty :  because  of  re f lec t ions  of  environmenta l  fea tures  in  loca l  
languages ,  because  of  the  the i r  common areas  of  d is t r ibu t ion ,  and  because  of  common threa ts  to  
the i r  conserva t ion  (Maff i ,  2005,  p .  600) .  
306 (Kothar i  e t  a l . ,  2012,  p .  19) .  
307 (Kothar i  e t  a l . ,  2012,  p .  6 ) .  
308 ( Jaksa ,  2006,  p .  162) .  
309 (Maff i ,  2014,  p .  4 ) .  See  a lso  (Maff i  &  Woodley ,  2010,  p .  4 ) .  
310 (Posey ,  1999b,  p .  7 ) .  
311 (Cocks ,  2006,  p .  188) .  
312 (Suzuki ,  1999,  p .  72) .  
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An increasing number of researches shows the different, but similar, relationships 
of care of IPLCs towards the environment313.  One of the first comprehensive books 
on the topic is edited by Posey314.  It  is a collection of studies from different parts 
of the world that highlights the role that spiritual and cultural values of indigenous 
and local communities have for the conservation of biodiversity. More recently, 
the action-research project by the International Institute for Environment and 
Development, Protecting Community Rights over Traditional Knowledge 315,  has 
described common customary values and worldviews in five indigenous 
communities in Kenya, Peru, Panama, and India. The communities, involved in a 
project aimed at finding sui generis instruments to protect traditional knowledge, 
have all shown to share holistic worldviews based on the assumption that 
everything in nature is inter-connected and inter-dependent: humankind is an 
element of nature and its traditional knowledge, practices and customary laws are 
as well.  Everything in nature is worth respect and the exploitation of natural 
resources is regulated by customary laws whose enforcement is overviewed by 
Spirits or Gods316.  Similarly a study by the Forest Peoples Programme317 
documented the sustainability of the use of natural resources by indigenous 
communities in Suriname, Cameroon, Guyana, Thailand and Bangladesh. The study 
shows that traditional knowledge and customary law systems of communities guide 
their wise use of the local resources under the idea of a spiritual connection with 
the lands. Further evidence has been provided by an extensive study organized by 
the IUCN and other supporting organizations on sacred natural sites318.  The study 
provides evidence of the relevance of sacred natural sites, mostly attributed to 
indigenous and local communities, for biodiversity and ecosystems’ conservation. 
A literature review from a hundred different studies from Africa and Asia319 has 
shown that sacred meanings attributed either to nature itself or to heroes, 
                                                
313 (Cocks ,  2006,  p .  188) .  
314 (Posey ,  1999a) .  
315 (Swiderska  e t  a l . ,  2009) .  
316 The  s tudies  have  a lso  revea led  tha t  the  communi t ies  a re  guided  by  the  e th ics  of :  rec iproc i ty  
in  exchanges  wi th  na ture  (as  much as  i s  taken  is  g iven  back) ;  equi l ibr ium wi th  na ture  (soc ie ty  
must  be  in  harmony wi th  na ture) ;  and  dual i ty  wi th in  na ture  (every th ing  has  a  complementary 
oppos i te  and  ba lance  must  be  kept )  (Swiderska  e t  a l . ,  2009) .   
317 (Fores t  People  Programme,  2011) .  
318 (Verschuuren ,  Wild ,  McNeely ,  &  Oviedo,  2010) .  In  the  s tudy ,  sacred  na tura l  s i tes  a re  def ined  
as :  «areas  of  lands  or  water  having  spec ia l  sp i r i tua l  s ign i f icance  to  peoples  and  communi t ies»  
(p .1) .  
319 (Verschuuren  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  19) .  
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structures or histories grounded in the territory320,  have led to the preservation of 
reservoirs of biodiversity321 equally rich, or richer, than close-by protected areas. 
3.2.2. Sustainable Lifestyles: Management of the Environment 
What does it  mean to act as a steward of an ecosystem and to conduct a sustainable 
lifestyle? To act as the steward or custodian of a land or ecosystem goes beyond 
its sustainable use. It  conveys a sense of responsibility to ensure that lands and 
resources are maintained in a way that respects and enhances their intrinsic value.  
Bavikatte has stressed that «biocultural rights are collective rights with a specific 
aim of affirming the right of stewardship of communities over their lands and 
waters» and, he continues, biocultural rights «seek to safeguard the stewarding 
relation between a community and its ecosystem»322.  Bavikatte suggests that 
biocultural rights «differ from private property rights […] and are asserted by 
communities that have traditionally had strong cultural and spiritual ties to their 
lands»323.  Do IPLCs have special systems of property over lands and natural 
resources that lead them to act in more sustainable ways than other peoples? And 
if yes, what are they? Do they contemplate rules, obligations and rights that fall  
within the concept 324 of private property  or do they have a different system of 
property 325? 
We could be tempted to say that indigenous legal systems have no such a thing as 
property. As Bavikatte argues326,  i t  is more appropriate to say that indigenous legal 
systems, or at least a majority of them, are not  private property systems .  If we in 
fact accept the definition of system of property provided by Waldron - «systems of 
rules governing access to and control of material resources»327 -  it  seems 
                                                
320 (Verschuuren  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  2 ) .  
321 (Verschuuren  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  1 ) .  
322 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  30) .  
323 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  30) .  
324 (Waldron  1988,  p .  31) .  
325 Unfor tunate ly  i t  wi l l  no t  be  poss ib le  here  to  explore  case  s tudies  tha t  p ic ture  the  organiza t ion  
of  proper ty  wi th in  d i f fe ren t  ind igenous  people ,  as  an  accura te  unders tanding  of  the  top ic  would  
require .  The  present  research  wi l l  d raw on  ar t ic les  and  s tudies  tha t  draw a  genera l  p ic ture  of  
ind igenous  peoples .  I t  means  to  draw on  genera l iza t ions  tha t  have  a l ready  been  cons t ruc ted .  
Before  indulg ing  wi th in  them a  word  must  be  sa id  on  the  vas t  d ivers i ty  tha t  ex is ts  among IPLCs 
around the  word .  The  genera l iza t ions  tha t  wi l l  be  used  here ,  as  a l l  genera l iza t ions ,  wi l l  p ic ture  
only  the  lega l  t rad i t ions  of  some IPLCs.  In  par t icu lar ,  they  wi l l  p ic ture  only  the  t rad i t ions  of  
some of  the  communi t ies  tha t  have  preserved  sus ta inable  l i fes ty les .  
326 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  pp .  30–49) .  
327 (Waldron ,  1988,  p .  31) .  The  def in i t ion  of  Waldron  only  concerns  mater ia l  resources  because ,  
he  expla ins ,  no t  a l l  soc ie t ies  may have  a  sys tem of  proper ty  ru les  to  a l loca te  non-mater ia l  
resources ,  such  as  knowledge ,  reputa t ion ,  ideas ,  e i ther  because  they  are  not  par t  o f  the i r  
«onto logy or ,  i f  they  do ,  because  human re la t ions  wi th  them are  not  conceived  in  te rms of  
access  and  contro l»  (Waldron  1988,  p .  34) .  In  the  las t  decade  the  debate  about  ind igenous  
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impossible to picture a community without any property system. Property rules 
provide a solution to problems of allocation of material resources within a 
society328,  a problem that each and every society has. Only a society living in a 
condition of lack of scarcity of resources would not need to allocate their access 
and use. In such a society, as in Eden, there would be enough of anything to 
satisfy everyone’s needs, so there would be no need to organise the allocation of 
resources. Since no community lives in any Eden-like condition we can with 
certainty affirm that all  IPLC legal systems include property rules that regulate 
access and use of material resources, such as natural products, and lands. IPLC 
property systems, though very diverse, can be enclosed in the category of 
commons ,  or as Elionor Ostrom calls them, common-pool-resources systems. 
Before moving into a brief exploration of IPLC property system, it  is useful to 
provide a concise account of private property systems in order to underline the 
main differences between private property and commons property. 
Private property 
Not all scholars agree on the possibility to provide a definition of what private 
property is because its features vary too much from a legal system to another. 
Waldron recognizes the existence of very different features in different legal 
systems but claims that there are certain common features that can reasonably be 
attached to the concept of private property. He defines private property systems 
as: «systems of governing access to and control of material resources, organized 
around the idea that resources are on the whole separate objects each assigned and 
therefore belonging to some particular individual whose decision as to the use of 
the resource is taken as final»329.  He argues that in a private property system ,  
usually, the holder of the private property title holds certain rights over the object 
X330:  
-  a right to posses, use, not use, and manage X; 
- a right to the income derived from permitting others to use X or from its 
capital value; 
- a right to security against expropriation by other people; 
                                                                                                                                                            
peoples  and  proper ty  r igh ts  has  been  cent red  most ly  on  the  i ssue  of  proper ty  of  t rad i t iona l  
knowledge .  Tradi t iona l  knowledge  is  an  in tangib le  good and  therefore  fa l l s  wi th in  a  ca tegory  of  
goods  d i f fe ren t  f rom lands  and  na tura l  resources .  
328 (Waldron  1988,  p .  32) .   
329 (Waldron ,  1988,  p .  38) .  
330 (Waldron ,  1988,  p .  49) .  
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- the power to transmit X by sale, gift or bequest; 
- lack of any term on any of these rights;  
- liability that certain judgments against him may be executed on X; 
- expectation that when rights to X of other peoples come to an end they come 
back to him.  
However, Waldron underlines, these features are not necessarily present in all  
private property systems. Each system might differ more or less from this standard 
set of rules but, nevertheless, be considerable as a private property system. What 
is,  then, that makes them all private property systems? It is,  Waldron writes, the 
decision to solve problems of allocation of limited resources trough the creation of 
relationships of ownership between resources and individuals331.  A relation that 
links resources, treated as separable objects332,  and individuals, threated as 
separable subjects, and such that the decision of an individual over the use of his  
object is accepted by the rest of society as conclusive333.  The owner “solves” the 
problem of allocation because he is the one that rules over the use of the object 
(where use is to be broadly interpreted as including also non-use, destruction, 
allocation to other people, etc).  
This description of the core of private property is not attached to any theory of 
justice. Therefore it  does not provide any guarantee that owners will use resources 
in any rational or in any way consistent with an idea of justice. Nor there is any 
guarantee that each individual is owner of something  or that resources are shared 
fairly within society. However, in practice, each private property system builds on 
certain perceptions of justice, more or less well  implemented, and each of them 
provides restrictions to the set of rights of the owner, may it  be for moralistic and 
paternalistic reasons334 or for efficiency and distributive justice matters335,  or for 
environmental reasons336.   
Indigenous property 
IPLCs legal and cultural systems are very diverse, however, it  is possible to affirm 
that many IPLCs manage lands and resources through a system of rules that can be 
                                                
331 (Waldron ,  1988,  p .  39) .  
332 (Waldron ,  1988,  p .  38) .  
333 (Waldron ,  1988,  p .  52) .  
334 (Calabres i  &  Melamed,  1972) .  
335 (Rose-Ackerman,  1985) .  
336 (Rodgers ,  2009) .   
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described as a system of communal property337,  or commons ,  in which property is 
not «centred on an individual but rather on the group and its community»338.  
Commons are defined by Donald Nonini as «those assemblages and ensembles of 
resources that human beings hold in common or in trust to use on behalf of 
themselves, other human beings, and past and future generations, and which are 
essential to their biological,  cultural and social reproduction»339.  Enrico Diciotti  
proposes to look at common goods as those goods that the members of a group 
have equal freedom to use, and no single member has exclusory rights over them, 
nor can acquire them340.  The definition of commons system is not an easy task, 
mostly because the term commons  is used to refer to different arrangements and 
goods341.  The type of commons that interests us here, are the commons described 
by Ostrom that Mauro Barberis qualifies as neo-ecologist 342:  institutional 
arrangements of autonomous small communities - between fifty and fifteen 
thousands members - that have successfully managed limited natural resources. 
Commons systems for the management of natural  resources have historically been 
dismantled along two contradictory ways, both turned out to be detrimental for 
indigenous peoples. The first dates back to the colonization of North America and 
Australia and was used to deny that indigenous peoples had any property rights 
over their lands343.  Since indigenous peoples held lands in commons, without a 
system of private property and since most of them did not practice agriculture, it  
was established that they owned no land344.  «Indigenous peoples tend to live lightly 
on the land, and thus do not produce through their lifestyles the kind of evidence 
of dominion that European-rooted cultures are willing to recognize as worthy of 
legal protection»345.  Their impact on lands and biodiversity was not visible: no 
fences, no farmed fields. Precisely because of their low impact on the 
environment, they were not recognized as having property rights over their lands 
and were evicted without consent or compensation. 
Ironically, the call for conservation of nature acted in the same way for opposite 
reasons, grounding on the theory of the tragedy of the commons .  In 1968 Garrett 
                                                
337 (Anaya  & Wil l iams,  2001;  Posey  & Dutf ie ld ,  1996,  p .  60) .  
338 ( Jaksa ,  2006,  p .  186) .  
339 (Nonin i ,  2007,  p .  1 ) .  
340 (Dic io t t i ,  2013,  p .  351) .  
341 (Barber is ,  2013,  p .  381) .  In  th is  a r t ic le  Barber is  ident i f ies  three  d i f fe ren t  narrat ives  of  
common goods  (benicomuni) :  neo-middle  age  nar ra t ives  -  whose  commons  descr ibe  l i t t le  
peasant  v i l lages  of  European  mounta ins ,  loca l ly  so l idary  bu t  c losed  to  the  outs ide  wor ld  - ;  neo-
communis t  nar ra t ives  -  whose  commons  are  the  goods  essent ia ls  for  the  success  of  the i r  po l i t ica l  
f igh ts  - ;  and  neo-ecologis t  nar ra t ives  -  those  tha t  in te res t  us  here .  
342 (Barber is ,  2013,  pp .  386–387) .  
343 (Benner ,  2005) .  
344 ( Jaksa ,  2006,  p .  168) .  
345 (Manus ,  2005,  p .  555) .  
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Hardin, in his article The Tragedy of the Commons 346,  searched for the human 
factors that influence the use of environmental resources and that can negatively  
effect their conservation. He reached two conclusions: the Earth cannot sustain –
nurture and shelter – an indefinite growth of human population347;  the allocation 
and use of resources must be regulated either by a centralized government or by a 
system of private property. Reasoning along with game theory, Hardin describes 
what he thinks would be the behaviour of a group of herdsmen sharing, in 
common, a grazing land. In the absence of any restriction, each herdsman will 
increase the number of his animals to increase his profits,  his utility. Each extra 
animal reduces the amount of available grazing land for everybody, but each single 
herdsman, including the new owner, is negatively affected only very remotely. 
However, given that all  herdsmen act in the same way, the land will soon be so 
overgrazed and destroyed and all herdsmen will lose all their animals. «Ruin is the 
destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons»348.   
The eviction of many indigenous and local communities from their lands, in order 
to preserve local biodiversity has been backed up by the Hardin’s theory349.  IPLCs, 
associated to use of resources in commons, were perceived as threats to 
ecosystems because they were bound to use them unsustainably350.  As Hardin 
suggested, the alternative solutions that were proposed consisted in the 
transformation of the commons in private property or State controlled systems351:  
privately owned conserved areas or governmental protected areas. 
In the late 1980s, the studies of Ostrom challenged the tragedy of the commons352 
and proved that community’s commons, under certain conditions353,  can be more 
effective in sustainable long-term use of natural resources than State-controlled or 
private property systems354.  Commons are not described as always-successful  
arrangements355,  but neither as less successful than private property or State-
                                                
346 (Hardin ,  1968) .  
347 The  unders tanding  tha t  the  increase  of  human popula t ion  above  cer ta in  l imi ts  may cause  the  
des t ruc t ion  of  Ear th’s  ecosys tems and ,  u l t imate ly ,  o f  human k ind  i t se l f ,  was  a  major  
contr ibut ion  Hardin  gave  to  theor ies  of  sus ta inable  development .  Whi le  i t  ra ises  many e th ica l  
i ssues ,  such  as  for  example  the  respec t  of  cer ta in  bas ics  f reedoms,  i t  i s  hard  to  deny  i t  on  the  
ground of  sc ien t i f ic  assumpt ions  and  da ta .  
348 (Hardin ,  1968) .  
349 (Bavika t te ,  2012,  p .  21) .  
350 (Becker  & Ostrom,  1995,  p .  115) .  
351 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  10) .  
352 (Becker  & Ostrom,  1995;  Ost rom,  1990) .  
353 Effec t ive  governance  of  commons is  no t  easy  to  achieve  and  is  no t  achieved  by  a l l  IPLCs,  bu t  
there  a re  many examples  of  successfu l  management  (Nonin i ,  2007,  p .  1 ) .   
354 (Ost rom,  1990,  p .  1 ) .  
355 (Nonin i ,  2007,  p .  2 ) .  
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controlled arrangements356.  Moreover, as Ostrom notes, depending on the physical 
and social environment, a shift from commons-like property systems to State-
controlled arrangements may have disastrous effects357.  It  is important to notice 
that the commons-like system that Ostrom describes is not a rule-less system 
without any institution. It  is not a state of freedom and lack of coercion, as the 
herdsmen system pictured by Hardin. Ostrom’s system of commons is a system 
that presents a combination of: clearly defined boundaries; rules that are adapted 
to local conditions and that allocate resources to users; participation of most 
resource-users in decision-making processes; effective control of compliance to 
rules by subjects accountable to the users; graduated sanctions for users that do 
not comply with rules; local and low-cost conflict-resolutions mechanisms; self-
determination of users (their rights to create and manage their institutional is not 
threatened by external authorities) and long-term tenure rights over the 
resources358.  
IPLC property systems, when they have a certain level of governmental self-
determination and long-term tenure rights over their lands and resources, resemble 
Ostrom commons – indeed she was inspired by the study on indigenous peoples 
and local communities in her research. IPLC commons are not unregulated like 
Hardin’s natural resources, they are ruled by customary laws that grant rights and 
impose obligations to members; they have more or less structured institutional 
systems, which coordinate behaviours and have means of monitoring compliance 
with rules; and they are usually “small enough” to make each person’s action 
noticeable to the others and consequently limit the free-rider359 problem. Hence, 
when they have certain fundamental rights to self-determination and over lands 
and resources they can be in the position to actually promote the conservation of 
the local environment. 
3.2.3. The Noble Savage Myth  
Assumptions about the correlation of indigenous peoples and biological diversity 
immediately bring to mind the famous noble savage  myth, and in particular that of 
the ecologically noble savage ,  that describes indigenous peoples as pacific friends 
of nature, too good, and too primitive ,  to harm the environment. 
                                                
356 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  10) .  
357 (Ost rom,  1990,  p .  23) .  Ost rom br ings  the  example  of  the  na t ional iza t ion  of  fores ts  prev ious ly  
managed  by  loca l  v i l lages  in  commons- l ike  a r rangements  and  provides  l i te ra ture  for  many 
s imi lar  examples .   
358 (Becker  & Ostrom,  1995,  p .  119) .  
359 A  f ree- r ider  i s  a  person  tha t  benef i t s  f rom a  good or  serv ice  wi thout  bear ing  the  cos ts  of  i t s  
c rea t ion  and  conserva t ion  (Olson ,  1965) .  
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«Some of  the  indigenous peoples  and the anthropologis ts  […] insis t  that  past  
indigenous peoples  were (and modern ones s t i l l  are)  gent le  and ecological ly  
wise  s tewards of  their  environments ,  in t imately  knew and respected Nature ,  
innocently  l ived in  a  vir tual  Garden of  Eden,  and could never  have done al l  
those bad things.  [ . . . ]  Only those evi l  modern Firs t  World inhabitants  are  
ignorant  of  Nature ,  don ' t  respect  the  environment ,  and destroy i t»360.  
Considering the popularity of the noble savage  myth, it  is important to clarify its 
meaning and scope and, most importantly, to state distance from it.  
The term noble savage  -  commonly understood as «a mythic personification of 
natural goodness by a romantic glorification of savage life»361 -  was first used by 
Marc Lescarbot in his book Histoire de la Nouvelle-France ,  in 1609362.  The term is 
usually attributed to Jean Jacques Rousseau and in particular to his book Discours 
sur l 'origine de l ' inégalité parmi les hommes ,  1745, where Rousseau describes an 
archetype of man «living in a “pure state of nature”»363.  Interestingly, Rousseau 
never actually uses the term bon sauvage364 and his reconstruction of human 
evolution is actually more complex. He describes an original era when people 
lived isolated and in peace with each other and with nature: this state of things 
was due to a lack of ability to conceive to take more365.  The human being he 
portrays has such modest needs and desires that it  takes very little to satisfy him366.  
He lives alone and idles, thinks little and sleeps most of the time367.  He may be 
particularly harmless in environmental terms, but is also very culturally and 
socially savage.  It  is,  for Rousseau, «the happiest and most stable of epochs»368,  
however, this animal-like state does not reflect the state of indigenous peoples 
discovered by his contemporaneous in the New World and in Southern Africa. The 
latter,  he thinks, are one step forward in evolution ,  they are not completely 
natural: they are reunited in groups, have discovered the first forms of property, 
and have developed basic languages and the first rules of society369.  They have 
already encountered vanity, contempt, shame and envy and can be cruel and 
                                                
360 (Diamond,  2005,  p .  9 ) .  Diamond is  very  cr i t ic  of  the  myth  of  the  noble  savage  and  in  
par t icu lar  of  i t s  use  in  today’s  d iscourse  on  the  recogni t ion  of  ind igenous  peoples’  r igh ts .  The  
c i ted  par t  o f  h is  book,  i s  an  i ronic ,  bu t  accura te ,  descr ip t ion  of  those  tha t  fa l l  in  the  ideologica l  
t rap  of  the  myth .  
361 (E l l ingson ,  2001,  p .  1 ) .  
362 (E l l ingson ,  2001,  p .  XV) .  
363 (E l l ingson ,  2001,  p .  1 ) .  
364 (E l l ingson,  2001,  p .  81) .  
365 (Rousseau ,  2008,  p .  23) .  
366 (Rousseau ,  2008,  p .  18) .  
367 (Rousseau ,  2008,  p .  16) .  
368 (Rousseau ,  2008,  p .  33) .  
369 (E l l ingson ,  2001,  p .  33) .  
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bloody370.  So, he writes «the goodness, which was suitable in the pure state of 
nature, was no longer proper in the new-born state of society»371.  
Whether or not Rousseau meant to describe indigenous peoples as noble savages ,  
two hundred years later,  John Crawfurd, the president of the Ethnological Society 
of London, addressed the “eccentric philosopher” inviting him to spend a week’s 
residence with the recently “discovered” inhabitants of the Terra del Fuego «to 
reach a saner conclusion»372,  meaning: to understand that savages  are in no way 
noble .  Crawfurd, in his article On the Conditions which Favour, Retard or 
Obstruct the Early Civilization of Man,  used the term noble savage  with a clear 
racist,  anti-human rights intent. In the article, where race is considered the first 
and most significant factor for the civilization  of a people, the two parts of the 
term are disentangled and savage is deprived of any form of nobility:  
«I  cannot  [ . . . ]  conceive anything noble  in  the  poor  naked,  crouching creature ,  
t rembling with  cold and s tarving from hunger»373.  
Neither Rousseau’s nor Crawfurd’s savage  resembles what today we would 
describe as an indigenous person. Also if,  with a very big effort,  deprived of its 
racist side374,  the term savage  means brutal,  ignorant, ferocious, backwards375.  
3.2.4. The Ideological Trap 
Today the myth of the noble savage is still  debated by scholars of different fields 
– anthropologists, conservationists,  ethnobiologists,  geographers. In 1990, the 
publication by the conservationist Kent Redford, titled The Ecologically Noble 
                                                
370 (Rousseau ,  2008,  pp .  32–33) .  
371 (Rousseau ,  2008,  p .  33) .  
372 (Crawfurd ,  1861) .  
373 (Crawfurd ,  1861) .  The  in ten t  of  Crawfurd’s  work  is  so  descr ibed  by  El l ingson  (2001,  p .  388) :  
« in  the  language  of  1990s  technology,  Crawfurd  succeeded  in  c rea t ing  a  d iscurs ive  and  
conceptua l  v i rus ,  one  tha t  ins inuates  i t se l f  in to  our  thought  and  words  and  scrambles  our  da ta  
and  programs,  u l t imate ly  corrupt ing  our  work  and  impair ing  our  access  to  the  most  va luable  par t  
o f  the  an thropologica l  her i tage :  the  c r i t ica l  awareness  of  our  shared  humani ty  tha t  should  have  
been  an thropology’s  f i r s t  and  grea tes t  g i f t  to  ourse lves  and  the  peoples  we s tudy».  In  the  book,  
E l l igson  ac tua l ly  d ismisses  the  idea  of  the  very  ex is tence  of  the  myth  i t se l f .  Af ter  showing tha t  
Rousseau  d id  not  co in  nor  ever  used  the  te rm,  he  demonst ra tes  how the  rea l  myth  i s  the  
ex is tence  of  the  myth  of  the  noble  savage ,  c rea ted  wi th  rac is t  purposes  by  Crawfurd .  
374 A  century  and  a  ha l f  la te r  the  myth  cont inues  to  be  used  as  a  rac is t ,  an t i - ind igenous  r igh ts  
too l .  For  example ,  S .  Grande  (1999)  shows how the  myth  has  been  used  in  Nor thern  America  to  
jus t i fy  the  e rad ica t ion  or ,  to  the  bes t ,  ass imi la t ion  of  American  Indians  dur ing  the  co loniza t ion  
per iod  and  how today  i t  i s  par t  o f  the  rhe tor ica l  cons t ruc t ion  used  to  keep  them conf ined  a t  the  
margins  of  soc ie ty .    
375 (E l l ingson ,  2001,  p .  355) .  
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Savage ,  granted the myth a new and slightly different resurrection376.  The 
nobleness was modernized and described as ecological ,  and it  was, as such, 
criticized. In his brief but incisive article, Redford argues that «there is no 
cultural barrier to the Indians’ adoption of means to “improve” their lives (i .e.,  
make them more like Western lives), even if the long-term sustainability of the 
resource base is threatened». Redford underlines that indigenous peoples (and 
local communities) have the same capacities, desires, and needs as western  people. 
Therefore, he argues, to assume that «when confronted with market pressures, 
higher population densities, and increased sedentism most indigenous peoples will 
maintain the integrity of their traditional methods», is to fall  into the “ideological 
trap” of the ecologically noble savage myth. The myth assumes that all  indigenous 
peoples have had - and have preserved - sustainable lifestyles, just as if such 
peoples had some inherent features that define their sustainable relationship with 
the environment and that run so deeply as to be independent from external 
conditions (an idea that somehow links such nobility as deep as to reach 
hypothetical savage  genes  and indigenous races 377).  The mythological nature of 
assumptions about indigenous eco-responsibility is further emphasised by the fact 
that recent archaeological discoveries have revealed that in many cases indigenous 
societies - before the arrival of European colonialists - have contributed to the 
destruction of habitats and the extinction of species. Even more problematically, 
once sustainable practices can become unsustainable when changes such as 
population density, abundance of land and involvement in a market economy 
occur378.  The noble savage myth then fails to reflect important realities and 
nuances fundamental to the achievement of sustainability in changing conditions 
because of its too simplistic representation of reality379.  
                                                
376 (E l l ingson ,  2001,  p .  344) .  
377 In  the  present  work  i t  would  be  ne i ther  adequate  nor  re levant  to  dwel l  on  the  c r i t ics  of  
rac ism.  But  i t  i s  impor tan t  to  under l ine  tha t  the  theory  here  embraced  on  the  top ic  i s  tha t  o f  the  
genet ic is ts  Luig i  Caval l i -Sforza  and  Guido  Barbujani  tha t  sus ta in  tha t  the  ex is tence  of  human 
races  i s  sc ien t i f ica l ly  proved  to  be  fa lse .  See :  (Barbujani ,  2006;  Caval l i -Sforza ,  Menozzi ,  &  
Piazza ,  1994) .  
378 For  ins tance ,  i f  the  cus tomary  use  of  cer ta in  spec ies  cannot  be  sus ta inable  anymore  because  
the i r  popula t ions  has  decreased  due  to  ex terna l  fac tors ;  o r  because  the  s ize  of  ava i lab le  lands  
has  been  reduced  and  t rad i t iona l  agr icu l tura l  techniques  ( l ike  the  s lash-and-burn:  an  
agr icu l tura l  technique ,  typ ica l  of  the  t ropica l  ra in  fores t ,  tha t  involves  the  burn ing  of  s lo ts  of  
lands  to  c lear  them for  f ie lds .  Af ter  cer ta in  years  of  use  the  p lo t  i s  le f t  to  res t  and  cu l t iva t ions  
a re  moved to  another  p iece  of  land)  do  not  a l low,  anymore ,  the  cyc l ic  regenera t ion  of  so i l ,  o r  
when the  in terna l  soc ia l  s t ruc tures  and  ru les  tha t  used  to  contro l  access  to  resources  a re  loss .  
Many indigenous  and  loca l  communi t ies  have  endeavoured  profound changes  and  today  they  are  
l iv ing  a  s ta te  of  t rans i t ion  ( (Diamond,  2012,  p .  6 ,  in  note) ,  ra ther  than  t radi t ion ,  because  they  
have  a l ready  had  the i r  t rad i t iona l  ways  of  l i fe  more  or  less  impaired  by  the  res t r ic t ion ,  or  
d isappearance ,  of  the i r  lands ,  by  the  des t ruc t ion  of  loca l  b iodivers i ty  and  by  the  l imi ta t ion  of  
the i r  r igh t  to  se l f -de terminat ion  caused  by  ac t iv i t ies  such  as  logging ,  mining ,  p lan ta t ions ,  dams,  
educat ional  po l ic ies ,  b iopi racy ,  and  pro tec ted  areas  (Fores t  People  Programme,  2011) .  
379 (Claus  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  269) .  
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Even though the present research springs from the idea of indigenous peoples 
living sustainably, it  rests on the understanding that there is no benefit to 
romanticize them – even those that still  l ive sustainably380.  To point out the 
dangers of the noble savage myth is not to claim that IPLCs do not have cultural,  
spiritual and legal systems that guide their relationships with the environment 
towards sustainable paths. It  is simply to acknowledge that IPLCs can and do - and 
sometimes for sustainability-inspired reasons - change their practices and/or find 
that their practices become unsustainable because external conditions have 
changed.  
 
                                                
380 (Posey ,  1999b,  p .  7 ) .  
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Part 4. Biocultural Rights 
Chapter 4.1. Definition, Foundations and Content 
4.1.1. Definition 
The term biocultural rights  is not in common usage381 and, although interest on the 
topic is rapidly growing382,  l i terature is limited as yet.  Before 2009 the term 
biocultural right is hardly found in the literature. In 2009 Ramirez and Ulaner383 
used the term to describe the rights of indigenous peoples over traditional 
knowledge associated with natural resources, but made no reference to a broader 
set of group rights concerned with the conservation of the environment. 
In 2010, Bavikatte, drawing on the wording of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing, and other 
environment-related UN treaties and declarations384,  argues that biocultural rights 
are a new set of third-generation rights in the process of being recognised385.  He 
traces their origin in the convergence of the post-development movement, the 
commons movement and the movement for IPLC rights386 and charts their 
development in «multilateral environmental agreements, domestic legislation, case 
law, shifts in development discourse and the struggles of communities»387.  A range 
of environment-focused documents, he explains, increasingly recognise the 
relevance of IPLCs’ traditional knowledge, practices and ways of life for the 
conservation of the environment388 and call upon States to fulfil  their 
responsibilities towards the environment by respecting the rights of peoples and 
communities to participate in the management of their territories and to preserve 
and promote their traditional knowledge389.  Biocultural rights are defined as: 
«rights of indigenous peoples and local communities over all  aspects of their ways 
                                                
381 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  49) .  
382 Volume 6  of  Journal  o f  Human Rights  and  the  Environment ,  to  be  publ ished  in  March  2015,  
wi l l  be  en t i re ly  dedica ted  to  b iocul tura l  r igh ts .  An adapta t ion  of  th is  thes is  wi l l  be  publ ished  in  
tha t  number .  
383 (Ramirez ,  2007;  Ulaner ,  2008) .  
384 Among which:  the  UN Convent ion  to  Combat  Deser t i f ica t ion ,  the  UN Framework  on  
Convent ion  on  Cl imate  Change ,  the  UN Forum on Fores ts ,  Food and  Agr icu l ture  Organiza t ion  
and  the  In terna t ional  Union  for  Conserva t ion  of  Nature  (Bavika t te ,  2014,  pp .  16–20) .  
385 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  1 ) .  See  4 .1 .2 .  
386 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  16) .  
387  (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  2 ) .  
388 Among which ,  in  par t icu lar :  a r t ic le  8 j  and  10c  of  the  CBD,  and  Preamble  of  the  Nagoya  
Pro tocol .  
389 Pr inc ip le  22  of  the  Rio  Declara t ion  and  Sect ion  2 .10  and  3 .26  of  Agenda  21;  a r t ic le  6 .2 ,  7 ,  
12 .1  and  16  of  the  Nagoya  Pro tocol .  
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of life that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity»390 
and thus «denote all the rights required to secure the stewardship role of 
communities over their lands and waters»391,  and, Bavikatte argues, biocultural 
rights can provide a «people-led alternative to state-led technocratic solutions to 
the environmental crisis»392.  Biocultural rights - according to this view - dwell on 
values, worldviews, practices, knowledge and institutions of indigenous peoples 
and local communities beneficial for the conservation of the environment. 
Bavikatte describes them as rights of communities «that have historically cared for 
their ecosystems […] irrespective of whether or not they have a formal title to 
it»393.  «The demand for biocultural rights», he underlines, «does not take as its 
point of departure the inherent right of a group or community to flourish, but 
rather […] the ethic of stewardship: it  is the ethic of stewardship and not the 
group per se  that justifies the right»394.   
In biocultural rights discourse, the call of IPLCs for the recognition of rights over 
lands and natural resources is thus densely combined with the recognition of their 
role as “conservationists” of local ecosystems395.  Both claims are relevant at the 
global level but are rooted at the local level.  Since the 1970s indigenous peoples 
have engaged in an Earth-wide campaign for the recognition of their rights but, as 
their name reminds, it  is a global campaign of local peoples. The global character 
of environmental issues stemmed long before, when States understood that 
pollution and other eco-disasters do not respect national boundaries. The two 
claims merged in one bigger stream when the environmental movement started to 
abandon the fences and fines  approach396 and indigenous peoples began to be 
considered more as partners than opponents.  
Bavikatte and Robinson argue that even though the concept of biocultural rights 
recalls the right to self-determination, it  focuses on the need to protect the 
environment by enhancing the link between communities and ecosystems397.  They 
explain that biocultural rights build on two convergent claims398:  one for the 
                                                
390 (Harry  Jonas ,  Bavika t te ,  &  Shrumm, 2010,  p .  49) .  Jonas  and  Shrumm have  la te r  rev iewed 
the i r  pos i t ion ,  which  wi l l  be  d iscussed  be low 4 .3 .2 .  For  Jonas  and  Shrumm new pos i t ion ,  see  
(Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013)  and  (Hol ly  Jonas ,  Jonas ,  &  Subramanian ,  2013) .  
391 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  16) .  
392 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  18) .  
393 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  143) .  
394 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  142)  
395 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  16  and  21) .  
396 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  50) .  
397 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  50) .  
398 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  50) .  
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recognition of rights of indigenous peoples and local communities and the other 
for the ending of the unsustainable and destructive use of biodiversity 399.  
According to this construction, biocultural rights appear to be based on the 
following understandings:  
-  some indigenous peoples and local communities have maintained sustainable 
lifestyles relevant for the conservation of ecosystems and for the sustainable use 
of natural resources;  
-  these ways of life can survive and flourish only if such peoples and communities 
are secured certain group rights over lands, resources, culture, and customary law; 
- the recognition of this set of group rights can thus enable and enhance the 
conservation of ecosystems and the sustainable use of natural resources400.   
It  is these three understandings that converge in the theoretical construction of 
biocultural rights as a “basket” of rights (and, as will be discussed below, their 
inherent duties) promoting the two core interests forming its foundations:  
1) the promotion and conservation of the cultural diversity and self-determination 
of indigenous peoples;  
2) the conservation of the environment. 
4.1.2. Emerging (Biocultural) Rights 
In his book Bavikatte is clear when he writes that his aim is «to map a trajectory 
of biocultural rights as they emerge trough multilateral environmental agreements, 
domestic legislation, case law, shifts in the development discourse, and the 
struggles of communities»401.  He does not pretend to be describing existing 
international law, neither in the form of treaties and conventions, nor in the form 
of custom. His voice is the voice of the doctrine, of a public law scholar, and his 
hope is that by telling and retelling the story  of biocultural rights and through the 
elaboration of doctrines and theories elaborated by other scholars, who argue for 
or against their existence and that provide interpretations of relevant treaties and 
court decisions, biocultural rights will “come alive”402.  
                                                
399 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  50) .  
400 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  50) .  
401 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  3 ) .  
402 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  115) .  
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Of course, Bavikatte’s is not simply an idea stemming from his aspirations and 
hopes. The theoretical construct of biocultural rights is an imaginary wire that 
connects heterogeneous facts and words that have developed and are developing in 
the rhetoric, treaties, declarations and development projects concerning IPLCs and 
the conservation of the environment. Following is a small reconstruction of the 
elements that can be connected trough the biocultural rights’ wire. 
As we saw above403,  the increasing recognition of the link between indigenous 
peoples and the environment has influenced international political declarations and 
conventions and has lead to the recognition of specific provisions for indigenous 
peoples404,  understood to be essential for their survival as peoples, and to the 
inclusion of references to them in environment-focused documents. Such 
documents are nature-centred and propose indigenous’ practices as instrumental 
for the conservation of the environment, and call States to recognize them certain 
rights, in particular in the management of natural resources and to the preservation 
of traditional knowledge. Among them we can see the Brundtland Report,  Our 
Common Future ,  issued in 1987 by the UN World Commission on Environment and 
Development, which affirms that indigenous traditional knowledge and experience 
offer valuable lessons for the sustainable management of natural resources and 
ecosystems405.  Accordingly, the 1992 Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 call States to 
fulfil  their responsibility towards the environment respecting the right of 
indigenous peoples to participate in the management of their territories406 and to 
preserve and promote their traditional knowledge407.  They acknowledge that 
«indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a 
vital role in environmental management and development because of their 
knowledge and traditional practices»408.  In 1993, it  entered into force the first 
international binding agreement that recognizes the role of indigenous peoples for 
conservation, the Convention on Biological Diversity. The CBD was welcomed as 
a great step forward by indigenous peoples movements because, besides affirming 
                                                
403 See  3 .1 .3 .  
404 (Manus ,  2005) .   
405 (World  Commiss ion  on  Environment  and  Development ,  1987,  p t .  0 .0 . I I .1 .46  and  
I I .4 . I I I .3 .74) .  The  Brundt land  Repor t  a lso  s ta ted  tha t :  « the  s ta r t ing  poin t  for  a  jus t  and  humane 
pol icy  for  such  groups  i s  the  recogni t ion  and  pro tec t ion  of  the i r  t rad i t iona l  r igh ts  to  land  and  
the  o ther  resources  tha t  sus ta in  the i r  way of  l i fe  -  r igh ts  tha t  may def ine  in  te rms tha t  do  not  f i t  
in to  s tandard  lega l  sys tems.  These  groups '  own ins t i tu t ions  to  regula te  r igh ts  and  obl iga t ions  
a re  c ruc ia l  for  main ta in ing  the  harmony wi th  na ture  and  the  environmenta l  awareness  
charac ter is t ic  of  the  t rad i t ional  way of  l i fe»  (World  Commiss ion  on  Environment  and  
Development ,  1987,  p t .   I I .4 . I I I .3 .75) .  
406 Pr inc ip le  22  of  the  Rio  Declara t ion  and  Sect ion  2 .10  and  3 .26  of  Agenda  21 .    
407 Sec t ion  3  of  Agenda  21 .  
408 Pr inc ip le  22  of  Rio  Declara t ion .   
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the close dependency of indigenous and local communities on biological 
resources409,  articles 8j and 10c also explicitly recognizes the importance of their 
knowledge, innovations and practices for the conservation of the environment410.  
The CBD calls States to protect and encourage the wider application of their 
customary use of biological resources411 as a means to achieve its first goal, the 
conservation of biodiversity. In 2010, after extensive negotiations, the Parties to 
the CBD adopted the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing. It  entered 
into force in 2014 and its objective is the regulation of the access and use of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge412 as means to contribute to the 
conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its components413.  The 
Protocol reaffirms and develops what the CBD stated. The Protocol builds on the 
principle of sovereignty of States over the genetic resources found in their 
territories414 but limits this sovereignty trough the recognition of specific rights to 
IPLCs. In the Preamble, States agreed to avow the interrelationship between 
genetic resources and IPLC traditional knowledge and their importance for 
environmental conservation and for the sustainable livelihood of these 
communities415.  Article 5, 6 and 7 of the Protocols, in fact,  require States to ensure 
that genetic resources and traditional knowledge of IPLCs are accessed with the 
prior informed consent of the communities and peoples of origin and that the 
benefits arising from their use is equally shared with them. Moreover, article 12 
and 22 call Parties to implement their obligations under the Protocol taking in 
considerations, when dealing with the access and use of natural resources and 
traditional knowledge, indigenous and local communities’ customary laws as well 
as their community protocols, which are documents in which they assert their 
                                                
409 CBD Preamble .   
410 CBD Art .  8 j .  
411 CBD Art .  10c .  
412 Together  wi th  t rad i t iona l  lands  and  te r r i to r ies ,  t rad i t iona l  knowledge  is  cons idered  the  
foundat ion  of  ind igenous  cu l tures  and  i t s  conserva t ion  essent ia l  to  the i r  ex is tence  (Uni ted  
Nat ions  Permanent  Forum on Indigenous  Issue ,  2004) .  Tobin  (2009)  a rgues  tha t  ind igenous  
r igh ts  to  l i fe ,  hea l th ,  food ,  cu l ture  depend on  the  main tenance  and  development  of  such  
knowledge  as  a  dynamic  e lement  tha t  genera tes  f rom the  connect ion  wi th  the  na tura l  wor ld  and  
tha t  i s  co l lec t ive ly  he ld  and  shared  among communi t ies  and  peoples .  Throughout  the  wor ld ,  
t rad i t iona l  knowledge  i s  wide ly  accessed  for  research  wi th  non  commerc ia l  purposes  and  for  the  
research  on  the  development  of  new commercia l  p roducts  in  pharmaceut ica l ,  cosmet ic ,  food  and  
o ther  indus t r ies  (Lai rd  & Wynberg ,  2008;  Ten  Kate  & Laird ,  1999) .  Many are  the  examples  of  
ac ts  of  so  ca l led  b iopi racy  tha t  see  in terna t ional  corpora t ions  access ing  t rad i t ional  knowledge  
assoc ia ted  wi th  b io logica l  resources  wi thout  the  people /communi ty’  consent  and  remain ing  the  
only  benef ic ia r ies  of  somet imes  enormous  prof i t s  (Mgbeoj i ,  2006) .  
413 Ar t .  1 .  
414 Pr inc ip le  2  of  the  Rio  Declara t ion ,  a r t ic le  3  of  the  CBD,  Preamble  of  the  Pro tocol .  
415 The  Pro tocol  i s  a l ready  inf luencing  the  making  of  na t ional  leg is la t ions  in  many developing  
countr ies  and  is  thus  contr ibut ing  to  the  recogni t ion  of  ind igenous  r igh ts  over  t rad i t iona l  
knowledge  and ,  in  some Sta tes ,  to  the  genet ic  resources  found in  the i r  te r r i to r ies .   
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rights, goals and worldviews416.  Bavikatte defines the Nagoya Protocol as a 
«monumental achievement of communities»417 because it  is the product of years of 
struggles and fight of indigenous peoples’ representatives and international 
organizations such as the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity, in order 
to achieve an international recognition of their potential role for the conservation 
of the environment. 
In 2004, under the umbrella of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), it  
entered into force the Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA), which recognizes the so called farmers’ rights. Farmers’ rights are 
defined by FAO as: «rights arising from the past,  present and future contributions 
of farmers in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources, 
particularly those in center of origin/diversity. The purpose of these rights is 
stated to be ensuring full benefits to farmers and supporting the continuation of 
their contributions»418.  Article 9 recognizes the contribution that indigenous 
peoples and local communities and, more broadly, farmers make towards the 
conservation and development of plant genetic resources419.  It  calls States to 
promote, trough yet unspecified national measures, the conservation of the 
traditional knowledge and practices of farmers, to share the benefits arising from 
the use of farmers’ plant genetic resources and to involve them in relevant 
decision-making procedures. The article is of course very specific and concerns 
only plant genetic resources, but it  builds on the understanding of the role of 
certain IPLCs for the conservation of certain natural resources and calls States, 
though timidly, to promote such conservation trough the recognition of rights to 
IPLCs. 
Other environment-focused conventions, in particular the UN Convention on 
Combating Desertification and the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change420,  do not make, as yet,  explicit  reference to rights that may be framed as 
seeds of biocultural rights. However, they make reference to indigenous peoples 
                                                
416 For  a  case  s tudy  and  a  more  ex tens ive  explanat ion  of  what  such  pro tocols  a re ,  see  be low a t  
Par t  5  and  sec t ion  5 .3 .  
417 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  109) .  
418 (Food and  Agr icu l ture  Organiza t ion ,  1989) .  
419 (P i res  de  Carvalho ,  2007) .  
420 For  example ,  recent  ta lks  about  the  UN Program on  Reducing  Emiss ions  f rom Defores ta t ion  
and  fores t  Degradat ion  (REDD) -  a  program developed  wi th in  the  UNFCCC -  have  evolved  to  
inc lude  re ference  to  the  r igh ts  ind igenous  peoples  and  loca l  communi t ies  (REDD+).  REDD is  a  
program a imed a t  reducing  the  emiss ion  of  CO 2  gasses  by  compensa t ing  countr ies  tha t  dec ide  not  to  grant  logging  l icences  over  par ts  of  the i r  fores ts .  Even  though the  UN-REDD Programme 
has  commit ted  to  fos te r  the  respec t  of  the  r igh ts  of  ind igenous  peoples  and  fores t -dependent  
communi t ies ,  REDD is  s t i l l  under  development  and  many are  s t i l l  the  problems re la ted  to  i t s  
implementa t ion .  
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and local communities as subjects of special consideration or as subjects to be 
included in development programs421.  
Bavikatte suggests looking also at the rulings of the Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights and the African Court as evidence of the emergence biocultural 
rights. In the above-mentioned422 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua case, the Court ruled in favour of the Awas Tingni indigenous 
community on the ground of the special spiritual and cultural ties that link the 
community to their ancestral lands. The Court recognized communal property 
rights to the community against the decision of the Ministry of the Environment to 
licence the land to two logging companies423.  Bavikatte argues that the Court could 
have recognized land rights to the community without emphasizing its spiritual 
and cultural relationship with it .  Moreover, Bavikatte expresses doubts over the 
fact that the Court would have recognized property rights to the community had it  
had the intention to engage in for-profit  logging or other detrimental activities424 
In the Moiwana Village v. Suriname case425,  Bavikatte underlines426 the fact that the 
same Court recognized communal land rights to a former-slave community on the 
ground of their profound all encompassing relationship to their lands, and on the 
ground of their dependency on the land for their spiritual and cultural identity427.  
Bavikatte calls their relationship with the land a relationship of stewardship, 
where the community acts as a wise environmentalist because it  recognizes its 
material and spiritual dependency on the land428.  Similarly, in the Saramaka People 
v. Suriname case429,  the Court,  recalling the two previous rulings, recognized 
communal land and natural resources rights to the community on the ground of the 
special cultural and spiritual relationship its members have with the land430.  
Bavikatte argues that also this case is an example of the recognition of IPLC 
stewardship relationships with the environment431.  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 2009 a 
decision, then approved by the African Union at its January 2010 meeting in Addis 
Ababa, on the case Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya. The Endorois are an 
                                                
421 (Z iegler  e t  a l . ,  2008) .  
422 See  above  a t  1 .3 .1 .  
423 Mayagna  (Sumo)  Awas  Tingni  Communi ty  v .  Nicaragua ,  par  149 .  
424 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  149) .  
425 See  above  a t  1 .3 .1 .  
426 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  152) .  
427 Moiwana Vi l lage  v .  Sur iname,  par .  131 .  
428 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  152) .  
429 See  above  a t  1 .3 .1 .  
430 Saramaka People  v .  Sur iname,  par .  90 .  
431 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  157) .  
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indigenous people of about 60.000 members that have traditionally lived as 
pastoralist in the Rift Valley, in Kenya432.  In 1978 the Kenyan government declared 
the area the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve and evicted the Endorois, without their 
consultation and promising compensation for their displacement. By 2003 only a 
very little monetary compensation had been received by a small part of the 
community members and all other promises, including the sharing of the revenues 
deriving from the management of the Reserve and the distribution of new lands, at 
not been met. On that year the Endorois presented their case at the African 
Commission that ruled in their favour. The Commission recognized the Endorois to 
be indigenous peoples that had communal property rights over their traditional 
lands because of their continued occupancy (until  the forceful eviction) and 
because of their special religious and cultural relationship with the lands433.  The 
Court recognized that the relationship with the lands and their natural resources 
was paramount for their survival and identity and declared that only very 
exceptional public interests434 could justify their eviction with compensation. And, 
most interestingly, the Commission declared that in this case the creation of a 
conservation area was a non-reasonable justification because: «the Endorois – as 
the ancestral guardians of that land - are best equipped to maintain its delicate 
ecosystems […and] the Endorois are prepared to continue the conservation work 
begun by the Government»435.  As Bavikatte points out, the type of relationship that 
the Commission has noted between the Endorois and their lands is a relationship 
that «includes the duty of stewardship»436.  The Commission stressed that 
«validation of rights is not automatically afforded to […] pre-invasion and pre-
colonial claims»437.  The indigenous peoples must also «have an unambiguous 
relationship to a distinct territory and that all  attempts to define [them] recognise 
the linkages between people, their land, and culture»438.  
In each of these cases, Bavikatte argues, the Courts did not simply recognize group 
rights to lands on the ground of historical occupancy. They also provided 
«extensive treatment […] of the cultural,  spiritual and, in effect “all encompassing 
relationships” between peoples and territories»439.  And, he stresses, had there been 
evidence of ecologically destructive activities by the communities, the courts 
                                                
432 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  160) .   
433 Centre  for  Minor i ty  Rights  Development  (Kenya)  and  Minor i ty  Rights  Group (on  behal f  of  
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438 Endorois  Welfare  Counci l  v .  Kenya ,  par .  154 .  
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would have more likely recognized them rights to compensation for their evictions, 
rather than rights over the lands and natural resources440.  
International treaties, States’ declarations and Court decisions are accompanied by 
IPLC declarations on environmental protection, access and benefit sharing, climate 
change, extractive industries, protected areas, and sacred natural sites, which 
emphasize the role of indigenous peoples as custodians of the environment. Among 
them the 1997 Heart of Peoples Declaration, the 2012 Rio+20 Indigenous Peoples 
International Declaration on Self-determination and Sustainable Development, the 
1993 Maataatua Declaration on the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, the 2010 Declaration of Solidarity of the International 
Conference on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, Alternatives and Solutions to the 
Climate Crisis and the 2008 Statement of Custodians of Sacred Natural Sites and 
Territories. 
None of these treaties, declarations and court decisions uses the term biocultural 
rights, but the content and form of the rights or interests they recognize may be 
interpreted as matching with the spirit  or the definition of biocultural rights.  
However, I think that further research and time is needed to understand whether 
these words and facts may be considered to be signs of the emergence of 
biocultural rights. 
4.1.3. Conditions for Being and Remaining Stewards of the Environment 
Biocultural rights discourse is grounded on the assumption, discussed above441,  that 
there exist IPLCs that have maintained environmentally sustainable ways of life. 
Bavikatte and Robinson have argued that these «“way[s] of life” relevant for 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity [are] linked to secure land 
tenure, use rights and rights to culture, knowledge and practices»442.  An analysis of 
the literature reveals certain conditions that seem indispensable for a people or 
community to be free to maintain its traditional way of life and its role as stewards 
of the environment. 
Traditional institutions (formal and informal) need to be recognised as legitimate 
by the members of the community they exist for443.  Rebecca Tsosie argues that in 
order to exercise their authority, traditional institutions need to be combined with 
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441 See  above  Chapter  3 .2 .  
442 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  50) .  
443 (Tsos ie ,  1996,  p .  294) .  
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a certain degree of social cohesion444,  such that the members of the group share a 
coherent and common understanding and an acceptance of traditional norms and 
values445 and are «embedded in the social context»446.  A lack of social cohesion, she 
suggests, may make traditional mechanisms such as ostracism, shame, fear of bad 
luck, or positive incentives ineffective for guiding the behaviour of community 
members447.  Traditional local institutions are, moreover, the primary instrument 
giving voice and application to the needs, concerns and interest of the local people 
and for regulating the use of lands and natural resources448.  Local institutions are 
therefore fundamental to the maintenance of traditional knowledge and values, 
customary laws and to the intergenerational transmission of language and culture, 
thus centrally contributing to the enhancement of «the conservation potential of 
traditional cultural and spiritual beliefs and practices related to the local 
environment»449.   
A strong cultural identity confers a «sense of pride»450 through the identification 
with a certain heritage. When it  is strong and flourishing, cultural identity can 
foster the conservation of cultural practices, knowledge and languages that 
regulate and maintain the sustainable use of lands and natural resources451.  Local 
traditional languages are one of the major elements of cultural identity  and are one 
of the means to communicate and pass on, generation after generation, knowledge 
of local biodiversity, traditional resource use and management practices452.  
The «recognition and preservation of cultural identity, lifestyles, and 
livelihoods»453 is also contingent «on the protection and control of traditional land 
bases and associated natural resources»454.  Relationship with native land is «central 
to their collective identity and wellbeing»455.  If «displaced from the land which 
provides both physical and spiritual sustenance, native communities are hopelessly 
vulnerable» and their «existence is deprived of its coherence and 
distinctiveness»456.  The intensive imbrication between land and identity has 
particularly telling implications for the relationship between governmental policy 
and laws and local practices, and precisely because the imposition of governmental  
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policies and laws can undermine the preservation of traditional institutions, certain 
degrees of normative autonomy and self-determination are needed to preserve 
traditional institutions, rules and commons-like property systems457 in order «to 
ensure that not only their lands and resources but also their ways of life and 
livelihoods, institutions and identities, values and knowledge systems, cultural 
traditions and languages are protected»458.  Accordingly, «most major international 
conservation organizations [now] recognise that indigenous peoples’ self-
determination is critical for biodiversity conservation»459 and that «detrimental 
impacts on biodiversity conservation […] occur when dominant society fails to 
allow indigenous groups’ self-determination and control over their natural 
resources»460.  
4.1.4. Which Rights Best Preserve the Conditions for Stewardship? 
How can these conditions for stewardship  be preserved? This is an important 
question, to which biocultural rights are - in a sense - a response. The rights that 
may be considered to be part of the biocultural rights basket are precisely those 
needed to safeguard the conditions for «secur[ing] the stewardship role»461 of 
IPLCs. This section accordingly offers a translation into human rights-terms of the 
main conditions set out above in order to identify which sets of rights might 
plausibly emerge from a recognition of biocultural rights in international or 
national law and to suggest what fighting for the recognition of biocultural rights 
would entail.   
Accordingly, the basket of biocultural rights is not conceptualised as a static set of 
pre-selected rights. It  is a basket to be filled with the «rights required by 
communities to care for their lands and resources»462 and to protect their ways of 
life. Since each community or people will have different needs in terms of rights 
to maintain its way of life, the biocultural rights basket will necessarily vary from 
one context to another in response to local circumstance and nuances .  Such 
differences can be expected to exist in relation to communities’ and peoples’ 
traditions, to their relationship with local ecosystems and to their level of 
interaction or conflict with external actors.  
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The following categories of rights are those capable of being recognised as 
biocultural rights if the dual justificatory foundations of Bavikatte’s formulation 
is taken seriously. The aim here is to identify the categories of rights that can be 
understood - with conceptual consistency - to be biocultural rights on the basis of 
Bavikatte’s formulation - and in particular with reference to his overriding 
emphasis on environmental stewardship.   
1) Rights to land and natural resources.  These include: the right to access and use 
traditional lands of a community/people or of a sufficient portion of them; special 
access to sacred natural sites; access and use over biotic (plants, animals, bacteria 
and fungi) and a-biotic (water, soil,  air,  rocks) resources present in the land463;  
protection from external threats to the environment such as pollution, invasive 
species and climate change. These rights are self-evidently fundamental to any 
stewardship role placed upon IPLCs.  
2) Rights to self-determination.  Self-determination should be understood to be the 
overarching right in the biocultural rights basket, the prerequisite for the 
realisation of all  other rights464.  As Anaya explains, self-determination of IPLCs 
entails «meaningful self-government through political institutions that reflect their 
specific cultural patterns and that permit them to be genuinely associated with all  
decisions affecting them on a continuous basis»465;  the possibility of each people 
and community to regulate its internal matters through the use of its traditional 
legal institutions and rules466;  and the limitation of impositions of decisions taken 
by external actors on matters that influence the community. As for example: 
construction of infrastructures (e.g. dams and roads), exploitation of resources by 
extractive industries or creation of protected areas. Since both aspects of this 
formulation are «considered instrumental to [IPLC] capacities to control the 
development of their distinctive cultures, including their use of lands and 
recourses»467,  both are therefore essential for their ability to maintain their 
stewardship role for the environment. 
3) Rights to cultural identity.  This refers to those rights and conditions necessary 
to safeguard the integrity of the values and worldviews, practices and knowledge 
of IPLCs. These rights include the right to speak traditional languages, to profess 
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religious and spiritual practices, to the education of children, and to apply, 
preserve and teach traditional knowledge. In other words, the broader right to 
maintain cultural,  social and religious specificities without experiencing 
discrimination by the State and by the rest of society. Given the intimacy between 
traditional worldviews, practices and cultural identity with IPLC environmental 
stewardship, these rights are also fundamental to the nature of biocultural rights. 
Besides these substantive rights, procedural rights (such as the right to access to 
justice, the right to prior informed consent and the right to the application of a 
precautionary approach) seem to be essential elements in the basket of biocultural 
rights because they are the tools that IPLCs will need in order to prevent or to halt 
violations of biocultural rights (always intrinsically related to the prevention of 
environmental destruction) and are therefore essential for making biocultural 
rights enforceable, rather than merely paper, rights468.   
4.1.5. Biocultural Rights Predecessor: Traditional Resource Rights 
The rights listed so far are restricted to those relevant for the conservation of the 
environment. Their focus on the environment brings biocultural rights beyond their 
precursors: Traditional Resource Rights (TRRs)469.  A few words on TRRs are 
important to further illustrate the distinctiveness of biocultural rights.  
TRRs are baskets, or as Posey calls them bundles 470,  of rights conceived by Posey 
and Graham Dutfield in the 1990s471.  TRRs build on the idea that indigenous 
peoples and local communities472 live in a sacred balance473 with the environment 
and that,  in order to survive and flourish, such peoples and communities need the 
recognition not only of basic human rights, but also of rights over lands and 
resources, rights to self-determination and rights over their cultural and spiritual 
knowledge and values474.  
Posey was inspired to develop the idea of TRRs by the increasing need of IPLCs to 
find alternative economic resources to survive, to develop and to demand the 
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respect of their rights vis à vis  national governments475.  Crucially, Posey noted that 
IPLCs «must revert to ecological destruction, associated with atrophy of their own 
knowledge systems, in order to acquire the economic power they need to 
survive»476.  The only means of IPLC economic income, Posey writes, «require the 
destruction of tropical forests in order to be obtained»477.  In order to provide 
alternative sources of income for IPLCs, Posey calls for the recognition of IPLCs’ 
rights over traditional knowledge. He writes that bio-prospecting - the use of 
traditional knowledge to discover, develop and improve pharmaceutical,  cosmetic, 
alimentary, and other products - could support IPLCs’ lives, survival and 
development in non-destructive ways while, at the same time, promoting the 
conservation of their precious knowledge478.  
Posey then expanded the idea of TRRs beyond the protection of traditional 
knowledge to integrate otherwise diverse provisions in order to create bundles of 
rights to address the economic needs, as well as the human rights and 
environmental concerns, of IPLCs479.  In particular, Posey focused on the 
importance of promoting IPLCs’ rights to self-determination and cultural 
diversity480.  His bundle of TRRs over lands and resources includes respect for 
cultural differences and traditional institutions, prior informed consent and veto 
power over projects that may affect IPLCs481.  He also developed a political and 
legal project482 aimed at upholding IPLCs’ rights through a process of 
identification ,  harmonisation  and equitisation483 of rights already expressed in 
existing binding and non-binding international documents from fields as different 
as biodiversity conservation, human rights, intellectual property rights, trade and 
development484.  
Posey’s formulation of the idea of TRRs was a milestone in the development of the 
discourse about the rights of IPLCs in relation to the environment. The 
environment was presented as being an essential element for their survival and 
flourishing because of IPLCs’ special relationship with it .  Posey’s work was 
emphatically directed towards upholding the interests of peoples and communities 
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and, in order to achieve the realisation of this aim, he emphasised the need to 
recognise IPLC rights over the environment.  
In the TRR formulation, the environment is conceptualised as being instrumental 
for the protection of IPLCs’ interests. The foundational justification of TRRs is 
precisely the value of the self-determination of IPLCs and the preservation and 
development of their cultural diversity and identity. The protection of the 
environment is not, as in biocultural rights, one of the foundations of the right and 
hence one of the interest to be pursued for its own value. The protection of the 
environment is an instrumental value in TRRs, a need for the realisation of - and 
possibly also a consequence of - the interests of IPLCs justifying TRRs485.  TRRs - 
in fact - place no restriction upon IPLCs’ freedom to self-determine their destinies 
towards potentially unsustainable futures. 
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Chapter 4.2. What of Duties? 
4.2.1. The First Foundation 
Framing IPLC claims as biocultural rights claims brings with it  important 
challenges - particularly those that hinge upon the duties invoked by the dual 
relationship between the interests lying at the heart of the discourse - that of 
IPLCs and that of environmental conservation. If these two interests start to be 
perceived as sufficiently important to reach the status of interests inviting 
protection by international or national law486,  a question then arises concerning 
which duties would exist in relation to each of these rights-protected interests. 
Duties are a fundamental element of the analysis of rights, without them rights 
remain mere pretences487.  Accordingly, if we want to take biocultural rights 
seriously488 we need to examine the relevant duties arising and identify the holders 
of such duties. In the case of the first foundation (the IPLC interest in the 
promotion and conservation of cultural diversity and identity) this matter is 
relatively more straightforward than the second (the conservation of the 
environment).  
The promotion and conservation of the cultural diversity and self-determination of 
IPLCs is clearly a direct interest of IPLCs. It  is relatively straightforward to 
construct an account of such rights, their importance and the likely set of duties 
attaching to them. IPLC self-determination and cultural diversity is an interest 
capable of being considered important enough to justify the emergence of the 
rights listed in section 4.1.4 above, and, consequently, the emergence of a 
corresponding set of duties for the realisation of such rights. IPLCs, as the rights-
holders, are openly the subject to whom the duties would be due. The holders of 
corresponding duties (both to act and to refrain from acting) would most likely be 
States, private enterprises and the international community, since these are most 
likely to be able to affect the conservation of the cultural diversity and the self-
determination of IPLCs. States, for example, would likely have the duty to 
recognise secure land and resource rights489 and to respect local institutions, 
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decision-making processes, traditional practices and worldviews by refraining 
from imposing inappropriate levels of State interference, from limiting the use of 
local languages, and from forcing development, educational or other policies. 
Private enterprises would likely have the duty to respect the wills of IPLCs on 
their recognised lands and to act only after prior informed consent has been 
sought, and to respect IPLCs’ right to refuse projects and other interventions. The 
international community would also likely have a duty to refrain from imposing 
conservation or development projects, such as protected areas, unless they are 
discussed, processed and accepted by local peoples and communities. Under these 
circumstances, IPLCs would straightforwardly be claimants490 for the respect of 
their self-determination and cultural diversity rights vis à vis national States and 
their institutions; private enterprises and the international community. At times, 
however, other interested parties might well speak on IPLCs’ behalf,  as might be 
the case with non-governmental organisations or community-based organisations, 
but such parties - and their representations - would always need to be legitimated 
by IPCLs. 
4.2.2. The Second Foundation 
The second foundation, the protection of the environment, raises more complex 
issues. 
IPLCs directly benefit from the protection of their environment because they 
depend on lands and natural resources for their survival and flourishing and for the 
conservation and development of their cultural diversity. If the emergence of 
biocultural rights is postulated, this implies that such IPLC interests are 
considered important enough to justify placing a duty (to act and to refrain from 
acting) upon a range of actors to protect that environment. As in the previous case, 
States and private enterprises are still  among the actors most likely to be able to 
affect the conservation of the environment and therefore to protect this specific 
interest of IPLCs. Such actors would be obligated not to harm the lands and 
natural resources of IPLCs and, under certain conditions, would also have the duty 
to support remedial actions in degraded areas where biological diversity has been 
depleted. IPLCs would also remain, in this context, claimants for the protection of 
the environment vis à vis  States, private enterprises and, in certain cases, the 
international community. 
                                                
490 The  c la imants  a re ,  roughly  speaking ,  those  empowered  to  command the  enforcement  or  waive  
of  the  dut ies  connected  to  a  r igh t  or  to  some o ther  va lue .  
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It  is important at this stage to note the implicit duality at the heart of biocultural 
rights theoretical construction. The rights to be included in the basket are needed 
for IPLCs to secure their stewardship of the environment, hence the interest of 
IPLCs in maintaining their relationship with their traditional lands and ways of 
life with relative security from governmental interference is clearly in view. 
Importantly, it  is also the case that the rights chosen are those needed to protect 
the environment (through the maintenance of the above-mentioned conditions491).  
Is the protection of the environment only an interest of IPLCs or is it  a 
distinguishable concern? A closer look at their two foundations is needed because 
the relationship between the two foundations can be framed in two different ways. 
Option 1 
If protection of the environment were to be incorporated into biocultural rights as 
merely an IPLC interest -  hence creating only the duties suggested in the previous 
section - it  would not form a distinct second foundation of biocultural rights but 
would simply be a consequential object of their observance (as is the case with 
TRRs). The second foundation would be an appendix of foundation one. Bavikatte 
presents a visual representation of biocultural rights in the form of «a wheel with 
the circumference being the objective of conservation and sustainable use, the 
central hub being the ethic of stewardship and the spokes being the different 
biocultural rights that communities require to protect their ways of life»492 pulling 
together «seemingly disparate rights in order to achieve the objective of 
conservation»493.  The rights in the basket are the spokes that,  by protecting certain 
interests of IPLCs, protect the central hub. The central hub is the ethic of 
stewardship that,  overall,  leads to IPLCs conserving of the environment. From this 
visual representation, it  seems necessary to treat the conservation of the 
environment as a real foundation, not a mere appendix of the first foundation 
relevant only as an interest of IPLCs. Bavikatte states it  clearly, «biocultural 
rights base their claims on two foundations»494.   
Besides, if  biocultural rights were described simply as a basket of specific rights 
of IPLCs over environmental assets, they might be sees a simple reproduction of 
the idea of TRRs, and probably, given the fact that TRRs are more widely known 
and carry the legacy of Posey, TRRs would prove a more influential tool for 
deployment in the rhetoric of human rights. 
                                                
491 See  4 .1 .3 .  
492 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  234) .  
493 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  234) .  
494 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  50) .  
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Option 2 
The conservation of the environment is regarded as a self-standing interest. But, 
whose interest? Indeed, the general conservation of biodiversity, the preservation 
of the dynamic equilibrium of ecosystems, the safeguarding of the health of air,  
water and soil are the very goals of the environment-related documents from which 
biocultural rights, according to Bavikatte, seem to emerge495.  These documents, 
more or less explicitly, aim at protecting the interest of humankind towards the 
conservation of the environment496.  Therefore, it  seems to be possible to picture 
biocultural rights as constructed upon two real  foundations: one related to the 
interests of IPLCs and the other to what can be considered to be a more general 
interest of humankind in the conservation of the environment. IPLCs are 
accordingly in a direct stewardship relationship, not simply with their own lands 
and traditions, but with a broader context in which IPLCs are constituted as 
environmental stewards for a far broader human constituency - humankind itself.  
According to this interpretation, biocultural rights are located at a meeting point 
between two interests: that of IPLCs and that of humankind itself.  Hence 
biocultural rights have two beneficiaries and, accordingly to the Interest Theory of 
rights497,  two holders: IPLCs and humankind.  
This is a duality that lends to a certain complexity concerning the question of 
duties, which arise and change according to the way in which the holders of the 
interest are conceptualised. The duality of their foundation means that biocultural 
rights are limited to certain categories of right - and that such rights,  moreover, 
have a distinctive character driven by the imposition of the stewardship duty 
emerging from the second foundation (the conservation of the environment for the 
whole of humanity). Therefore, rights that respond to the needs and interests of 
IPLCs but which have no connection to the maintenance of this broader role as 
conservationists,  cannot be fully justified as biocultural rights because they would 
                                                
495 See  Preambles  and  Art ic les  1  of  CBD,  UN Convent ion  to  Combat  Deser t i f ica t ion ,  the  UN 
Framework  Convent ion  on  Cl imate  Change ,  the  Rio  Declara t ion ,  the  UN Forum on Fores ts ,  Food 
and  Agr icu l ture  Organiza t ion  and  the  In terna t ional  Union  for  Conserva t ion  of  Nature .  
496 The  CBD and is  Nagoya  Pro tocol ,  the  Rio  Declara t ion  and  Agenda  21 ,  and  the  o ther  
in te rna t ional  t rea t ies  and  dec lara t ions  c i ted  above ,  see  4 .1 .2 ,  a re  documents  f ramed to  address  
the  in te res t  o f  humankind ,  and  of  S ta tes ,  towards  the  conserva t ion  of  the  environment .  Even  i f  
they  recognize  the  in t r ins ic  va lue  of  na ture  none  of  them makes  re ference  to  the  r igh ts  of  na ture  
or  of  the  environment .  They  adopt  and  an thropocentr ic  approach  «based  on  the  v iew tha t  
environmenta l  pro tec t ion  i s  pr imar i ly  jus t i f ied  as  a  means  of  pro tec t ing  humans ,  ra ther  then  an  
end  in  i t se l f»  (Sands  e t  a l . ,  2012,  p .  776) .  The  appropr ia teness  of  the  choice  be tween an  
an thropocentr ic  and  a  cosmocent r ic  approach  towards  conserva t ion  wi l l  no t  be  d iscussed  here .  
However ,  re f lec t ing  the  approach  most  commonly  chosen  by  the  above  ment ioned  ins t ruments ,  i t  
i s  no t  a t tempted  an  in te rpre ta t ion  of  b iocul tura l  r igh ts  as  r igh ts  whose  holder ,  toge ther  wi th  
IPLCs,  i s  the  environment  i t se l f .  I t  i s ,  however ,  cons idered  to  be  a  po ten t ia l ly  in te res t ing  pa th  
of  ana lys is ,  which  wi l l  hopefu l ly  be  explored  in  fu ture  research .   
497 See  above  a t  2 .2 .2 .  
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not build on both foundations proposed as their justification. Logically, in the 
light of the second foundation for biocultural rights, all  the rights just enumerated 
can only  be considered to be part of the basket of biocultural rights if they are 
relevant for the stewardship role of IPLCs. It  is also impossible to select them a 
priori ,  with no reference to a specific people/community, because the basket of 
biocultural rights, as noted above, adapts from one case to another according to 
local circumstances and nuances. Accordingly, certain rights, such as the right to 
land and natural resources will be necessary for all  communities and peoples 
performing a stewardship function,  while others, such as the right to language, may 
not always be justifiable as biocultural rights in a given specific context because 
they may not always have relevance for the conservation of the environment. 
4.2.3. Noble Savages or Ideological Trap? 
It has been argued here that the conservation of the environment is also a general 
interest of humankind. As noted above, the rights included in the biocultural rights 
basket are precisely those needed to maintain the stewardship role of IPLCs 
towards the environment and, consequently, to protect,  also, this general interest.  
In order to understand how this general interest is protected, a little further 
reflection on the stewardship role of IPLCs is helpful.   
If we assume that IPLCs are and will remain sustainable once their biocultural 
rights are protected, then the implication is that the general interest in the 
conservation of the environment is more or less automatically protected once the 
rights of IPLCs are guaranteed and the only duties requiring operationalization - in 
such a situation - would be those of States, private enterprises and the 
international community. However, this is an implication based upon an unstable 
assumption. Simply providing rights to land and resources, rights to self-
determination and rights to preserve distinct cultural identities to IPLCs does not 
imply - much less guarantee - that the interested community/people will maintain 
its sustainable lifestyle forever. IPLC practices, rules and beliefs may not always 
remain «in line with conservation goals»498.  IPLCs might conceivably take 
decisions that lead to unsustainable consequences for their lands and resources, 
and they may also voluntarily decide to not act as stewards of the environment 
anymore.  
It  is accordingly essential that biocultural rights discourse should keep a distance 
from noble savage rhetoric and its ideological trap because otherwise the general 
                                                
498 (Berkes ,  2004,  p .  625) .  
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interests of humankind in environmental preservation, one of biocultural rights 
protected interests, would not be really taken in consideration. Moreover, any such 
mythology would leave biocultural rights relatively weak in the face of data 
showing the potential threat that IPLCs themselves might pose to the environment. 
The logic of biocultural rights within Bavikatte’s construction of them suggests 
that biocultural rights approaches either fall  in the ideological trap of the noble 
savage, or need explicitly to incorporate (something Bavikatte does not seem to 
do) the possibility of the effect of IPLC traditions and practices ceasing to be 
sustainable. If IPLCs were entirely free to change sustainable lifestyles to suit 
IPLC needs, they would potentially disregard the second foundation of biocultural 
rights. The dual foundations of Bavikatte’s formulation - especially when located 
against a stewardship duty on behalf of humankind - present a significant tension. 
This strategy brings significant challenges, some of which will now be introduced. 
4.2.4. Challenges to Imposing a Duty 
It is worth noting that such a conceptual foundation for the identification of rights 
is unusual within the human rights tradition. While the broad justificatory 
argument for biocultural rights laid out by Bavikatte shares a certain resonance 
with the Interest Theory of rights, and while biocultural rights are conceptualised 
as being an emergent category of group rights, they are distinctively linked to a 
general interest in the conservation of the environment elevated to the rank of a 
dual justificatory foundation beside (and in potential tension with - as will be 
discussed below) the interests of one of the rights-holders, IPLCs499.  
The logic of biocultural rights suggests that failure to observe a duty of 
sustainability might justify the withdrawal of the right itself or some other sort of 
punishment. An IPLC duty to be and to remain sustainable (through appropriate 
                                                
499 This  formula t ion  of  a  human r igh t  (or  basket  thereof)  i s  unusual .  Very  of ten  human r igh ts  a re  
represented  fo l lowing  the  descr ip t ion  provided  by  Dworkin  (Dworkin ,  1977) .  As  seen  above  a t  
2 .3 .1 ,  he  descr ibes  human r ights  as  t rumps  tha t  win  over  cons idera t ions  of  genera l  in te res ts  
(Waldron ,  1984,  p .  17)  because  they  pro tec t  human in teres ts  cons idered  so  fundamenta l  as  to  
t rump over  the  in teres t  o f  the  communi ty  as  a  whole  (Dworkin ,  1984,  p .  153) .  See  above  a t  
2 .3 .1 .  An example  might  make  th ings  c learer :  the  f reedom of  speech  is  commonly  unders tood  to  
be  a  human r ight .  I t  p ro tec ts  the  in te res t  o f  every  person  to  express  her  ideas  and  to  
communica te  wi th  o ther  people .  I f  f reedom of  speech  were  to  be  condi t ioned  by  a  genera l  
in te res t  in  the  growth  of  knowledge  and  cu l ture  (very  impor tan t  indeed)  a l l  sor ts  of  problems 
would  ar ise .  Only  those  books ,  speeches ,  v ideos ,  e tc .  tha t  provide  a  growth  of  knowledge  would  
be  publ ishable ;  someone  (who?)  would  have  to  be  en t i t led  to  dec ide  what  counts  as  a  
publ ica t ion  contr ibut ing  to  the  growth  o f  knowledge ;  some people  would  be  exc luded  f rom the  
ambi t  of  an  accord ingly  condi t ioned  f reedom of  speech  because  of  the i r  unconvent ional  ideas ,  
and  so  on .  Condi t ion ing  the  f reedom of  speech  in  th is  way seems unacceptable  to  a l l  o f  us ,  
because  we perce ive  the  in teres t  o f  every  person  to  be  f ree  to  communica te  as  be ing  more  
impor tan t  than  the  genera l  in te res t  in  the  growth  of  knowledge .  For  a  d i f fe ren t  pos i t ion  see  
(Lei te r ,  2014) .  
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adaptation where necessary), in other words, seems minimally to imply the need 
for some kind of sanction if the State and the international community fulfil  their 
respective duties and yet the IPLC fails to. However, this has problematic 
implications. 
First,  if  we accept the idea of biocultural rights as inherently implying a duty of 
environmental conservation in the interests of humankind as a whole, then IPLCs 
would in effect be granted not just a basket of rights, but placed under a bundle of 
duties. Accordingly, the right to self-determination recognised as the overarching 
biocultural right is given an environmentally limited content. While in the light of 
relatively static assumptions about the nature of IPLCs such duties may seem to be 
in line with IPLCs own values and desires, in a world of changing contexts and 
complex pressures, such duties could become a burden upon IPLCs in direct 
conflict with their right to self-determination.  
We could seek to meet this objection by emphasising that the duty to maintain a 
role as stewards of the environment does not necessitate static perpetuation of 
traditional ways of life. IPLCs can remain free to (self)determine their ways of life 
and to develop their culture, traditions and practices in line with their desires, 
wills and needs, to adapt to external inputs or evolve internal changes. They 
might, for example, abandon certain life practices and combine their traditions 
with techniques, knowledge and practices acquired from other societies. However, 
it  would remain non-negotiable for them to do so while maintaining sustainability. 
Their right to self-determination would still  therefore have a distinctive 
conceptual limit: the conservation of the environment. 
What if it  is the case of a community that guarantees good conservation of the 
local environment but not the best  level of conservation possible? It could be the 
case, for example, that a conservation project,  as a typical protected area, is more 
efficient. Are we to say that conservation of the environment has a limit in the 
respect and preservation of the self-determination and cultural identity of IPLCs? 
Or, would an increase in environmental conservation justify a decrease in the 
promotion of IPLC interests? As we saw above biocultural rights have two 
foundations and both have the same value and weight. None of the two may be 
disregarded if we are to remain within the boundaries of biocultural rights. The 
two interests would therefore have to be balanced500,  weighted against each other, 
in the attempt to protect at least partially both of them and to limit their 
realization to the less possible extent, because biocultural rights are neither purely 
                                                
500 See  above  a t  2 .3 .2 .  
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environmental rights nor purely IPLC rights.  Indeed, balancing techniques lead, by 
definition, to the sacrifice of certain aspects of the interests but they are, 
nevertheless, necessary in any case of conflict between rights or, as in this case, 
among the interests justifying a right. In might be the case that some strategic 
considerations help us face in the balancing process: conservation without local 
communities involvement is more costly because of the need to find alternatives 
for the community; lack of community participation often hinders the long term 
sustainability of the conservation actions; more inputs from the outside are needed 
in terms of management and patrolling of the area; community members may 
become themselves a threat to the conservation of a land and resources from which 
they cannot benefit anymore501.  However, it  will  always be a costly decision. 
Secondly, if IPLCs were to be placed under such a duty, then one or more other 
subjects would need to be recognised as claimants of that duty. This raises a 
challenge. The subject for whom this duty exists is conceived of as “humankind”, 
but humankind is not a definite entity. The most likely representatives of 
humankind are States and some elements of civil society (Non Governmental 
Organisations, Community Based Organizations, Foundations and the like) that 
might claim to represent the interests of humankind to the conservation of the 
environment (more or less sincerely). However, this solution also produces 
tensions because the putative claimants also correspond to the very kinds of actors 
that tend to violate the rights of IPLCs (States) or correspond to actors that 
currently have little or no power to require the enforcement of the duty. The 
involvement of the international community could provide a potential solution, 
perhaps building on the tools that might be offered by the Nagoya Protocol, but 
this point needs further development and research.   
Thirdly, the question of sanctions raises as yet unresolved matters. What 
sanctions, besides the loss of their entitlement to biocultural rights, might IPLCs 
be subject to if they do not comply with their duty and what conception of a 
protected environment should be applied, in any case, to judge the actions of 
IPLCs? The first question needs further exploration of international and national 
instruments for the enforcement of duties and might vary from one country to 
another. The second question requires an extensive study of environmental 
conservation standards in combination with a study of different conceptions of the 
environment held by IPLCs and by international environmental law itself.  It  is 
fundamentally problematic to propose the imposition of duties and liabilities on 
                                                
501 See  above  a t  3 .1 .2  and  3 .1 .3 .  
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populations with variant concepts and conceptions of “the environment” and/or to 
have an uncritical approach to the value of environmental conservation. 
Biocultural rights discourse, in order to develop to full maturity, will  need to 
develop responses to such important questions.  
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Chapter 4.3. A Sui Generis Right: Customary Legal Systems and Strategic 
Considerations 
4.3.1. A Sui Generis Human Right 
Given the overall picture that emerges from this analysis - in which biocultural 
rights materialise as “conditioned rights” that come with duties and that protect a 
general interest of humankind - biocultural rights appear to be sui generis as 
human rights. It  does seem possible to try to overcome the tension identified above 
by suggesting that biocultural rights should be understood explicitly to operate as 
a sui generis  legal concept attempting to create a bridge between human rights as 
commonly understood in western  legal systems and IPLC legal (and more broadly, 
normative) practices502.   
As noted above503,  human rights have traditionally been conceived as 
predominantly individual rights: as a means to protect certain interests and needs 
of individual subjects, regardless of and against the general interest of the rest of 
the community/State504.  Western legal systems can be considered to be rights-
based505,  shaped around the aim of enhancing the interests of each subject because 
she or he is perceived as having a self-standing value superior to that of the 
group506.  In contrast,  IPLCs tend to «challenge the individualistic approach to 
human rights»507.  IPLC legal approaches may, in fact,  be described as duty-based508 
because they are shaped around the aim of safeguarding the existence of the group 
by ensuring the conformity of individual actions with a certain code of rules. IPLC 
normative practices rest upon the understanding that no member of a community 
can survive except within the community509 and that the community itself cannot 
survive if detached from the surrounding natural world. Thus, the wellbeing of the 
community depends on the wellbeing of the environment. For such worldview 
systems, as Bavikatte argues, the environment is «so integrally intertwined with 
community life that it  represents an entire way of being and knowing»510 and «the 
defence of Nature for these communities represented a defence of a “cosmovision” 
                                                
502 Given  the  d ivers i ty  and  r ichness  of  IPLCs’  lega l  sys tems,  de ta i led  research  would  be  needed  
in  order  to  provide  a  comprehens ive  p ic ture  of  the i r  t rad i t ions .  I  here  a t tempt  to  ident i fy  some 
common fea tures ,  consc ious  of  the  the i r  very  genera l  and  superf ic ia l  na ture .  
503 See  sec t ion  2 .3 .3 .  
504 (Waldron ,  1984,  p .  1 ) .  
505 (Bobbio ,  1988) .  
506 (Bobbio ,  1988) .  
507 (Niezen ,  2003,  p .  133) .  
508 (Bobbio ,  1988) .  
509 (Cul l inan ,  2002,  p .  114;  Masolo ,  2004 ,  p .  492) .  
510 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  6 ) .  
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and of the very notions of self and Community»511.  Accordingly, the overall goal of 
the rules of IPLC legal approaches could be considered to be the promotion and 
conservation of the wellbeing of the environment and, consequently, of the group.  
Customary laws impose duties and limits on the members of the community in 
order to provide for the protection of the environment, and by commanding the 
protection of the environment such customary laws aim to ensure the protection of 
the community, future generations and the individual subject him/herself.  For as 
long as it  remains true that there is a densely imbricated co-dependency between 
community and local environment in this way, the duty made conditional for the 
concept of biocultural rights might not after all  be an unacceptable imposition of 
the environmental expectations of an eco-awakening international legal system 
based on worldview commitments incompatible with IPLC commitments. In such a 
traditionally intimate human-environmental relationship, the recognition of a 
stewardship duty might appear to be a step towards the recognition of rights 
mirroring a fundamental structure of IPLC legal approaches and practices: a 
structure at the centre of which there is the protection of the environment. 
However, as has already been noted, the fact that IPLCs might adapt their 
customary laws, beliefs and worldviews to an encroaching economic system and a 
wider, globalising world includes the possibility that the environment loses its 
centrality in IPLC legal approaches, values and norms. Precisely because this may 
happen, biocultural rights position themselves at an uneasy borderline between the 
IPLC right to self-determination and the conservation of the environment. In this 
set of tensions, the conservation of the environment - as an enforceable legal duty 
placed upon IPLCs as environmental stewards for the whole of humankind - is 
potentially balanced with the entitlements of IPLCs - with concomitant duties 
being placed on States, corporate actors and international institutions.  
In short,  the rhetoric and strategy of biocultural rights build on the tension 
emerging from the dual foundations of biocultural rights, with potentially complex 
implications for IPLCs. 
4.3.2. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities: Rhetoric, Strategy 
and the Need for Critical Awareness  
The traditional intimacy between IPLCs and their living environments and natural 
resources is an important reason for the emergence of a biocultural rights 
                                                
511 (Bavika t te ,  2014,  p .  6 ) .  
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discourse. This intimacy, also recognised by IPLCs themselves, is also a strong 
reason why an engagement with biocultural rights as an emergent category of 
human right is so important to address – because, when placed within the existing 
human rights and environment debate, it  is a hopeful clue to finding ways to 
address the current global environmental crisis.  That said, it  is important to 
acknowledge that placing so much emphasis upon the relationship between IPLCs 
and the environment requires us to bear in mind a warning issued by Jared 
Diamond: 
«Above al l ,  i t  seems to  me wrongheaded and dangerous to  invoke his tor ical  
assumptions about  environmental  pract ices  of  nat ive peoples  in  order  to  
just i fy  t reat ing them fair ly .  […] By invoking this  assumption to  just i fy  fa ir  
t reatment  of  nat ive peoples ,  we imply that  i t  would be OK to mistreat  them if  
that  assumption could be refuted» 512.  
To emphasise the environmental role of IPLCs does indeed present the danger of 
subordinating IPLC rights to a role as environmental stewards. Biocultural rights, 
as conceived by Bavikatte (and drawn from environment-related international 
documents and agreements) cannot evade this danger, since the theoretical 
construct of biocultural rights is grounded precisely on IPLCs’ stewardship role 
towards ecosystems and biodiversity - and not just in their own interests - on 
behalf of the environmental interests of humankind as a whole. How then, might 
this danger be addressed? 
Jonas et al .  in The Living Convention513 argue that this danger implies the need to 
draw a distinction between indigenous peoples and local communities within 
biocultural rights discourse. The concept of biocultural rights as presented by 
Bavikatte refers to both indigenous peoples and to local communities, and the two 
groups are co-referents for the same umbrella of rights. Jonas et al . ,  by contrast,  
suggest that biocultural rights may be appropriate to describe the claims that local 
communities are making, but not the claims of indigenous peoples514.  This 
suggestion hinges on the special dependency of local community rights on 
environmental contexts - a factor distinguishing them from indigenous peoples 
(which possess a special recognition in their own right).  Local communities, Jonas 
et al.  argue, unlike indigenous peoples, lack recognition in international law and 
are only lately gaining acknowledgment: despite the fact that the Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights has recently recognised certain indigenous rights of local 
                                                
512 (Diamond,  2005,  pp .  9–10) .  
513 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013) .  
514 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  26) .  
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communities of descendants of African slaves515,  local communities cannot yet be 
regarded as holding the same rights or status as do indigenous peoples516.  
The first  recognition of local communities as right-holders is found in article 8j of 
the CBD517,  and such recognition has since appeared in many other international 
documents issued by UN bodies, UN treaties and other international 
organisations518.  In all of these documents, as noted above519,  local communities 
come within the framework of consideration because of their relationship with the 
environment. They come into consideration, in other words, precisely because of 
their role for the conservation of certain environmental assets or ecosystems - not 
because of their existence as communities. For such communities, therefore, the 
linkage between biocultural rights and stewardship duties does not seem to present 
the same kind of dangers as it  does for indigenous peoples. For Jonas et al.  «it  
seems appropriate to talk of local communities» biocultural rights because «this 
approach better describes the claim they are making and consequently the specific 
rights for which they are calling»520.  By contrast,  Jonas et al .  argue that indigenous 
peoples are holders of indigenous rights and «can exercise certain rights under 
international law regardless of the type of lifestyle they lead»521.  They can claim 
indigenous rights, widely recognised in international law, purely because of their 
indigenous status  and regardless of their stewardship role towards the 
environment522.  The true foundation of indigenous rights «is an extensive 
connection to the land of their ancestors and the critical importance that has for 
their identities and contemporary ways of life»523.  Such rights, Jonas et al.  argue, 
do not  arise from environmentally related considerations and do not bind their 
holders to any conservation-oriented conduct: «indigenous rights were developed 
within the framework of general human rights»524 and, as such, they are specially 
secured. Biocultural rights, by contrast,  are sui generis human rights based on a 
general interest for the conservation of the environment in combination with the 
special interests of their holders, and are, accordingly, inherently limited and 
attached to duties. Therefore, for Jonas et al . ,  unlike for Bavikatte and Robinson, 
                                                
515 (Antkowiak ,  2007) .  For  re ferences  and  more  info  on  the  In ter -American  Cour t  cases ,  see  
above  a t  1 .3 .1 .  
516 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  26) .  
517 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  24) .  
518 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  24) .  For  example ,  in  reso lu t ions  of  the  Conference  of  the  Par t ies  
and  Guidel ines  of  the  Ramsar  Convent ion  on  Wet lands ,  reso lu t ions ,  po l icy  documents  and  
guide l ines  of  the  In terna t ional  Union  for  the  Conserva t ion  of  Nature  ( IUCN) and  the  World  
Wild l i fe  Fund (WWF).  
519 See  sec t ion  1 .3 .1 .  
520 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  26) .  
521 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  26) .  
522 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  26) .  
523 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  23) .  
524 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2013,  p .  23) .  
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biocultural rights discourse is not appropriate for encapsulating the rights of 
indigenous peoples. 
The critique presented by Jonas et al.  requires the clarification of three further 
points concerning the theoretical construction of biocultural rights and how this 
relates to international law and to indigenous peoples’ interests. 
The first clarification concerns whether indigenous peoples are or are not holders 
of biocultural rights. This is a matter of definition. This thesis has analysed the 
formulation of biocultural rights as provided by Bavikatte and Robinson and based 
on the words of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, all  referring to “indigenous and 
local communities”. Under this definition of biocultural rights, those indigenous 
peoples that have preserved sustainable lifestyles meet the requirements to be 
regarded as holders of biocultural rights (though their retention of that status, as 
has been explored above, remains conditional on the maintenance of sustainable 
lifestyles). 
The second clarification concerns whether, as Bavikatte and Robinson argue, 
biocultural rights are “emerging” (in the process of being recognised) rights in  
international law, and if so, to what extent - or whether biocultural rights are more 
accurately understood to be a theoretical construction de iure condendo ,  a political 
ideal to be pursued. As discussed above525,  this point,  though important, is left 
open for future investigation.  
The third clarification concerns the question of whether it  would be strategically 
helpful for indigenous peoples to ask for the recognition of biocultural rights or 
whether they might encounter more costs than benefits by framing their claims in 
these terms. Might biocultural rights improve the chances of indigenous peoples 
seeing their interests protected and counteract a history of marginalisation? First,  
the recognition of biocultural rights would not enhance the legal position of 
indigenous peoples. This is because such peoples are already holders of the rights 
included in the basket of biocultural rights as holders of indigenous rights. 
Indigenous rights, as has been noted, are already recognised in international law 
and are therefore protected by international courts (such as the Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights).  Indigenous peoples are not constructed by such 
law and cases as holders of a duty to conserve the environment, and nor is their 
right to self-determination thereby limited. Secondly, as has been argued here, the 
                                                
525 See  above  4 .1 .2 .  
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use of biocultural rights arguments to promote indigenous interests could present 
the danger, as raised by Diamond526,  of conditioning indigenous rights to 
environmental considerations. This runs the additional risk of tying the discourse 
about indigenous peoples’ rights to their role in the conservation of the 
environment rather than to their extensive connection to ancestral lands.  
Despite these dangers, however, it  is possible that demanding the recognition of 
rights under the label of biocultural rights could be strategically useful for some 
indigenous peoples still  struggling to see their indigenous rights upheld by a State. 
Many developing countries are facing a strong call from the international 
community for the conservation of the environment within their territories. Many 
States struggle to address this call because of limited economic resources and 
because they are also called upon to promote the costly implementation of rights to 
health, to education, to food and water, and indigenous peoples’ rights. A State 
might therefore be more inclined to attend to a call for biocultural rights rather 
than to a direct call for indigenous rights because biocultural rights discourse 
addresses a human rights issue and simultaneously comes with the “compensation” 
of environmental conservation. 
There is a second potential strategic advantage to biocultural rights discourse: 
their rhetoric can sound more politically neutral,  precisely because, as Bavikatte 
and Robinson argue, biocultural rights do not carry the «undertone of self-
determination that made States nervous»527.  This is precisely because biocultural 
rights «were predominantly lobbied for […] as “environmental rights” of 
communities to ensure biodiversity conservation»528,  thus directing governments’ 
attention towards environmental and human rights issues rather than to self-
determination claims. 
Thirdly, and even more importantly - and relevant for local communities as well - ,  
biocultural rights could yet be a strategic instrument to help IPLCs to protect their 
ways of life through a much needed landscape approach529 as an answer against the 
                                                
526 See  beginning  of  th is  sec t ion .  
527 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  50) .  
528 (Bavika t te  & Robinson ,  2011,  p .  50) .   
529 (Harry  Jonas ,  Jonas ,  &  Makagon,  2014) .  The  landscape  approach  p roposes  to  look  for  the  
appropr ia te  r igh ts  to  recognize  to  a  cer ta in  communi ty  or  people  by  looking  a t  the  d i f fe ren t  
human and  na tura l  e lements  of  the  landscape  where  they  l ive .  I t  i s  an  evolu t ion  of  the  
ecosys tem approach  p roposed  by  the  CBD.  The  la t te r  was  proposed  as  an  a l te rna t ive  to  the  
spec ies  approach  common unt i l  tha t  moment  in  in terna t ional  law.  The  ecosys tem approach  is  the  
guid ing  pr inc ip le  of  a l l  p rograms of  work  of  the  CBD and «is  based  on  the  appl ica t ion  of  
appropr ia te  sc ien t i f ic  methodologies  focused  on  leve ls  of  b io logica l  organiza t ion ,  which  
encompass  the  essent ia l  s t ruc ture ,  p rocesses ,  funct ions  and  in terac t ions  among organisms and  
the i r  envi ronment .  I t  a lso  recognizes  tha t  humans ,  wi th  the i r  cu l tura l  d ivers i ty ,  a re  an  in tegra l  
component  of  many ecosys tems» (Secre tar ia t  o f  the  Convent ion  on  Bio logica l  Divers i ty ,  2004) .  
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current fragmentation of landscape by national and international law. Biocultural 
rights could prove strategically useful modes of claim in a context where there are 
an increasing number of laws, programs and declarations concerning indigenous 
peoples and local communities and the protection of the environment providing for 
rights to access to land, benefit sharing, traditional knowledge, carbon emissions, 
protected areas and much more, but which are essentially fragmented, addressed by 
different bodies, and found in diverse sources and categories of law530.  IPLCs, in 
order to protect interconnected aspects of their lives - all  part of the same 
biocultural landscape - have presently to engage with a plethora of legal sources: 
«at least with the laws and institutions addressing land, biodiversity,  agriculture, 
protected areas, and potentially access and benefit sharing»531.  This process of 
fragmentation of the local landscape by national and international law, is one of 
the reasons that inspired Posey to develop his TRR integrated rights approach532 
and to look for a more comprehensive body of law that specifically addresses the 
overall issues facing IPLCs533.  Bavikatte’s deployment of rights under one 
umbrella label has the advantage that biocultural rights might hold out the 
political hope of presenting a single interdependent and comprehensive call:  a 
claim for the recognition of biocultural rights could draw together all  of the 
different rights needed to promote the self-determination and conservation of the 
cultural diversity of a community or people. 
Based on these three strategic advantages, and given the fact that many indigenous 
peoples are still  struggling to see their indigenous status recognised by their 
States534,  biocultural rights discourse and claims could provide an alternative route 
for the fulfilment of indigenous claims. However, as the analysis here has clearly 
suggested, this strategy, for all  i ts promise, is not without risk: for indigenous 
peoples to frame their call for rights in biocultural rights terms would not be a 
decision without a price to pay, and they would be claiming a category of rights 
which, unlike indigenous rights in international law, are inherently conditioned to 
the conservation of the environment. Any such strategy, therefore, should remain 
advertant to the potential threats lurking within claims for biocultural rights and 
proceed with considerable critical awareness of their implications. 
Before moving to conclusions, I will briefly discuss one more critique that could 
be raised to the theoretical construct of biocultural rights: that they are nothing 
                                                
530 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2014) .  
531 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2014) .  
532 (Harry  Jonas  & Shrumm, 2012) .  
533 (Harry  Jonas  e t  a l . ,  2014) .   
534 (Xanthaki ,  2007,  p .  133) .  
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more than a set of distinct rights and duties of different subjects, i .e.  right to self-
determination of indigenous peoples, right of local communities to maintain 
traditional and sustainable ways of life, right of humankind to the conservation of 
the environment, duty of States to respect the rights of IPLCs, duty of IPLCs to 
conserve the environment, and so on. And, it  follows, there is no such a thing as 
biocultural rights, but only distinct rights and duties gathered by Bavikatte under 
one name. This critique appears to me to be correct but wrongly placed. It  is true 
that biocultural rights are an assemblage of rights and duties distinguishable one 
from another, and this is also, indeed, how they have been described. But it  is also 
true that these rights and duties derive, logically and necessarily from two 
common justifications. Following an Interest Theory approach, one or more 
interests (justifications) considered worth of legal protection give rise to one or 
more rights, and necessarily of duties. Truth is that biocultural rights have an 
unusual configuration of the holders of rights and duties, as they at times overlap 
– IPLCs are both right and duty holders. However it  is not a requirement of the 
Interest Theory that the holders of rights are not also holders of duties. Moreover 
this critique would be wrongly addressed. The reason why, as I have explained, the 
theoretical construct of biocultural rights is appropriate, is not because it  raises 
new un-debated interests, but because, by gathering these interests together, it  
facilitates the addressing of certain problems. As explained above, there are 
strategic  considerations to use biocultural rights, to claim for them rather than for 
claiming for many distinct rights in different fora ,  or than claiming for more 
politically-challenging rights, such as indigenous peoples’ rights or self-
determination rights. Hence, the critique is correct when saying that biocultural 
rights gather distinct rights and duties, but it  fails to see how they derive from 
common protected interests and it  fails to recognize the strategic, rather than 
ontological,  relevance of the theoretical construct of biocultural rights. 
106 
 
Chapter 4.4. Conclusions 
Part 4 of the thesis has presented an exploration of the theoretical construct of 
biocultural rights as proposed by Bavikatte (and, to a lesser extent, by Robinson). 
The analysis has engaged with the dual foundations of biocultural rights in the 
self-determination and cultural identity of IPLCs, and conservation of the 
environment - and has explored the consequences of this heterogeneous 
combination of protected interests.  
As has been emphasised, Bavikatte’s construction of biocultural rights centrally 
hinges upon an assumption that many indigenous peoples and local communities 
have a special stewardship role towards the environment, and that such a role 
needs the protection of certain rights in order to be maintained. Here, these rights 
were identified in three sets: rights to land and resources, rights to self-
determination and rights to cultural identity. Each of these sets collects those 
rights useful for communities and peoples to conserve their lifestyles relevant for 
the conservation of the environment, and accordingly, form the core entitlements 
provided by biocultural rights. In order for such rights to be fulfilled States, 
private companies and international institutions have to abide by the 
corresponding duties (such as allowing indigenous peoples and local communities 
to live in their traditional lands, guaranteeing access and use of the natural 
resources found in those lands, refraining from imposing projects without prior 
informed consent, etc.).  However - and crucially - the analysis offered here has 
suggested that these duties are not the only duties that biocultural rights give rise 
to. Environmental conservation is a justificatory foundation of biocultural rights, 
not only as an interest of IPLCs, but also as an interest of humankind - drawn from 
environment-focused international and national documents whose goal is precisely 
the protection of the environment for the benefit of the whole world. Hence both 
indigenous peoples and local communities and the rest of humankind are holders 
of biocultural rights. As a result,  biocultural rights must also be understood to 
place upon IPLCs the responsibility to conserve the environment of their 
territories in order to protect this wider interest.  Unless we fall into the 
ideological trap of the noble savage myth, then this responsibility to conserve the 
environment is to be interpreted as a duty, an enforceable one, to conserve the 
environment. Difficult questions persist concerning this central construction of 
IPLCs as holders of a duty to act as stewards. Minimally, further reflection to 
clarify the nature of sanctions to enforce the duty, the subjects entitled to claim 
for such enforcement and the standard of environmental protection to be used to 
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judge violations, seems necessary if biocultural rights discourse is to mature and 
develop a consistent degree of critical reflexivity. In particular, reflection is 
needed on the fact that biocultural rights seem to subordinate - to condition - a set 
of rights of IPLCs to a general interest,  which itself is unlikely to be immune from 
potentially oppressive implications.  
Bavikatte’s concept of biocultural rights in particular presents challenges 
concerning the distinction (or lack thereof) between indigenous peoples and local 
communities as right-holders. While the analysis presented here acknowledges the 
importance of biocultural rights as useful strategic options for the framing of 
claims for local communities and as contingently useful strategies for indigenous 
peoples still  struggling to see their indigenous rights respected - such strategies 
demand a high degree of critical awareness. While biocultural rights present a 
more politically neutral language than that of indigenous rights, they must be used 
in full consciousness of the price attached to them: the problematic conditioning 
of the protection of indigenous interests to the indigenous role as “stewards” of 
“the environment” for the rest of humankind.  
There is no doubting the richness of biocultural rights discourse as a field for 
further engagement and research. Nevertheless, the tensions emerging from 
Bavikatte’s formulation of biocultural rights discourse stands in need of further 
research, evaluation and reflection. New inputs from practitioners and indigenous 
peoples’ and local communities’ representatives are particularly necessary in order 
to provide a clearer picture of the strategic advantages and disadvantages of 
biocultural rights claims and discourse as it  develops. The present analysis 
confirms the intriguing promise of biocultural rights discourse as an important 
forum of enquiry concerning the search for new strategies to face the current 
environmental crisis,  in which we see indigenous peoples as important co-agents 
in building alternative futures. Even though, and because, they have conserved 
legal systems and ethics different from ours they my help us create new and more 
successful relationships with the environment. It  is exciting to see a discourse 
attempting to draw creatively upon human-rights-compatible principles and non-
western ethics.  
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Part 5. Case Study - Testing Biocultural Rights: The Khwe People 
in Bwabwata National Park 
Chapter 5.1. Introduction 
 
  
 
The beauty of Bwabwata National Park, located in the Caprivi Strip535,  Namibia, 
strikes you since the first step after the entrance gate, at the Buffalo check point.  
Equally striking is the thought of spending a few days within its borders without a 
car filled with water, food and good camping gears. Nevertheless, for the last few 
hundred years the Khwe, have lived in those lands, have grown and developed 
their language, culture and identity and have survived not only the harshness of 
the place but also several conflicts occurring with other tribes, different colonial 
governments’ oppressions and military occupations. Today, after more than 20 
years from Namibian independence, the Khwe still  l ive in those lands, and about 
1500 of them have been encroached inside the borders of the Bwabwata National 
                                                
535 The  name Capriv i  S tr ip  has  been  changed in to  Zambesi  Region  in  August  2013 as  par t  o f  the  
Namibian  process  of  pos t - independence  renaming.   
Entrance  Gate  to  the  Bwabwata  Nat ional  Park ,  Buf fa lo  check  poin t  
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Park536.  Their 12 communities descend from the San, hunter-gathers indigenous 
peoples, also known as Bushman, often described as the first human beings of the 
world. The communities have undergone centuries of struggles due to different 
migration and colonization events in Namibia and have continued to rely on 
traditional practices for their livelihoods, mostly veldt food products and hunting. 
Even though Namibia is one of the African countries that has the most advanced 
legislation on the interaction between communities and conservation of the 
environment, it  does not provide, as yet,  indications on the rights of indigenous 
peoples and local communities living inside national parks. The Khwe 
communities, even though they have received support by many local organizations, 
still  lack the recognition of rights to gather veldt products, to hunt and to access 
their lands to transmit to the new generations their traditional knowledge and 
customary practices. Strongly concerned about the loss of their knowledge and 
practices, and struggling to survive with limited access to their livelihoods, they 
have gathered to ask the support of the Non Governmental Organization Natural 
Justice: lawyers for communities and the environment  for the development of a 
Biocultural Community Protocol (BCP). BCPs are documents resulting from 
extensive consultations, legal-awareness-raising and community participation and 
aimed at framing the calls of indigenous peoples and local communities within the 
local,  national and international legal framework. This Part,  after a review of 
Namibian relevant environmental law, will present the history and current case of 
the Khwe communities and will describe the process of drafting their BCP. The 
workshop for the consultation was run with 22 participants from the 12 villages 
within the Park and was facilitated by the Centre for Indigenous Knowledge & 
Organizational Development, Ghana, and run jointly with the local organization 
Integrated Rural Development and Natural Conservation. During the consultation, 
the Khwe have showed the interest of the communities to obtain more rights on the 
access to natural resources within the highly restricted areas of the Park and to 
help the conservation of the local environment in collaboration with Park 
managers. 
 
                                                
536 (Legal  Ass is tance  Centre ,  2006,  p .  11) .  
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Chapter 5.2. National Background: Legal Review of Namibian Environmental 
Law and Policy 
5.2.1. Introduction 
The present review of Namibian environmental laws and policies does not provide 
a comprehensive picture of all  Namibian environmental norms. It  rather aims at 
picturing all environmental laws and policies relevant for the case of the Khwe in 
the Bwabwata National Park.  
5.2.2. International Law 
Since 1990, when it  gained independence from South Africa, Namibia started to 
develop its internal environmental law under the light of the principles of its new 
Constitution and of international multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). 
Article 144537 of the Constitution recognizes that the general rules of public 
international law and international binding agreements are part of the law of the 
State, as long as they conform with the Constitution.  
Of the many signed international treaties, those that appear more relevant for the 
Bwabwata National Park and the Khwe communities living in the area are: the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES, entered into force in 1991); the CBD (entered into force in 1997); the 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing serious Drought and/or Desertification (UNCCD, entered into force 
in 1997). 
The CITES Convention aims at protecting endangered species by monitoring and 
regulating their international trade. Endangered animals and plants are listed in 
three different Appendices, depending on the level of threat that international 
trade poses to their conservation. Among Namibian species: 28 animal species and 
1 plant species are listed in Appendix I538;  164 animal species and 121 plant 
species are listed in Appendix II539;  and 3 animal species are listed in Appendix 
                                                
537 Ar t ic le  144  Namibia  Const i tu t ion :  «Unless  o therwise  provided  by  th is  Const i tu t ion  or  Act  of  
Par l iament ,  the  genera l  ru les  of  publ ic  in te rna t ional  law and  in terna t ional  agreements  b inding  
upon Namibia  under  th is  Const i tu t ion  sha l l  form par t  o f  the  law of  Namibia».  
538 Species  l i s ted  in  Appendix  I  cannot  be  in terna t ional ly  t raded  i f  taken  f rom the  wi ld .  Only  
ar t i f ic ia l ly  propagated  spec imen can ,  wi th  the  due  permits ,  be  t raded .   
539 Specimen taken  f rom the  wi ld  be longing  to  the  spec ies  l i s ted  in  Appendix  I I  can  be  
in te rna t ional ly  t raded  only  wi th in  f ixed  annual  quotas .  
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III540.  It  is interesting to note that,  in 2000, recommendations were made at the 
CITES Convention of the Parties for the inclusion in Appendix II of the 
Harpagophytum procumbens  and Harpagophytum zeyheri ,  commonly known as 
Devil’s Claw, but the positive results obtained by the management of the harvest 
in Nyae Nyae Conservancy and in the Zambesi Region have halted the listing 
process.  
Namibia is one of the signatory countries of the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and 
the CBD541,  hence is called to fulfil  i ts responsibility towards the environment 
respecting the right of indigenous peoples to participate in the management of 
their territories542,  preserving and promoting their traditional knowledge543,  
recognising and duly supporting their identity, culture and interests, and enabling 
their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development544.  
Namibia has given implementation to the CBD with Acts and Policies and in 
particular through the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (see below). 
Namibia is also a Party to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. The 
Convention does not set specific obligations for parties apart for the duty to 
provide for the participation of the public in those decisions relevant for the 
management of water resources and land use. However, most importantly, the 
Convention creates an institutional basis for a global effort to mitigate 
desertification and drought by calling member States to engage in effective 
international cooperation, joint decision-making, common planning and project 
running.   
5.2.3. Regional Law 
The African Union 
Like all other African countries, with the sole exception of Morocco, Namibia is a 
member of the Africa Union (AU). The AU, that came into life in 2002, acts 
through the determination of common Policies for all  member States. The 
conservation and sustainable use of the environment is one of its overarching 
aims, together with the promotion of human rights. The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, one of the milestone binding agreements within the AU 
                                                
540 In te rna t ional  t rade  on  spec ies  in  Appendix  I I I  i s  res t r ic ted  only  for  spec imen or ig ina t ing  f rom 
spec i f ic  countr ies .  
541 See  above  a t  4 .1 .2 .  
542 Pr inc ip le  22  of  the  Rio  Declara t ion  and  Sect ion  2 .10  and  3 .26  of  Agenda  21 .    
543 Sec t ion  3  of  Agenda  21 .  
544 Pr inc ip le  22  of  the  Rio  Declara t ion .   
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framework, «affirms that all  peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development» (Article 24). Moreover, Article 21 
affirms that «all peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources» 
and that «in case of spoliation, the dispossessed people shall have the right to the 
lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation». The 
obligations of the African Charter are judged on by the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights, a quasi-judicial body, and by the African Court,  
recently been entitled with judicial powers545.  These two bodies have addressed a 
number of cases where violations of Article 21 and 24 have been found, most of 
which also involved the violation of other human rights. So far Namibia has never 
been brought in front of the Commission or Court,  but their decisions and the 
interpretations they give of the African Charter can influence national courts’ 
decisions and can promote the respect of certain principles in acts and Policies. 
For example, in the Endorois546 and Ogoni547 cases, respectively, the Court and the 
Commission have interpreted the African Charter as imposing on States the 
obligation to balance the value of the conservation of the environment with the 
rights of indigenous peoples to culture, development and access to natural 
resources and the obligation to promote and conserve a healthy environment in 
order to respect these same indigenous rights.  
African Ministerial Conference on the Environment 
Namibia is a member of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment 
(AMCEN), a permanent forum established in 1985 where the Ministers of the 
Environment from African Countries meet to discuss and provide advocacy for a 
number of environmental related matters among which: the conservation of the 
environment, sustainable development and promotion of human rights, agricultural 
activities and food security. AMCEN provides guidance on the implementation of 
international environmental agreements, and on the harmonization and 
development of African environmental Policies and agreements. For example, 
AMCEN facilitated the revision of the African Convention on Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources, of which Namibia is one of the signatory Parties 
(however the Convention has not yet entered into force).  
  
                                                
545 In  Namibia ,  in  l igh t  of  a r t ic le  144  of  the  Const i tu t ion ,  the  Afr ican  Char ter  could  a lso  be  
ad judica ted  by  domest ic  cour ts ,  however ,  i t  has  never  happened unt i l  today .  
546 Centre  for  Minor i ty  Rights  Development  (Kenya)  and  Minor i ty  Rights  Group In terna t ional  on  
behal f  of  Endorois  Welfare  Counci l  v  Kenya ,  Afr ican  Cour t  dec is ion  276 of  2003.   
547 See  above  a t  4 .1 .2 .  
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Southern African Development Community 
As one of 15 other African States, Namibia is a member of the Southern African 
Development Community (until  1992 know as the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference). Environmental conservation and sustainable 
development are part of its many objectives, implemented by the additional 
binding Protocols. There are, in fact,  Protocols concerning many different topics, 
among which: energy, fisheries, forestry, mining, shared watercourses, tourism, 
trade, and wildlife conservation.  
The SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses entered into force in 2003 and aims at 
promoting a common, wise and sustainable use of shared watercourses by 
facilitating agreements among bordering countries and the harmonization of their 
Policies and laws on watercourses. The signatory States have agreed to use shared 
watercourses sustainably and equitably without harming the interest of the other 
stakeholder Countries. Namibia, Botswana, and Angola established, in 1994, the 
Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission that has the responsibility of 
advising the governments of the management of the Okavango River. Similarly, 
under the auspices of the Protocol, it  was established in 2003 the Zambesi 
Watercourse Commission, an organization that gathers all the countries that share 
the Zambesi River Basin: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The organization aims at: promoting the 
conservation and sustainable use of the basin, promoting research and capacity 
building, coordinating planning and use of the basin, harmonizing policies and 
legislations, resolving disputes, and raising awareness in the area.  
The 1999 SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement aims at 
promoting the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife resources, with the 
exclusion of fisheries and forests, by promoting cooperation among the members, 
by binding members to protect their own resources and not to cause any harm to 
those of other States, mandating research on the status of wildlife, and 
establishing common management programs. In order to protect and sustainably 
manage wildlife, the Protocol encourages the creation of trans-frontier conserved 
areas and community-based natural resource management activities by facilitating 
interactions among States and establishing a Wildlife Conservation Fund.  
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5.2.4. Namibian Constitution 
Namibia adopted its current Constitution in March 1990, after 30 years of struggle 
for independence from colonial and foreign rule. It  is the highest law of the land 
and all acts, laws, policies and international agreements are applicable only if they 
are consistent with the provisions and principles of the Constitution.  
The Constitution does not recognize a human right to the environment but contains 
provisions on environmental protection and sustainable use among the Principles 
of State Policy548.  As Article 101 recognises, the Principles of the State Policy are 
not legally enforceable but are meant to guide the Government in its law-making 
and law-implementing functions and can be used by the national Courts in 
interpreting legal provisions.  
Article 100 of the Constitution declares property of the State all  «land, water and 
natural resources below and above the surface of the land and in the continental 
shelf and within the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of 
Namibia», unless they are legally owned by other subjects. Article 16 provides for 
all  person to acquire, own and dispose of all  forms of immovable property in any 
part of Namibia, however, private owners are limited in the exercise of their 
property rights by a duty of protection and sustainable use of natural resources. 
Article 95(l) affirms that the State shall adopt policies to maintain ecosystems, 
essential ecological processes and biological diversity, and to promote their 
sustainable use for the benefit of present and future Namibians. In order to ensure 
these obligations, the Constitution vests the national Ombudsman with the function 
of investigating complains concerning the environment. Article 89 to 94 
(completed by the 1990 Ombudsman Act) establish an independent Ombudsman to 
protect citizens against violations of fundamental rights and freedoms by State and 
private actors, abuses of power by governmental officials,  manifest injustice and 
corruption. They also vest the Ombudsman with the power «to investigate 
complaints concerning the over-utilization of living natural resources, the 
irrational exploitation of non-renewable resources, the degradation and destruction 
of ecosystems and failure to protect the beauty and character of Namibia»549.  The 
Ombudsman receives complaints by individual citizens whose interests have been 
violated (and in some cases it  can undertake proactive actions550) and it  has to 
investigate their complaints and take appropriate remedial actions such as 
                                                
548 The  Pr inc ip les  of  S ta te  Pol icy  are  conta ined  in  Chapter  11 ,  f rom ar t ic le  95  to  a r t ic le  101 .   
549 Ar t ic le  91c  of  the  Const i tu t ion .  
550 (Ruppel -Schl ich t ing ,  2013b,  p .  485) .  
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facilitating compromise between parties, referring to Prosecutor-General,  bringing 
proceeding to competent Courts, make recommendations for the amendment of 
anti-constitutional pre-independence laws or other grossly unreasonable 
legislations. The powers of the Ombudsman to investigate and take action in 
environmental matters can be a very effective instrument for the protection of the 
environment and of rights related to it ,  however, so far the complaints concerning 
the environment are greatly outnumbered by all other matters551.  
5.2.5. National Laws and Policies 
National management and planning 
Namibia recognizes the inestimable value of its natural resources and lands and 
has dedicated many laws and policies to regulate their ownership, management and 
conservation. Shortly after independence, the 1992 Namibian’s Green Plan, 
provided for the creation of laws and policies aimed at protecting a healthy 
environment and prosperous economy. It  combined concerns for health of 
individuals and society, protection of the environment, development of the 
economy, poverty reduction, and improved education.  
The Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) is responsible for the 
implementation of Namibia’s obligations under international environmental 
agreements and is supported by the Environmental Commissioner552 and the 
Environmental Officers. In 2001, the Environmental Investment Fund was 
established by the Environmental Investment Fund of Namibia Act. The 
Environmental Investment Fund is entitled to collect levies on protected areas 
entrances553,  and on certain commercial uses of natural products and to receive 
funds from the Parliament, in order to support the work of the MET. The Fund 
shall then allocate money for the implementation of environmental policies 
through grants, loans, bursaries and other financial aids to governmental,  non-
governmental and private organizations and individuals. Funds shall be allocated 
to support: the sustainable use and management of the environment; the 
conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems; «the improvement in the management 
of natural resources for the benefit of those whose livelihoods directly depend on 
natural resources or are most directly affected by protected areas for the promotion 
                                                
551 (Ruppel -Schl ich t ing ,  2013b,  p .  482) .  
552 The  of f ice  of  the  Environmenta l  Commiss ioner  was  es tab l ished  in  te rms of  Sec t ion  16  of  the  
Environmenta l  Management  Act .  
553 The  Board  of  the  Fund may de termine  the  exempt ion  of  any  ca tegory  of  persons  form paying  
such  lev ies  (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2001a ,  sec .  26) .  
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of diversified sustainable rural development»; and the management of 
conservancies, game parks and nature reserves554.   
The 2007 Environmental Management Act555,  that came into force in 2012, 
establishes the general principles for the national management and conservation of 
the environment556:  optimal sustainable yield in exploitation of natural resources; 
intergenerational equity in the management of Namibian cultural and natural 
heritage; involvement of local authorities in projects’ monitoring; participation of 
the affected parties in decisions making, assessment and monitoring processes; 
community involvement in the management of natural resources and sharing of the 
benefits arising from their use; equitable access to environmental resources; 
precaution in decision making. In order to promote the respect of these principles 
and the sustainable management and use of the environment, the Act draws on the 
1995 Environmental Assessment Policy that introduced a system of environmental 
clearance certificates557.  Such certificates, now governed by the Act and its 
regulations, are required for the commencement of all  those activities considered 
potentially harmful for the environment, among which are: forestry, land use and 
development, tourism development, agriculture and water resources developments. 
Such certificates are issued by the appointed Environmental Commissioner after an 
assessment procedure aimed at verifying their impact on the environment, their 
associated risks, the existing of alternatives and the mitigation options. The 
procedure that must be followed to obtain a certificate requires the presentation of 
the project,  the consultation of any person, institution or authority that may be 
effected, the organization of a public hearing on the matter, the hearing of experts’ 
opinions and any other activity considered necessary.  
Vision 2030 is a document that provides a long-term Policy plan for the 
development of Namibia. It  was issued in 2004 and aims at guiding Namibia until  
2030. It  is taken forward and revised every five years, through the issue of 
National Development Plans, more detailed and updated documents that plan 
future policies. Unlike its predecessors, the 2012 National Development Plan does 
not include environmental protection among its three overarching goals, however 
it  does include it  among its values and principles. As part of the development 
strategy outlined it  also includes the following environmental related objectives: 
implementation of the Environmental Management Act; implementation of the 
Community-based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) programme; 
                                                
554 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2001a ,  sec .  25) .  
555 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2007) .  
556 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2007,  sec .  3 ) .  
557 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2007,  sec .  27  and  32–37) .  
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improved cooperation and Policy implementation; promotion of partnerships 
between the public and private sectors and communities.  
Lands  
The 1994 Land Use Planning Policy proclaims the existence of five land types in 
Namibia: Communal Land, State Land, Proclaimed State Land, Private Land, and 
Wetland Systems. They can fall within different ownership regimes:  
-  state land: it  includes land allocated for nature conservation (protected areas 
and game parks), agricultural research farms and military bases, and urban 
areas owned by local authorities; 
-  communal land: land vested in the State which the State shall hold in trust 
and administer for the benefits of the people who live on it;   
-  private land: it  includes rural commercial farmlands558 (freehold agricultural 
land), and private urban areas. 
The 1995 Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act559 provides for the 
acquisition of agricultural land by the State for the purpose of levelling economic 
and social injustices of the past through the redistribution of such lands to those 
Namibians who do not own, or have the use, of adequate agricultural land. The 
Ministry may acquire agricultural lands from willing sellers, or may acquire or 
expropriate (subject to compensation), underutilized or foreign-owned or excessive 
lands. The allotments of such lands are then to be leased to chosen citizens for 
agricultural purposes only, and for a period not exceeding 99 years. The lessees 
can become owner of the land but only by buying it  off from the Ministry.  
The 1997 National Resettlement Policy regulates resettlements and requires them 
to be socially, economically and environmentally sustainable and to provide the 
grounds to make local communities become self-supporting. 
The 1998 National Land Policy introduces the concept of unitary land, in contrast 
with the colonial regime organized around «first and second class systems of land 
tenure, divided along racial lines»560.  The Policy aims at levelling out the 
injustices derived from the colonial land management by promoting equal rights 
and opportunities to all  citizens and community involvement in land management. 
                                                
558 About  44% of  Namibian  land  is  labe l led  as  commercia l  fa rmland (Bethune  & Ruppel ,  2013a ,  
p .  178) .  
559 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1995) .  The  Act  was  amended by  the  Agr icu l tura l  (Commercia l )  Land 
Reform Second Amendment  Act ,  Act  No.  19  of  2003.  
560 (Minis t ry  of  Environment  and  Tour ism,  1998,  Chapter  1 .3) .  
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It  promotes sustainable land use and states that unsustainable use of land can lead 
to the termination or denial of a land title. It  was then followed, in 2003, by the 
National Land Tenure Policy that,  as the previous one, calls for a sustainable use 
of land. It  provides for compensations for expropriated lands and for the 
recognition of land tenure rights to farm workers and occupiers (those that spent 
less than ten years on a single farm).  
Communal lands 
Communal lands are areas vested in the State «in trust for the benefit of traditional 
communities residing in those areas and for the purpose of promoting the 
economic and social development of the people of Namibia, in particular the 
landless and those with insufficient access to land»561.  Any area which is part of 
un-alienated State land may be declared communal land by act of the President and 
approval of the National Assembly562.  Communal lands are regulated by the 
Communal Land Reform Act, 2002, and, for what concerns the management role of 
Traditional Authorities (TA), by the Traditional Authorities Act, 2000. TA can be 
formed by traditional communities and are composed by: a leader, senior 
traditional councillors and traditional councillors elected by the community. 
Recognized Chiefs and TAs have the power to advise the President in issues 
concerning the utilization of communal lands563 and have to role of ensuring the 
sustainable use of natural resources and the conservation of the environment 
within communal areas, as well as within conservancies (see below) for their own 
benefit and for the benefit of all  Namibians564.  They also have the power to 
exercise local customary laws and to codify such laws and to provide assistance to 
police and other State organs565.  They decide upon applications for the allocation 
of customary land rights (rights to farming and residential units) and rights of 
leasehold566.  The 2002 Communal Land Reform Act provides for the creation of 
Communal Land Boards (CLB), that include representatives of TAs, of organized 
farming communities and of the conservancies of the area. The CLBs shall verify 
and register the allocation of customary land rights by TAs and Chiefs, and may 
veto their decisions upon written justifications. CLBs may also grant leaseholds 
rights for agricultural purposes on portions of communal lands, but only within 
designated areas and subject to the payment of a fee. Any leaseholds of a duration 
                                                
561 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2002,  sec .  17) .  
562 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2002,  sec .  16) .  
563 (Legal  Ass is tance  Centre ,  2006,  p .  13) .  
564 (Ruppel ,  2008,  p .  113) .  
565 ( Jansen ,  2010,  p .  19) .  
566 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2002,  sec .  19–20) .  
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which exceeds 10 years need to be approved by the Ministry of Lands and no 
leasehold can be granted for a period that exceeds 99 years567.   
TAs and Chiefs also regulate access to and use of commonage  areas for grazing 
purposes on the ground of the local laws. In commonage areas it  is not allowed, 
unless by written consent by Chief or TA, to erect buildings, plough or cultivate, 
or obstruct access to water.  TAs and CLBs regulate all  other uses of lands, such 
as tourism and agriculture and, when communal lands overlap with conservancies, 
they shall take in consideration the objectives, plans and needs of the 
conservancies568.  
The 1995 Community-based Tourism Policy  links tourism as a tool for 
conservation, to tourism as a tool for community economic and social 
development. The Policy recognizes that residents of communal areas have 
historically rarely been involved in the benefits of tourism activities while have 
often endured negative consequences for tourists intrusions and wildlife conflicts.  
It  therefore calls for the private tourism sector that acts on communal lands to 
involve and share benefit with local residents so to provide incentives for 
conservation to those that bear the cost of wildlife. To promote the respect of 
these principles the Policy decides that applications for tourism enterprises will be 
judged also on the ground of the participation of the local communities in the 
planning process, on the environmental impact of the project,  and on the sharing 
of the benefits arising from it.   
Even though the Communal Land Reform Act provides for the allocation of rights 
over lands and resources to communities, land tenure rights remain vested in the 
State. The Act specifically states that «no right conferring freehold ownership is 
capable of being granted» on communal land areas569.  Therefore, since Article 100 
of the Constitution claims that the State is the owner of all  lands that are not 
lawfully owned by other subjects, communities are bound to remain lessees and 
never to be recognized as owners unless their communal ownership is recognized 
in virtue of customary law and traditional practices since “time immemorial” as it  
has happened in many other cases concerning ancestral lands claims570.  The current 
lack of formal land rights, together with the prohibition to erect fences within 
                                                
567 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2002,  p t .  2 ) .  
568 (B .  T .  B .  Jones ,  2012,  p .  19) .  
569 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2002,  sec .  17) .  
570 Such  as  for  example  the  for  example  the  Delmaguuk case  in  Canada ,  Mabo in  Aust ra l ia ,  
Endero is  in  Kenya ,  Centra l  Khalahar i  Game Reserve  case  in  Botswana  (P .  Watson ,  2013,  
personal  communica t ion) .  
120 
 
communal land571,  results in limited abilities of local authorities to control the 
settlements of external actors, something that may strongly hinder their interests 
and plans572.   
Conservation of the Environment  
Article 95(l) of the Constitution commits Namibia to conserve biodiversity and 
ecosystems for the benefit of all  Namibians. It  is given implementation by many 
acts and Policies under the umbrella of the National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan.  The Strategy provides a strategic framework for the management of 
biological resources, regulating conservation, trade, and economic activities with 
the ultimate aim to conserve the environment and support sustainable development.  
Protected areas and national parks  
16.6% of Namibian land is designated to national parks and game reserves.  
The Nature Conservation Ordinance, 1975, regulates the establishment of protected 
areas. It  states that they may be established for the protection, propagation and 
study of wild species and «ethnological,  archaeological,  historical and other 
scientific interests»573.  The Ministry of Environment and Tourism has the power 
and duty to manage and control parks and change, by simple decree, their 
boundaries, as well as their very existence (with exclusion of the Etosha National 
Park)574.  Protected areas can fall within different typologies: state-run PAs, 
conservancies, and private reserves, but none of them falls within the IUCN 
typologies575.  For example, there are no different typologies based on access and 
use rights by local communities. 
The Ordinance establishes which activities are prohibited in protected areas 
without holding a permit: take or keep residence, convey weapons or traps, cause 
any veldt fire, capture or hunt animals, eggs, nests, and plants, introduce animals, 
and chop of trees576.  These activities are prohibited also in private game parks, 
except to their owners577.   
                                                
571 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2002,  sec .  18) .  
572 (B .  T .  B .  Jones ,  2012,  p .  24  f ) .  One  of  the  b igges t  i ssues  on  communal  lands  i s  the  growing 
prac t ice  of  i l lega l  fenc ing ,  a  loca l  form of  land  grabbing .  Weal th ier  people  fence  of f  la rge  areas  
of  communal  lands  for  the i r  own benef i t s ,  usua l ly  pr iva te  ranching  ac t iv i t ies ,  and  depr ive  loca l  
people  f rom access  and  use  of  resource  found there in  (P .  Watson ,  2013,  personal  
communica t ion) .  
573 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1975,  sec .  14) .  
574 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1975,  sec .  15–16) .  
575 (B .  T .  B .  Jones ,  2012,  p .  26) .  
576 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1975,  sec .  18  and  20) .  
577 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1975,  sec .  22–23) .  
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The Policy on Tourism and Wildlife Concessions on State Land, 2007, addresses 
specifically those communities that live within or close to protected areas and that 
are negatively affected by wildlife from the protected area, show a commitment to 
the conservation of the protected area, are particularly needy because they are 
marginalized (the Policy specifically takes San communities as example). The 
Policy proposes the update and enhancement of the Namibian system of 
“concessions” in order to improve the livelihoods of communities and the 
conservation of the areas. Concessions are «rights, whether full or restricted or 
shared or exclusive, to conduct tourism activities and/or to commercially use state-
owned plant and/or animal resources (collectively referred to as wildlife 
resources) on business principles in proclaimed protected areas and any other State 
Land for a specified period of time»578.  The concessions are meant to be awarded to 
community representatives and institutions, such as conservancies, community 
forests, appropriately structured Trusts and registered community associations, and 
cooperatives, and recognized Traditional Authorities579.  The Policy recognizes that 
in Namibia there are many different communities and prioritizes those living 
inside protected areas «because such communities potentially have the most impact 
on the park and are likely to be most negatively affected by wildlife or by loss of 
access to land and resources». These communities are recognizes as the most 
affected but also as those that might have the most negative effect on the park 
unless they are involved in the management of tourism and wildlife. Concessions 
should be preferentially awarded, the Policy states, directly to communities but, 
where the community lacks the capacity and/or the capital,  joint ventures or other 
forms of partnerships with other entities are accepted. Nevertheless the agreements 
signed between community and partners have to provide for sufficient involvement 
and participation of the community and equal sharing of benefits.  
Even though the Policy has been issued in 2007, there still  is no piece of 
legislation regulating the life of communities within protected areas, such as the 
Khwe communities in Bwabwata. The Policy can foster initiatives and acts of the 
MET but needs to be supported by the adoption of an adequate legislation.  
Conservancies 
The 1995 Ministry’s Policy on Wildlife Management Utilisation and Tourism in 
Communal Areas provides for the overcoming of some of the discriminatory facets 
                                                
578 (Minis t ry  of  Environment  and  Tour ism,  2007,  p .  4 ) .  
579 (Minis t ry  of  Environment  and  Tour ism,  2007,  Annex 1) .  
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of the 1975 Natural Conservation Ordinance580 and for the creation of incentives to 
conservation for local communities. The Policy recognises that before colonial 
times, local communities beliefs and values made them good stewards of the 
environment and provides for them to regain such responsibilities toward 
wildlife581.  The Policy establishes that communities living in communal areas are 
to be recognized limited rights over wildlife so as to be able to manage them 
sustainably and to benefit from them and from related tourism activities. The 
Policy was followed by the 1996, Nature Conservation Amendment Act, that 
amended the Natural Conservation Ordinance. The Act provides for the creation of 
conservancies in communal and commercial lands as means for communities to 
gain rights and benefits over wildlife and tourism and to incentivize conservation. 
Today there are 71 registered conservancies, that cover 149 829 km2 of communal 
land (about 18% of Namibian land)582.  
The Nature Conservation Amendment Act establishes the application procedure for 
the creation of a conservancy583.  Any group of persons residing on communal land 
has to appoint a Conservancy Committee, agree on a Constitution that sets the 
sustainable use of wildlife as one of its objectives, determine the means for an 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from wildlife use, and propose the 
boundaries of the conservancy. After scrutiny of the presented documentation, the 
Ministry may declare the area a conservancy, however this act does not grant any 
land right to its members. They are instead awarded ownership rights only over all  
huntable game (eland, oryx, springbok, kudu, warthog, buffalo and bushpig584).  It  
means that the members of the conservancy can hunt and use unprotected species 
without further authorizations from the Ministry, but only within the limits of 
restrictions imposed by the ministries, i .e.  hunting permits, weapon restraints, 
hunting quotas. The conservancy can agree with the Ministry on certain quotas for 
the use of protected species (see below) for trophy hunting, sale and other 
activities and can then sublicense the quotas to local tourism companies. The latter 
can agree with the conservancy for the creation of joint ventures or other 
partnership schemes for the creation of tourism infrastructures and activities. In 
case of droughts or human-wildlife conflicts the conservancy can require to the 
Ministry further permits to shoot or displace problem animals. All the benefits 
arising from the use of wildlife and tourism are received by the conservancy and 
                                                
580 (Hinz ,  2013,  p .  361) .   
581 Minis t ry’s  Pol icy  on  Wild l i fe  Management  Ut i l i sa t ion  and  Tour ism in  Communal  Areas ,  7-8 .  
582 (B .  T .  B .  Jones ,  2012,  p .  11) .  
583 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1996,  sec .  24(A)) .  
584 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1975,  schedule  5) .  
123 
 
have to be shared among all the members of conservancy in line with their 
Constitution.  
Forests 
About 9.3% of Namibian land is covered by forests585.  Deforestation is a major 
challenge for Namibian conservation efforts and it  is mostly caused by clearance 
for agriculture, uncontrolled fires, selective logging and use of wood for 
livelihoods586.  In 1996, the MET issued the Namibian Forestry Strategic Plan to 
guide action toward the conservation of forests for their socio-economic value and 
for the protection of biodiversity. The Plan proposes a decentralized system of 
forest management and conservation: recognition of private or communal rights 
over lands and/or resources to local populations in return for forest protection. 
Only when these decentralized options are considered inefficient,  the State should 
directly take care of putting the forest under protection.  
The 2001 Forest Act is the main piece of legislation on forest management. 
Together with the Development Forest Policy, 2001, it  regulates the use of forests 
around the central aim of balancing conservation and rural development587.  The Act 
establishes a Forestry Council,  in charge of advising the Minister on forest matters 
and creates three types of forests: State Forest Reserves, Regional Forest Reserves 
and Community Forests588.  All types of forests shall be managed and developed, 
the Act establishes, to conserve soil and water resources and maintain 
biodiversity. 
Community Forests589 should be regulated along with the Community Forests 
Guidelines issued in 2005 by the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry, 
however the document has ever since remained non-binding. Up to 2012 there were 
13 community forests in Namibia, covering 4,652 Km2  590.  The Ministry can sign a 
community forest agreement with any entity (be it  a chief, a Traditional Authority 
or other) that it  recognizes as representing the interests of the communities that 
reside and have control over, or traditional rights over, the communal land where 
the forest is found. The community representatives have to propose the boundaries 
and present a Forest Management Plan to be agreed with the Ministry. On the 
ground of the agreement, rights are awarded on: use of forest products, grazing, 
control of the use of forest products by outsiders and relevant fees, and quotas of 
                                                
585 (Ruppel -Schl ich t ing ,  2013a ,  p .  28) .  
586 (Ruppel -Schl ich t ing ,  2013a ,  p .  28) .  
587 (Ruppel ,  2013,  p .  127) .  
588 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2001b,  sec .  16) .  
589 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2001b,  sec .  15) .  
590 (B .  T .  B .  Jones ,  2012,  p .  11) .  
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timber and wild animals that the community can collect.  Alike conservancies, 
community forests retain 100% of the income derived from use of local resources, 
but they include also timber and other forest products. The community has the 
duty to create a Forest Management Committee that has to ensure the management 
of the resources and the distribution of the income is done in accordance with the 
Management Plan and has to submit reports to the Ministry every month.   
Where, and only where, the effective management of forest resources of national 
importance or the conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity of a forest found in 
a communal land cannot be achieved through the management of that communal 
land as a community forest,  the Minister or the Regional Council can, 
respectively, declare that forest to be a State Forest Reserves or a Regional Forest 
Reserves. The Forest Act requires the local residents to be informed and their 
requests and needs to be given due attention591.  Sections 21-23 of the 2001 Forest 
Act provide for the creation of protected forests whenever the Minister of 
Environment and Tourism is satisfied that on a certain area it  is necessary for the 
protection of local soil,  water, and biodiversity. The Minister shall consult the 
owner or occupier of the land in question, including the local chief or Traditional 
Authority in communal lands, and agree with them on the measures required for 
the protection of the forest and on their other obligations. The Minister is also 
required to pay compensation to the owner of the land or the members of the 
community if the long-term use of the land is substantially diminished.   
Wildlife  
The Ministry of Environment and Tourism is responsible for the conservation of 
wild animals and plants and for the management of “problem animals”. The Nature 
Conservation Ordinance, 1975, lists and regulates wild animals within three 
different categories592:  specially protected game593,  protected game, huntable game, 
huntable game birds. Specially protected game and protected game shall not be 
hunted at any time and by any person unless lawfully holding a permit issued by 
the MET. Killing of such species is permitted only to a landowner or to the 
occupier of communal land to defend human life or health, or to protect life of 
livestock, poultry or domestic animals. Moreover, they «may hunt any game, 
excluding elephants, hippopotami and rhinoceros, destroying or damaging crops or 
                                                
591 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2001b,  sec .  13–14) .  
592 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1975,  Chapter  I I I ) .  
593 Mounta in  zebra ,  g i ra f fes ,  k l ipspr ingers ,  e lephants ,  rh inoceros ,  impalas ,  h ippopotamus,  whi te  
rh inoceros ,  zebras  (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1975,  Schedule  I I I ) .  
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plants on any cultivated land on such land»594.  In special circumstances, any wild 
animal may be declared by the Ministry a “problem animal” hence becoming 
huntable at any time by the owner or lessee of a land. This provision is explicitly 
not applicable within game parks595.  Huntable game and huntable game birds are 
under the property of the owner of any adequately-fenced farm or of any piece of 
land no less than one thousand hectares. The owner can hunt such game and can 
issue hunting permits to outsiders (and require a fee in return).  
In 1994, the MET issued the Policy for the Conservation of Biotic Diversity and 
Habitat Protection to guide laws and regulations aimed at adequately protecting all 
species and subspecies, ecosystems and natural life support processes. The 
instruments it  proposes are very heterogeneous and range from inventories to 
monitoring and research, from education to cooperation with local,  national, 
regional and international organizations.  
In 1997 it  was issued the Game Products Trust Fund Act  that established a Trust 
Fund to collect revenues from the use of game products belonging to the State, 
such as for example the sale of ivory’s quotas allowed by the CITES Convention, 
and to receive donations for conservation purposes596.  The funds are meant to be 
used to improve conservation and management of wildlife resources, to support 
rural development, and to improve the relationship between people and wildlife597.  
Funds are distributed to conservancies, protected areas and wildlife councils upon 
presentation of projects and priority is to be given to returning funds to the areas 
of origin of the game products598.  
Soil 
The Soil Conservation Act of 1969, as amended until 1978, regulates the 
combating of soil erosion, and the conservation and improvement of the use of soil 
and vegetation and the protection of water sources. It  confers the Ministry the 
power to issue direction to land owners or occupiers in order to dispose changes in 
land uses and destinations and to expropriate lands when the practiced activities 
may cause any form of soil erosion, denudation, disturbance or drainage of land, 
or water pollution599.  
 
                                                
594 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1975,  sec .  37) .  
595 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1975,  Chapter  IV) .  
596 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1997,  sec .  2 ) .  
597 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1997,  sec .  3 ) .  
598 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1997,  sec .  14) .  
599 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1969,  sec .  3  and  18) .  
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Agriculture 
Namibian lands are very fragile and land degradation threatens more than half of 
Namibian population that relies on agricultural activities for livelihoods600.  Given 
their great importance there are many policies and pieces of legislation that target 
land use and agriculture. They provide farmers with administrative support to 
decentralize land management and aim at promoting community-based resources 
management601.  
The 1995 National Agricultural Policy and the 1997 Regional Planning and 
Development Policy deal with agricultural production. As a means to increase food 
production, improve employment opportunities in rural areas, enhance income and 
household food security, they promote the increase of self-sufficient smallholder 
agricultural production and limit State aid only to specific short-term 
circumstances. The National Agricultural Policy stresses that agricultural 
prosperity is not the sole responsibility of the State but also of farming 
communities and the private sector. Rural people are invited to reduce their 
dependence on the government and changes are enacted to promote a higher 
participation of the private sector in agricultural activities. The Policy eliminates 
subsidies and price control and fixing because they might distort the market and 
discourage private investments. Prices shall instead be set by the market forces. 
The Policy disposes for the privatization of services previously provided by the 
Government, such as farm inputs (seeds, agro chemicals, animal feeds, drugs, 
equipment), credits,  veterinary care, quarantine facilities and domestic marketing. 
The State is presented as an inefficient manager of business and funds and is left 
accountable only to provide very essential services where the private sector is 
unwilling or unable to participate. It  is disposed also that access to water and 
irrigation services shall be provided by private entities rather than the government 
and, in order to encourage self-sufficiency, water users will be required to pay for 
the operation and maintenance of their irrigation schemes. To promote agricultural 
development the Policy counts on investments by the public and private sectors in 
new technologies, and on more public investments in formal education. It  calls for 
the introduction of high-productive crops and extensive livestock production in 
under-utilized areas and the introduction of non-traditional high-value agricultural 
product for the foreign market. Finally, the Policy addresses drought and other 
calamities through long-term planning and public-private management 
mechanisms, all  to be used in order to create local self-coping capacities.  
                                                
600 (Bethune  & Ruppel ,  2013a ,  p .  175) .  
601 (Bethune  & Ruppel ,  2013a ,  p .  175) .  
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The Regional Planning and Development Policy recognizes the vulnerability and 
aridity of Namibian ecosystems and requires the utilization of Environmental 
Impact Assessments in the management of agricultural activities so to avoid that 
their expansion may become a threat.   
Waters 
Namibia is one of the driest African countries and water issues are perceived as 
particularly critical and fragile. All Namibian water sources are recognized to be 
an indivisible national asset,  whose custodian, on behalf of all  society, is the 
government. Water can be privately owned when it  flows on a private land, but the 
Minister of Agriculture, Water and Forestry retains the power to limit the use of 
the owner.  
The 1956 Water Act is the main piece of legislation on water management in 
Namibia because the 2004 Water Resources Management Act has not yet been 
implemented. The Water Act makes the MET, in particular the Department of 
Water Affairs,  responsible for the conservation, management and use of all 
watercourses. It  recognises property rights to land owners over the water courses, 
superficial or subterranean, found in their lands but strictly limits their rights to 
uses within their land’ borders602.  It  declares all  surfaces and under water coursers, 
that are not found in private land, to be property of the State, and the Ministry can 
regulate their use, as it  deems necessary. Public water can be accessed and used by 
any person for immediate purposes, such as drinking, washing, cooking, sanitation, 
and watering of crops no bigger than one hectare603.  Instead, irrigation activities 
may be subject to government-imposed levies and other uses shall be agreed with 
the Ministry.  
The 1993 Water and Sanitation Policy recognizes the importance of an efficient 
and sustainable management of water resources to guarantee economic 
development and health. It  creates the Directorate of Rural Water Supply and 
establishes 200 Water Point Committees for the local management of water 
supplies. Decentralization and polycentrism are perceived as two instruments to 
guarantee a more efficient management of water resources. Communities are 
recognized the right to manage their water resources but they have to contribute to 
costs. Costs that are regulated through the 1997 Water Corporation Act, which 
established the Namibian Water Corporation Limited. It  is a public company that 
has the duty to manage water supplies and waterworks, and to set water levies and 
                                                
602 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1956,  sec .  5 ) .  
603 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  1956,  sec .  7 ) .  
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tariffs in the Namibian territory in the most cost effective way, with due regard to 
the needs of the consumers, the conservation of the environment and the 
sustainability of water uses.  
When it enters into force, the 2004 Water Resources Management Act will require 
Namibian water resources to be managed in ways consistent with the following 
principles: equitable access by every citizen to adequate quantity of water, within 
a reasonable distance from their place of adobe; recognition of the human right to 
water; harmonization of human needs with environmental needs; integrated 
planning and management of water resources; public access to information; 
sustainable development and use of water resources; awareness raising; prevention 
of pollution; meeting of Namibian international obligations in relation to shared 
water resources; decentralization of governance. The Act provides for the creation 
of a system of Water Basin604 Management Committees605,  8 of which had already 
been established by 2011606.  The Committees shall protect,  develop, conserve and 
manage water resources in their area, promote community participation and self-
reliance, prepare water resources plans for the basin to be submitted to the 
Ministry, manage waterworks, report of the impacts of Policies and help resolve 
conflicts.  The Act also provides for the establishment of a system of registered 
Water Point User Associations that have to be elected by groups of rural 
households using a particular water point607.  The members of the Water Point 
Association have to elect a Water Point Committee to manage the day-to-day affair 
of the water point.  When two or more Water Point Associations are sharing one 
rural water supply scheme they have to come together to establish a Local Water 
User Association. The Local Water User and the Water Point User Associations are 
responsible for use and conservation of the water points, shall manage the use of 
water by members and non members and can act to enforce water regulations and 
against water wastes and other damages608.   
According to the Act, any person can access and use water for domestic uses 
without payment of fees or need of licences. Any other use will require a licence. 
Limits may be imposed if the Ministry creates a Water Management Area for the 
purpose of guaranteeing the conservation of its natural resources609.  However, the 
                                                
604 Bas ins  a re  def ined  by  the  Act  as  a reas  «f rom which  ra infa l l  d ra ins  in to  a  common terminus» 
(Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2004,  sec .  1 ) .  
605 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2004,  p t .  IV) .  
606 (Bethune  & Ruppel ,  2013b,  p .  166) .  
607 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2004,  p t .  V) .  
608 (B .  T .  B .  Jones ,  2012,  p .  23) .  
609 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2004,  p t .  XII ) .  
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Ministry has to adequately consult with the interested parties and keep in 
considerations their needs when deciding over the limitations imposed.  
This Policy is now backed up by the 2002 National Water Policy White Paper, 
which is centred on the idea that Namibian scarce water resources are essential for 
human needs, economic development activities and environmental conservation. 
The Policy provides for a wise management of water resources for the benefit all  
Namibians, of present and future generations, and for the preservation of the 
environment, through the participation of stakeholders and the decentralization of 
decision-making procedures and through the effective implementation of the 
“polluter pays principle”. 
Cross-border watercourses 
Namibia is committed by international agreements to a certain use of shared 
watercourses. The National Water Policy implements such obligations and commits 
Namibia to use shared watercourses sustainably, to equally share the benefits 
arising from their use, and to respect the rights of local communities. The 2003 
Inland Fisheries Resources Act calls for cooperation with countries with which 
rivers and other water resources are shared. The Water Resources Management Act 
recognizes obligations of Namibia under the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and the Southern African 
Development Community Protocol on Shared Water Courses and requires the 
Ministry to collaborate with riparian States for the management of shared 
watercourses in respect of international and regional agreements610.  The Ministry 
shall engage in joint planning and project development and shall collaborate in the 
collection and analysis of relevant data about the watercourse, in order to promote 
environmentally sound economic growth. 
Inland fisheries  
The 2003 Inland Fisheries Resources Act deals with the conservation and 
management of inland fisheries and requires the Minister to promote the 
sustainable utilization and protection of inland fisheries resources in accordance 
with international laws and agreements.  
Fishing is allowed, without regulated fishing gears (rod, real, l ine, hook and net),  
to owners or lessees in private lands and to communities in communal areas. In 
order to fish with regulated gears it  is required to hold a fishing license issued by 
                                                
610 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2004,  p t .  X) .  
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the Ministry or a designated officer, upon payment of a fee611.  The Act prohibits 
altogether destructive fishing methods, such as use of chemicals and explosives, 
and forbids fishing in game parks, natural reserves, up until  100 meters from a 
bridge, and in any way that obstructs more than half the width of a watercourse612.  
The Act also outlaws, unless with permission by the Minister, the introduction of 
any species of fish into a watercourse, the import of alive fish in Namibia and the 
export of live fishes declared endangered species613.  The Act empowers the 
Minister to declare any area of inland waters as a fisheries reserve for 
conservation and fish-stock-regeneration purposes.  
Drought 
The 1997 Namibia’s Drought Policy and Strategy  address the problems that the 
high aridity of Namibian climate poses on agriculture and livelihoods. It  aims at 
making livestock keepers and farmers self-reliant,  so it  provides for interventions 
only in extreme events. It  proposes the elimination of fodder and forage subsidies 
for farmers, because they promote the unsustainable increase of livestock. Instead, 
the Policy encourages the sale of livestock in times of drought. In order to 
increase pressure on adopting sustainable practices, the Policy states that only 
those farmers who have implemented sustainable practices should receive drought 
aid. 
Tourism 
Tourism is recognized to be one of the most important economic activities of 
Namibia and is managed by the Ministry of the Environment and Tourism. The 
1994 Tourism White Paper, as well as the Revised Draft Tourism Policy 2001-
2010, elevate sustainability and no detriment for the environment as the core 
values of tourism development. They require that a part of the profits derived from 
tourism shall be reinvested into conservation activities.  
Traditional knowledge and access and benefit sharing 
The Access to Biological Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge Bill 
has not yet been finalized. Currently issues concerning the protection of 
traditional knowledge and the sharing of the benefits arising from biological 
resources are dealt with by the Interim Bioprospecting Committee.  
                                                
611 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2003,  sec .  11) .  
612 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2003,  sec .  17–18) .  
613 (Republ ic  of  Namibia ,  2003,  sec .  19) .  
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Chapter 5.3. Biocultural Community Protocols 
In the last few years, Natural Justice: lawyers for communities and the 
environment  has been promoting the development of Biocultural Community 
Protocols as instruments to increase the capacity of a community to drive the local 
implementation of international and national environmental laws and to promote 
the respect of its biocultural rights. In 2010, after more than 10 years of 
negotiations and thanks to the intense lobbying by indigenous and local 
communities’ representatives and supporting NGOs, BCPs have been introduced in 
the text of the Nagoya additional Protocol to the CBD, so gaining international 
recognition. Article 12614 and 21615 call Parties to implement their obligations under 
the Protocol taking in considerations, when dealing with the access and use of 
natural resources and traditional knowledge, not only indigenous and local 
communities’ customary laws but also their community protocols.  
5.3.1. What are Biocultural Community Protocols? 
BCPs, though they differ from one community to another, are «community-led 
instrument[s] that promote participatory advocacy for the recognition of and 
support for ways of life that are based on the customary sustainable use of 
biodiversity, according to standards and procedures set out in customary, national, 
and international laws and policies»616.  They are documents in which a community 
outlines what its customary laws, local values, principles, needs and aspirations 
are and, on their basis, it  states how, and on what terms, it  wishes to engage with 
external stakeholders. They are documents produced after extensive community 
discussion and consultation organized in line with traditional decision making 
procedures and with the help of a community-based organization (CBO) or NGO. 
The aim of the discussions and consultation is to raise the awareness and 
understanding of the community about its biocultural rights, as recognized by 
international and national law. Knowledge of the relevant laws is,  in fact,  essential 
for communities to claim the respect of the rights and to negotiate with external 
stakeholders.  
                                                
614 Ar t .  12  Nagoya  Pro tocol :  «In  implement ing  the i r  ob l iga t ions  under  th is  Pro tocol ,  Par t ies  sha l l  
in  accordance  wi th  domest ic  law take  in to  cons idera t ion  ind igenous  and  loca l  communi t ies ’  
cus tomary  laws,  communi ty  pro tocols  and  procedures ,  as  appl icable ,  wi th  respec t  to  t rad i t iona l  
knowledge  assoc ia ted  wi th  genet ic  resources».  
615 Ar t .  2  Nagoya  Pro tocol :  «Each  Par ty  sha l l  take  measures  to  ra ise  awareness  of  the  impor tance  
of  genet ic  resources  and  t rad i t iona l  knowledge  assoc ia ted  wi th  genet ic  resources ,  and  re la ted  
access  and  benef i t - shar ing  i ssues .  Such  measures  may inc lude ,  in te r  a l ia :  awareness- r i s ing  of  
communi ty  pro tocols  and  procedures  of  ind igenous  and  loca l  communi t ies» .  
616 (Harry  Jonas ,  Shrumm, & Bavika t te ,  2010,  p .  109) .  
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5.3.2. Development and Content 
Usually, BCPs include the self-definition and the description of the community 
(i.e.:  its history, its population data) and the community may decide to include the 
description of the natural resources of its territories, the use that it  has 
traditionally made of them – including conservation techniques – and their 
relevance for the survival of the community. With more or less details the 
community might describe the knowledge it  has about the ecosystems that 
surround it ,  the use of medicinal plants, herding, gathering and hunting practices. 
This part of the protocol has different functions: it  regenerates the consciousness 
of the community about its role in the ecosystems and about the cultural 
background it  has; it  can also be a chance of exchange and knowledge transmission 
within the community (for example to the younger generations that spend less time 
with the community because of school attendance); finally it  shows to external 
stakeholders – such as the local government or protected areas managers – the role 
the community has in the ecosystem, its potential in conservation and restoration 
projects of the area and the need to protect its traditional lifestyle and its 
wellbeing in order to protect the local environment.  
The development of a protocol is a chance to clearly define the customary laws of 
the community, the rules of engagement with third parties and the terms for the 
access and use of traditional knowledge617.  Since customary laws are mostly 
unwritten and orally transmitted, they are often unclear, even for the community 
members, therefore NGOs and other external agencies struggle to understand what 
they are and are not allowed to and how they are supposed to behave. The BCP is 
an opportunity for the community to think about and clarify what its customary 
laws are and to clearly state them in a written document comprehensible and 
trustable to all outsiders. In particular, even though (and because), customary laws 
are almost never recognised by State law, it  is a way to assert their existence and 
importance vis à vis  government agencies, judicial courts and local authorities. 
This section can also include the description of the decision making procedures of 
the community that outsiders need to go through in order to obtain the real free 
prior informed consent618 (FPIC) of the community before accessing their 
knowledge or starting any other activity.  
                                                
617 (Afr ican  Bio-cul tura l  Communi ty  Pro tocol  In i t ia t ive ,  2011) .  
618 The  FPIC is  a  requirement  now inc luded  in  many na t ional  and  in terna t ional  laws ,  in  
par t icu lar  in  the  CBD and the  Nagoya  Pro tocol .  I t  wi l l  be  d iscussed  fur ther  in  Chapter  3 .   
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The process of developing the protocol can go further, allowing the community to 
reflect and lay out in the document the problems that it  finds more challenging at 
the time being and for which it  might appreciate external support.  Challenges may 
vary from land rights issues; to conflicts on the management of natural resource 
with other communities or with governmental authorities and private companies; 
from environmental changes or degradation (such as droughts, desertification, pest 
invasions, climate change, species extinctions); to disappearing traditional 
languages and practices and much more. This section is very precious not only for 
the community itself but also for the organizations interested in promoting the 
wellbeing and the respect of the biocultural rights of the community. 
Depending on its needs and interests,  the community can also add sections in the 
BCP on, for example, its sacred natural sites, its nomadic routes, the relationships 
it  has with other communities and their importance for its livelihoods or practices.  
5.3.3. Application 
Given the diversity of projects and cultural and legal systems of indigenous and 
local peoples, BCPs act as a guide on the process  without fixing one-fits-all 
norms. Thanks to their very adaptive and flexible format, BCPs can be used in 
very different situations. They can in fact address issues as diverse as619:  
-  Community management of biodiversity conservation projects; 
-  Sustainably use plants and animal genetic resources and manage the benefit 
arising from their use; 
-  Ensure environmental and other laws are implemented according to 
customary laws; 
-  Community management of protected areas and of endangered species; 
-  Oppose unsustainable development on their lands; and 
-  Engage with governmental or other agencies.  
5.3.4. Process is the Outcome 
The process  i tself of developing a BCP can be considered one of the outcomes per 
se  because it  is an instrument of empowerment of the community. The 
                                                
619 (Uni ted  Nat ions  Environmenta l  Program,  2010) .  
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development of a BCP allows the community the time to understand and discuss 
before entering in contact with outsiders, so guaranteeing a more appropriate 
decision making procedure. During the process  the community gains awareness of 
its rights as recognized by the law, clarifies both its leadership roles and its 
customary laws (legal empowerment), and improves its negotiating strength with 
external stakeholders620.  The process can also restore community self-
consciousness, both as a collective entity and as a holder of valuable knowledge 
and practices. It  can as well be a chance of inter-community exchange (often 
intergenerational) of knowledge, ideas and aspiration, increasing the community 
cohesion.  
5.3.5. Conclusion 
BCPs are not a final answer, they are aimed at building the ability to find new and 
value-based solutions – different from case to case. They are a tool to turn over 
the current tendency to propose (and sometime impose) outsiders’ solutions to 
local problems, challenges, and environments. The aim is to allow communities to 
effectively lead the development and implementation of projects and rights-claims 
rather than passively accept the decisions of external organizations .   
                                                
620 (Sa l te r  &  Von Braun,  2011) .  
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Chapter 5.4. Case Study  
5.4.1. Bwabwata National Park 
 
 
Bwabwata National Park is situated in the Caprivi Sprit,  a long protrusion of about 
450 Km of Namibian territory that extends towards Zambia and Zimbabwe and that 
borders with Angola and Botswana. Caprivi Strip became part of Namibian 
territory in 1890, six years after Namibia became a German colony621.  Namibia, 
under the name of South-West Africa remained under German domination until  the 
end of World War II,  when the League of Nations placed it  under the control of 
South Africa.  
In 1963, putting aside an South African apartheid plan to turn Caprivi Strip in a 
San-people area, the Strip was proclaimed West Caprivi Nature Park622.  In 1968 it  
was upgraded to Caprivi Game Park but did not function as a Park for long 
because in the same year it  was turned in a military zone of the South African 
                                                
621 (Dain-Owens ,  Kemp,  & Lavel le ,  2010,  p .  1 ) .  
622 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  2 ) .  
Map showing  Capriv i  S tr ip  
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Defence Force (SADF), because strategically important in the Namibian 
independence war. In 1966 in fact,  the UN had declared South African occupation 
illegal and the refusal of South Africa to grant independence spawned the war 
against the South West African Peoples’ Organization that was fighting for 
Namibian independence. The Khwe people of Caprivi Strip were involved in the 
military activities and were forced to leave their territories and to reside in army 
settlements623.  When, in 1990 the war ended and Namibia gained independence, the 
San found themselves lacking any governmental support because they were 
accused of being allies of the South African forces624.  
In November 2007, the area between the Okawango and the Kwando rivers was 
proclaimed Bwabwata National Park. The Park covers an area of 6.274 Km2 of 
Savana biome where, through the many vegetation types, Kalahari woodland 
prevails625.  The Park is divided in two by a gravel road along which the main 
settlements are distributed (it  is estimated that above 20 settlements ranging from 
12 to 100 inhabitants are present)626.  
BNP is one of the few national parks in the world where local people live627.  Since 
they live in a National Park, they cannot ask for the creation of Communal 
Conservancies628 and, unless there is a change in legislation, they are doomed to 
remain uneasy inhabitants of the Park with little benefits and many restrictions.  In 
order to manage the coexistence of peoples and natural resources the Park has been 
divided in two types of areas: 
-  3 Core Areas (Mahango, Buffalo and Kwando) with special protection and 
controlled tourism. Here veldt product harvesting, hunting, cattle rearing and wood 
collecting are not allowed; 
- 1 large Multiple-use Area where community-based tourism, trophy hunting, 
human settlement and development is allowed, though with limitations. Here 
residents are allowed to live, to plough, to collect firewood, bush food and 
building or other raw materials for subsistence purposes. 
Any commercial use of land and natural resources within both areas of the Park, 
where permitted, needs to be authorized by the MET. 
                                                
623 (Boden,  2011) .  
624 (Boden,  2011) .  
625 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  8 ) .  
626 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  8 ) .  
627 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  1 ) .  
628 See  above  a t  5 .2 .5 .  
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5.4.2. The Khwe 
San People 
The first inhabitants of the Southern part of Africa were organized in several 
tribes of nomadic people that called themselves: Ju|’hoansi,  Khwe, | |Ani, G|wi, 
Naro, Hai| |om, !Xoò, #Khomani, !Xun, | |Gana, Tshua, | |Xekgwi, !Ui629.  
                                                
629 (Le  Roux  &  W hi te ,  2004) .  The  |  ‘  !  #  symbols  ind ica ted  the  d i f f e ren t  c l i ck  sounds  o f  the  San  
l anguage .   
Map showing  the  Mul t ip le  Use  and  Core  Areas  o f  Bwabwata  
Nat ional  Park  ( IRDNC,  2009)  
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Map o f  the  San  tr ibes  o f  Southern  Afr ica 630.  
Each tribe had little contact with the others, but they all shared the same hunter-
gatherer livelihoods, a similar click-sound language, traditional dances and rock 
art.  For at least 20.000 years they lived in the area now encompassed between the 
boundaries drawn by the European colonizers of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, 
South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Throughout millennia of life in the desert 
                                                
630 (Kuru  Family  Organiza t ions ,  2008) .  
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and semi-desert African lands the San learnt to live on the rich biodiversity those 
lands had to offer and to take care of it  for the present and future generations631.  
In less than 2,000 years, since the arrival of the Bantu and the Europeans, more 
than 300.000 San turned from being the ancient and unique lords of their lands to 
being «the most impoverished, disempowered, and stigmatized ethnic group in 
Southern Africa»632.  Today, only approximately 88,000 San remain. Most of them 
live as marginal poor struggling to make a living in the new market-economy 
world, lacking rights over their lands and the education to fully integrate633.  
In Namibia there are about 30.000 San, divided in at least 5 language groups and 
located in different areas of the Nord-east of the country634.  Most groups live in the 
less valuable lands of Namibia, because since the XVI century they have been 
pushed at the sides of their original territories by Bantu migrations coming from 
the North635.  Today, the San are the most marginalized ethnic group in Namibia, 
facing problems such as poverty, powerlessness and social disorganization and 
mostly living in white-owned farms, other ethnic groups’ lands and in government 
lands636.   
The Khwe of West Caprivi Strip  
The resident population of West Caprivi numbers approximately 5000 adults,  of 
whom 82% are Khwe (San) and 18% Mbukushu, a Bantu people that moved to area 
the about two hundred years ago637.  
The Khwe, even though they have traditionally lived in the area, have never been 
granted official recognition by the national government because being nomadic 
communities they do not fit  the requirements of land possession that the 
government aspects and because, traditionally, they did not have a central 
authority to be recognized but a number of local ones638.  Since 1989 they have 
created a centralized authority but it  has not, as yet,  received any official 
recognition as Khwe Traditional Authority639.  The Khwe (unrecognized) 
Traditional Authority has had many leadership problems, due to the chosen leaders 
(acting for their own interests or encountering legal and alcohol-addiction 
                                                
631 (Le  Roux & White ,  2004) .  
632 (Sylva in ,  2002) .  
633 (Suzman,  2001) .  
634 (Legal  Ass is tance  Centre ,  2006,  p .  1 ) .  
635 (Legal  Ass is tance  Centre ,  2006,  p .  1 ) .  
636 (Legal  Ass is tance  Centre ,  2006,  pp .  2–3) .  
637 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  2 ) .  
638 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  2 ) .  
639 See  above  a t  5 .2 .5 .  
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problems) as well as to issues concerning communication between the communities 
spread in the Park640.  Many Khwe have reported confusion concerning who the 
current members of the Traditional Authority are and are de facto  ruled by the 
Mbukushu leaders641.  In fact,  unlike the Khwe, the Mbukushu’s Traditional 
Authority has received official recognition and now proclaims that the Khwe are 
not a distinct people, but rather their former subjects, that,  as such, need no 
further official recognition642.   
The Khwe are currently supported in their life within the Park by the work of 
Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC) a Namibian 
NGO643.  Since 1994, 43 community members have been involved in a program for 
the management of the Park. They act as Community Game Guards and as 
Community Resources Monitors and work inside the park to monitoring wildlife 
and poaching, monitoring the collection and use of medicinal and food plants and 
advising and teaching community members to use sustainable techniques644.  
Besides this, in 2000, IRDNC has supported the Bwabwata residents to create the 
Kyaramacan Peoples Association. It  is the legal body that represents all  the 
residents of the park, from the various ethnic groups, in issues concerning the 
management of natural resources (previous authorization of the MET) and the 
distribution of benefits generating from their use. In particular for the distribution 
of benefits from trophy hunting and the organic harvesting of the Devil’s Claw645.  
However, since 2010 the MET has not granted any hunting concessions hence no 
benefits have been distributed646.  
In 2010, IRDNC commissioned a study to the Round River Conservation Research 
Centre on the current status of the livelihoods of the Khwe and on their impact on 
                                                
640 (Boden,  2011) .  
641 (Boden,  2011) .  
642 (Legal  Ass is tance  Centre ,  2006,  p .  6 ) .  
643 I t  i s  a  no-prof i t  o rganiza t ion  tha t  focuses  on  communi ty-based  na tura l  resources  management  
in  Capr iv i  and  Kunene  Regions .  I t  i s  dedica ted  to  wi ld l i fe  conserva t ion ,  rura l  development  and  
democracy  bui ld ing .  IRDNC has  ac ted  as  a  br idging  organiza t ion  be tween the  communi t ies  and  
the  government  and  has  worked  to  es tab l ish  forms of  communi ty-based  na tura l  resources  
management  wi th  the  Khwe (Taylor ,  2005,  p .  37) .  For  more  informat ion  v is i t  the i r  o f f ic ia l  
webs i te  a t :  h t tp : / /www.i rdnc .org .na / .   
644 (Taylor ,  2005,  p .  37) .  
645 The  Devi l ’s  c law,  Harpagophytum  spec ies  (D.  Cole  & Stewar t ,  2005) ,  ana lges ic  and  an t i -
inf lammatory  proper t ies  have  long  been  known in  the  t rad i t iona l  sys tem of  the  San  and  earned  i t  
a  p lace  in  the  European  market  s ince  the  mid- twent ie th  century  (D.  Cole ,  2009) .  Unt i l  2007 the  
Park  was  charac ter ized  by  la rge  sca le  unsus ta inable  and  i l lega l  harves t ing  of  Devi l ’s  c law for  
poor  pr ices  pa id  to  harves ters  and  poor  qual i ty  of  harves ted  mater ia l .  In  2007,  wi th  the  
ass is tance  of  MET and IRDNC, KA es tab l ished  a  Devi l ’s  Claw Management  P lan  tha t  in t roduced  
ru les  on  harves t ing  methodologies  and  moni tor ing  ac t iv i t ies .  KA organized  t ra in ings  for  the  
harves ters ,  reg is te red  them and obta ined  the  cer t i f ica t ion  of  organic  products  for  the  Devi l ’s  
c law.  The  income of  the  harves ters  increased  by  three  t imes  and  the  sus ta inabi l i ty  of  the  
resources  use  was  reg is te red  as  increased .  
646 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  4 ) .  
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the conservation of biodiversity in the park. The study has reported that the Khwe 
communities living in the Park rely mostly on natural products for food, building 
materials and medicines: they gather veldt products, such as fruits and roots, as 
well honey, reeds, grass and wood, and very limited small animals’ hunting647.  
Trough extensive interviews within the Park, the Report has recorded the use of 
135 plant species as among the important food sources for the Khwe and 103 as 
the most important for medicinal and cultural purposes648.  Many of the alimentary 
and medicinal plants traditionally used have been reported as inaccessible or very 
scarce in the Multiple-use Areas649,  and present only in the Core Areas. Due to 
limited access to the Core Areas of the Park, those richest in biodiversity, and to 
the ban on gathering and hunting within those areas, the traditional livelihoods of 
the communities are not anymore sufficient for their survival and they have had to 
increasingly rely on external aid, jobs and limited agriculture650.  Agriculture is 
limited because of the lack of water and because of conflicts with wildlife: 40% of 
the interviewees declared elephants to be a treat to their crops and lamented that 
there was no compensation for damaged crops by the MET651.  
The Report accounts for the lack of a balanced diet for the inhabitants of the Park 
because of the almost complete lack of protein due to the ban on hunting and the 
absence of income necessary to buy meat products652 (moreover, the food store are 
very few and mostly unreachable for the majority of inhabitants because of the 
lack means of transport).  
Beside subsistence problems, the lack of access to core areas also limits the ability 
of the elders to teach to new generations their knowledge and practices about land, 
animals and plants. The Round River study reports that «the new lifestyles have 
distances the Khwe from their cultural traditions and led to a loss of local 
ecological knowledge»653.   
Cohabitation with the Mbukushu is also uneasy, not only because of their attitude 
towards the Khwe, but also because they traditionally are cattle holders. In the last 
few years and increasing number of Mbukushu have settled within the Bwabwata 
National Park boundaries and have brought their cattle along. Even though it  is 
formally prohibited to import any animal within a national park, they have se ttled 
                                                
647 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010) .  
648 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  13  and  46) .  
649 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  70  and  74) .  
650 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  5 ) .  
651 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  59) .  
652 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  71) .  In  most  households  the  so le  source  of  income are  o ld -age  
pens ions  granted  by  the  government  for  people  over  60s  (Boden,  2008,  p .  143) .  
653 (Dain-Owens  e t  a l . ,  2010,  p .  5 ) .  
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in the Multiple-use Areas, that,  unlike the Core Areas, are not well patrolled by 
the Park officials and rules are not always implemented. The Khwe, that 
traditionally have neither cattle nor crops, are hunter-gathers and have found 
themselves limited by the cumbersome presence of (illegal) cattle and the (legal) 
limitations on hunting and gathering imposed for the conservation of the park. 
5.4.3. Khwe Biocultural Community Protocol: Development and Process 
In 2011, Natural Justice (NJ) organized in Windhoek a workshop in collaboration 
with the Legal Assistance Centre of Namibia on Biocultural Community Protocols 
as instruments for the promotion of biocultural rights of indigenous and local 
communities654.  Inspired by the workshop, the year after,  the IRDNC and the 
Kyaramacan Peoples Association invited Natural Justice to visit  the Khwe 
communities in the park to assist them in the recognition of their relationship with 
the park environment and in the negotiation of greater rights to access and use 
resources within its borders in order to overcome their livelihood and cultural-loss 
problems. After a first round of consultations and awareness rising about BCPs, in 
2012 Natural Justice was mandated by the communities to assist to develop their 
Protocol655.   
Community consultations: BCP first Workshop with Custodians 
Committee of Elders & Youths 
The BCP first Workshop with Custodians Committee of Elders and Youth was 
organized by Natural Justice, in collaboration with CIKOD (Centre for Indigenous 
Knowledge & Organizational Development, Ghana) and the IRDNC from the 23r d  
to the 26t h  of September 2013. The workshop was attended by the custodians 
committee, composed of: 2 women and 2 men elected by the Khwe communities to 
lead them in the development of a BCP - called the custodian committee; 28 elders 
and youths selected in each of the 12 Khwe villages of the Park; and a team of 4 
Khwe and members of TOCaDI656 from Shakawe, Botswana. The workshop 
consisted of four intensive days dedicated to the following activities. 
 
                                                
654 (Natura l  Jus t ice ,  2012,  p .  9 ) .  
655 (Natura l  Jus t ice ,  2013,  p .  9 ) .  The  pro jec t  i s  funded  by  the  Afr ican  Biocul tura l  Communi ty  
Pro tocols  In i t ia t ive .  A  Natura l  Jus t ice- led  in i t ia t ive  a imed a t  suppor t ing  communi t ies  to  
develop  BCPs,  t ra in ing  of  BCP fac i l i ta tors  and  developing  BCPs’  bes t -prac t ices .   
656 TOCaDI s tands  for  the  Trus t  for  Okavango Cul tura l  and  Development  In i t ia t ives ,  an  NGO tha t  
works  in  the  Okavango sub-d is t r ic t  in  Botswana  for  the  promot ion  of  land  r igh ts  of  loca l  
margina l ized  communi t ies ,  in  par t icu lar ,  bu t  no t  on ly ,  San  people .  For  more  informat ion  v is i t  
the  of f ic ia l  webs i te :  h t tp : / /www.kuru .co .bw/TOCaDI.h tml .   
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Day 1: 
• Introduction by the custodians committee on their mandate, objectives, fears 
and expectations from the BCP process. 
 
 
Two of the four members of the custodian committee spoke one after the other 
(one in English and Afrikaans, the other in Khwe was then translated by a young 
community member) and drew the picture of a house filled with symbols (picture 
1). They explained that the house represents the culture and knowledge of the 
Khwe and the symbols drawn inside stand for (from left to right): the fire, 
initiation ceremonies (a stick with a drop of blood), the village and its inhabitants, 
hunting practices (the bow), the animals of the Park (an animal track), the 
documentation of their traditional knowledge (a book and a pen), their need to 
walk back to the house (a human footprint).  The family drawn outside the house 
represents all  the Khwe of Bwabwata National Park that are now, they explained, 
outside the house of traditional practices and culture. They are far from it because 
they cannot make fires in the veldt,  they cannot gather all  the plants they need for 
their ceremonies, they cannot hunt the animals of the Park and hence, they are 
Pics .  1  and  2  
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loosing their traditional knowledge. The last two symbols represent what they 
would like to do: to record their traditional knowledge in a written form and to 
walk back inside the house. The creation of a written record of their traditional 
knowledge has already been started with the help of IRDNC and would be, they 
said, very useful to teach their children about their practices. A draft of the book, 
called San Values  was showed to the group (picture 2). The kids, they explained, 
mostly go to school and can read. But they cannot learn the traditional practices of 
their fathers because they spend a lot of time in schools (schools are far and they 
most often have to be hosted there for the school months) and because they do not 
have access to the areas of the Park where most of the animals and plants are. 
During the discussion, in fact,  one of the elders noted that the book alone is not 
enough because “the children need to see things with their eyes. They should learn 
to prepare the bow and the arrows, and should go with the hunter to see the 
footprints, the killing, the lying down animal, and the skinning. But the 
government is not allowing it  anymore”. 
• Introduction on indigenous peoples’ rights and BCPs. 
Natural Justice lawyer, Lesle Jansen, gave an overview of indigenous peoples’ 
rights in international law (with particular focus on the CBD) and in Namibian 
human rights and environmental law. She then explained what a BCP is and how it 
could be used by the Khwe to improve their lives within Bwabwata National Park. 
In particular she suggested actions of lobbying with the local MET authorities in 
conjunction with IRDNC and the KA. 
• Introduction on the tools used during the workshop.  
CIKOD moderator, Wilberforce Laate, described the tools used to collect 
information during the workshop:  
Community Institutions and Resource Mapping (CIRM)657.  The aim of this tool is 
to teach to the selected workshop participants to collect from the community data 
on the formal and traditional institutions that are charged of taking decisions, and 
on the human and natural resources that are available. Data is collected by small 
teams of workshop participants that are sent to the communities to make 
interviews and to draw maps of the resources. In the first step the workshop 
participants are invited to brainstorm the institutions and resources they think the 
community has. Then the questions to be posed are framed with the support of the 
                                                
657 (CIKOD, 2013) .  
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moderator. A role-play helps the teams to get familiar with the questions and the 
mapping and finally, the teams are sent to the community to collect the 
information and draw the maps. Last step is the validation: the workshop 
participants discuss the information collected and validate  them on the ground of 
their knowledge. 
Community Visioning and Action Plan658.  Trough structured questions the 
facilitator leads the community to come out with their dreams of what they want 
with regards to their institutions and resources previously identified. The first part 
focuses on the issues of the community. The second part is dedicated to identify 
the priorities of the community and its development needs and to develop concrete 
action plans to achieve its goals. 
• First steps of CIRM: framing the questions to be asked in villages to gather 
information on institutions and resources.  
What are the institutions/people responsible for the following resources?  
-  Forest 
-  Water 
-  Animals 
-  Land in Multiple-use Area 
-  Land in Core Areas 
-  Food plants 
-  Medicinal plants 
-  Sacred places 
-  Ceremonies 
-  Human-made fire 
-  Wildfire 
-  Tracking 
-  Hunting 
                                                
658 (CIKOD, 2013) .  
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-  Festivals 
-  Meat distribution 
-  Healing ceremonies 
-  Gathering 
What type of food plants/building materials/medicinal plants/animals/water/lands 
do you have and use?  
Can you find them in the Multiple-use Area? 
Can you find them in the Core Area? 
What you can find is enough? 
• Participant’s introduction to mapping. 
CIKOD moderator showed the participants how to draw maps on the ground and 
then invited them to draw a map of the villages of the Park in order to get 
confident with the tool (picture 3). 
 
Pic  3 .  F irs t  a t tempts  a t  drawing a  phys ica l  map 
 
147 
 
• Second step of CIRM: role-play. 
Participants were divided in 6 groups: three asking the questionnaire and the other 
three acting as groups of women, elders and youth to be interviewed. They 
collected data on the institutions and resources and then drew maps of the location 
of the resources. 
• Report of the role-play.  
The interviewers groups reported on the answers they had received and explained 
the meanings of the maps the interviewees had drawn.  
All the participants then reflected, in preparation for the following day of 
fieldwork, on the difficulties they had experienced. 
DAY 2: 
• Third step of CIRM: interviews in one of the villages.  
Workshop participants, divided in three groups, visited a close by Khwe village, 
and asked the agreed questions to the community members. One group questioned 
the elders, one the women and one the youths. Each group responded to the 
questions and prepared a map representing the distribution of resources. 
The groups that interviewed the elders and the women (picture 4) collected the 
lists of resources used by the community members. These lists (reported below 
after the validation process) showed the use of many plants species for food and 
medicinal purposes and indicated the people and institutions responsible for their 
management. The women lamented the presence of many restrictions on the 
collection of the resources. Even if some food sources are present nearby they 
cannot harvest them or fish them and in particular they said they are afraid of 
being arrested if caught while harvesting. In fact,  they said, they took most of the 
food they used from the nearby shop. Water sources, they said, are also very 
limited and they take most of the water from the river, regardless of the presence 
of crocodiles. For what concerns lands they reported a lot of confusion and 
conflicts with other tribes and said that,  while there used to be a division, “now it 
is like a squatter camp”. 
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Pic  4 .  Group col lec t ing  in format ion  wi th  the  women 
Pic  5 .  Map drawn by  the  youths  
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The group of the youths engaged in a slightly different enterprise. They became 
very excited and decided to draw a map of how they would like the area to 
become. They draw a map (picture 5) that showed their will to expand the Core 
Area close to the village and to be helped to create a school, a clinic and a shop 
close to the village. They also drew a lodge with a campsite and a craft centre that 
they would have liked to manage. Besides the lodge and the expanded Core Areas 
they said they would like to create farms where to grow food for the village. 
DAY 3:  
• Groups’ leaders report on the findings of the previous day. 
• Presentation by the Botswana team on its work with TOCaDI in the Okavango 
Delta. 
As an example of best practice ,  the team explained how they have used community 
maps to claim for recognition of land rights. 
• Validation of the information collected in the village. 
The workshop participants went trough the information collected in the village 
about the resources used and the institutions and people that control them. After 
extensive consultations, the participants added a few more resources that they 
thought important for the Khwe and changed some of the indications about the 
institutions and people in charge of managing the resources thanks to the help of 
representatives of the KA and of IRDNC. 
The collection of this data, reported in the figure below (picture 6) was very 
relevant for the next steps of the workshop. The participants could focus on the 
resources they have, the areas where they are found, the challenges they encounter 
in accessing and using them. It stimulated their thoughts about the current 
situation within the Park and about what they feel their main problems are. This 
exercise revealed to be fundamental for the elaboration of the Community Vision 
and Action Plan. 
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DAY 4: 
• Creation of a map representing the present distribution of resources in the 
Park. 
The participants were invited to draw a map of Bwabwata National Park and to 
point where main resources are found (picture 7). They drew many resources in the 
Multiple-use Area but specified that certain ones, in particular certain medicinal 
and food plants, were present only in the Core Areas.  
Pic .  6 .  L is t  o f  resources  va l idated  
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• Community Vision and Action Plan.  
The workshop participants showed a strong desire for an increased access to the 
Core Areas, both to gather plants unavailable, or scarcely available, in the 
Multiple-use Areas, and to transmit to the new generations knowledge about their 
territory, their uses and their management practices. On the ground of the map of 
the present drawn the day before, the participants were invited to draw another 
map representing the changes they would have liked to fight for (picture 8).  
They drew a map showing the reduction of the Core Areas and the increase of the 
area within the veterinary fence (where cattle usually is kept) .  In particular they 
suggested shifting the boundary of the Kwando Core Area so to reduce its size. On 
the other side of the Park, they have suggested to shift the boundaries of the 
veterinary fence so to increase the area where cattle and other animals can move. 
In this way, they said, the villages will have more access to the resources currently 
in the Core Areas (hence restricted) and will have more space to keep their 
animals.  
After drawing and explaining their first proposal, the workshop participants were 
invited to reflect on two points. If the Core Area is restricted the Multiple-use 
Area, where they have more conflicts with the Mbukushu owners of cattle, will be 
expanded. And this might increase the conflicts rather then reduce them. 
Moreover, the shift of the veterinary fence will increase once more the area 
occupied by the Mbukushu, as they are the only owners of cattle. Moreover they 
were invited to reflect on whether it  really is the way they plan to “walk back to 
the house of the Khwe traditions” as they said on the first day. 
Pic .  7 .  Map o f  the  present  Bwabwata  Nat ional  Park  
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After more consultations among them, the custodian committee said that the 
participants had agreed on a second option. It  required to define the specific needs 
of the communities and to agree with the park management authorities on special 
permits to enter the Core Areas at certain times of the year, along with the 
following requirements: seasonal access to collect medicinal plants and food 
plants unavailable in the Multiple-use Areas; organize periodic trips in the Core 
Areas, accompanied by park authorities, to teach the youths knowledge about the 
Park; have new permits for hunting a few animals a year. The Round Rivers 
research reported above659 provides details on the plants, animals and water sources 
mostly needed and not available or sufficient in the Multiple-use Areas and on the 
seasons and location of each plant species. It  was proposed to use it  as the source 
of information to negotiate new access rights to the Core Areas. 
Community consultations: future steps  
The workshop has showed the great interests of the custodian committee to 
continue the process of development of a BCP. The data collected in this first 
round of negotiation is not sufficient to write the final BCP. The next step will 
require legal-awareness rising within the custodian committee and the elders and 
further consultations in each of the other 12 villages in order to understand what 
their Community Visions are. Hopefully the 12 villages will provide community 
visions compatible with each other and still  so strongly focused on the will to live 
in harmony with the Park. 
 
                                                
659 See  above  a t  5 .4 .2 .  
In  the  nex t  page:  Pic .  8 .  Map o f  Opt ion  1  for  the  fu ture  o f  the  Park  
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Chapter 5.5. Bwabwata Biocultural Community Protocol 
Here is provided the current draft of the Biocultural Community Protocol of the 
Khwe of Bwabwata that was prepared in the second round of negotiations 
conducted by Natural Justice, in February 2014. It  will have to be adapted and 
extended after consultation with the other villages. 
5.5.1. Our Communities Values 
In our culture and tradition there four important natural resources that we value 
in our life and throughout.  
The Land 
Our land is most important to us, we feel safe on our land, and we consider it  as 
our homestead. The way we lived in the past is also important to us, especially 
hunting and gathering.  
In the same vein, animals and plants are important to us because it  is where we 
get our food and medicine. 
The Eland  
The most sacred animal to us is the eland, when the eland meat is brought home, 
no argument should be observed otherwise the ancestors will  curse the ones who 
initiated the arguments. 
We use the animal skin to make blankets, shoes and the fat for instigating a 
ceremony as well as healing the environment so that the environment does not die 
and to heal persons with eye and chest problem. 
We only hunt the old male eland, we do not hunt the female for the purposes of 
reproduction. The meat was kept for a period of time to reduce hunting and 
preserve the eland. We also hunt far from our homestead.  
The Kyara tree 
We use the Kyara tree to make our cooking oil from the Kyara kernels. The old 
men of the family then take the Kyara oil and use it  for healing people in the 
village. We use the oil to smear on the leg, chest and the face of the hunters when 
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they go hunt so that they may be successful and the oil is also similarly smeared 
on the hunted meat. We also use the oil for the initiation ceremony 
The oil is only harvested during certain periods normally from November to April,  
otherwise the person brings bad luck on to them if harvested during other periods. 
In this way we conserve and protect our Kyara tree. There are also certain plants 
in our Tradition that our culture does not allow to be touched nor harvesting.  
Wild animals 
Like everyone else in Namibia, we also have great value for our domestic animals. 
Our elders have taught us how to live with the wild animals; we consider them as 
our herds and flocks. 
5.5.2. Managing our Environment 
The environment is the most important element to us. The old man of a homestead 
is normally the one that informs the young men of our community about the 
reproduction of a plant ,  in order to the start the burning earlier so that the tree 
can produce healthy. 
 Burning of the environment early is very important to us, we normally do it  in 
April to July, this is the best time to initiate burning, however if  the rain was not 
that good the previous year then burning of the environment is stopped early 
normally in June. 
Harvesting of a plant is only allowed when the old man of a homestead announces 
harvesting, thus, the first ready fruits are brought to the old man of the family 
before he can announce harvesting. If  anyone was found harvesting an unripe plan 
tree the person together with their family was chased away from the village. 
Deforestation, cutting down of trees is not allowed in our community. We normally 
climb on the tree, to remove the ripe fruits to avoid breaking the shrubs of the 
trees. 
5.5.3. Our Traditional Knowledge 
We hold variety of traditional knowledge which has developed from time in 
memorial from our ancestors. We are known for our healing knowledge to our 
people and to our environment. 
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Knowledge pertaining to plants 
We collect the dry wood of the Teak tree, we then cut it  and remove the red part 
which is found in middle of the dry wood. Pound and get the power, which we 
serve to get the finest power. With this power we use it  to heal somebody who is 
sick and we also use it  for offering to our ancestors when we communicate with 
them. We also use the red power to smear on the tools of the hunters so that the 
ancestors can bless the tools. 
If  someone from the village had gone for a very long time when they return home 
we also smeared the powder on their heads that symbolises blessings from 
ancestors.  
We use the seeds of a certain tree, to suppress hunger when it’s ready for 
harvesting. Either it  normally prepped with boiling water or cook it  in meat, it  
should be prepared in a correct way and eaten responsibly as it  is very poisonous. 
The leaves of this tree can also be used to heal diarrhoea and eye problems. 
 We hold knowledge on storage of our wild fruits so that they last longer. We put 
our fruits in holes and cover with them with a bulk of a certain plant, leaves of a 
certain tree and then sand on the top.  
5.5.4. The Preservation of our Knowledge 
We pass the knowledge that we hold to our young ones during our traditional fire 
assembly and through learning by doing. 
- Learning by doing  
As we demonstrate to our children how to use the knowledge. A male child follows 
the father in the field to learn the tactics of hunting and whether a certain animal 
was nearby the homestead or far away. On the other hand a girl mostly spent time 
with the mother to learn the gathering methods.  
-  Traditional fire 
We have two types of fire in our tradition, Men fire where only the young men and 
the old men of the family come together to discuss and share men activities. 
During this fire assembly, we also discuss our knowledge that we hold. All the 
young girls and the old women of the family gather together to discuss women 
responsibility as well as passing on traditional knowledge. 
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5.5.5. Communication Structure of our Community    
This protocol reaffirms our right to Prior informed consent to be sought before the 
implementation of any activities on our land. We will therefore not consult with 
anyone who wants to access our traditional knowledge and natural resources 
without having gone through our custodian committee, which has been elected by 
our community. After a researcher, Non-governmental Organisation, or 
government has consulted with our custodian committee about the content of the 
meeting, the custodian committee must then set up a meeting with our community 
that must then decide whether to meet up with such a person or not. 
5.5.6. Challenges and Vision 
Challenges 
-  Our biggest challenge is the fact that we have no Traditional Authority of our 
own tribe to lead and represent us at a national level.  We call on the Republic 
of Namibia to give us the opportunity to elect our own leaders and give them 
the recognition they deserve. 
-  At this stage, we feel that we have no control over our land we are living on. 
We are not fully recognised and respected by other tribes who often tell us that 
we live on land that does not belong to us, but which belongs to animals. 
-  There is an increase on deforestation, as many people are cutting down our 
trees in the park. It  is difficult for us to get enough food and get the right 
medicines from our trees as other people cut down our trees without 
differentiating between medicinal trees and wild fruits.  
-  Our wild animals are being poached a lot by other tribes who are allowed to 
reside in the park with us; we recommend that the government employ people 
from our community to protect our wildlife, as we know the value of wild 
animals to us. 
-  It is also a challenge to see other people bringing their cattle and cows for 
grazing in the park. Our community is not allowed to have domestic animals in 
the park. 
-  We also feel that our community has lack of access to just ice, as they know 
little about their rights and freedom. We therefore request from our 
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government to put programs in place to educate our people about the our 
rights and freedom both under national and international law. 
-  Lack of proper consultation between our community and government officials 
when implementing activities on our land.  
-  Most of our medicinal plants are fenced in the core area were we are not 
allowed to harvest,  we therefore meekly request that we are allowed to harvest 
on certain periods. We can work on an agreement with the government 
regarding this. 
-  Our community experience human and wildlife conflict of which response from 
the Ministry is not fast enough. 
-  Our communities who are unable to understand English are unable to know 
national news and international news as the news on the radio and newspaper 
to not have it  in our language. 
-  Currently our community is dying slowly as we are restricted to harvest 
certain fruits to treat each other, thus we are unable to harvest our medicinal 
plants to heal our people and our Environment. 
We urge the Republic of Namibia to give us access to the resources we need in the 
park. We appreciate the concession that our government give us for five years, 
they are working together with us through the Kyaramacan. We are not able to 
have cattle in certain areas, however the neighbours have cattle in restricted 
areas at the same time the cattle is sent in the park.  
Chapter 5.6. Analysis of the Protocol Under the Light of Biocultural Rights 
The Khwe-Bwabwata case study is a clear example of the conflicts that can arise 
between conservation goals and human rights, in particular indigenous peoples and 
local communities’ rights. Biocultural rights can play an important role in this 
case, by underlying the attitude and knowledge of the communities towards the 
environment and their potential contribution to its conservation. The Khwe are, in 
fact,  de facto supporting park authorities through their work as community 
resource monitors and community game guards and require more access to the park 
for access to livelihoods but also to transmit to future generation that same 
knowledge that will be needed for the next generations of game guards and 
resources monitors. Besides their knowledge of the Park, the Khwe have also 
maintained, through the transmission of traditional knowledge and practices over 
the past hundreds of years, ways of life that do not require cattle keeping nor 
agriculture, two practices not compatible with the conservation of the Park. At the 
same time, as a Ministry of the Environment official attending the workshop 
underlined, a hungry people will not refrain, autonomously, from hunting and 
gathering at an unsustainable level.  Limits need to be imposed and enforced from 
the outside. This is true, unless there are strong institutional structures in the 
group that are able to control effectively the action of the members and that are 
conscious of the consequences of unsustainable uses. Whether these structures are 
present inside the Khwe is not confirmed by the consultations, while it  is 
confirmed their attachment to the Park as a gift of God, to be used as He wishes, 
and the centrality Park resources have for their livelihoods and identity. While the 
first option proposed by the workshop participants does not appear as rea lly 
compatible with the conservation of the Park, the second option shows their will to 
have more access to resources while at the same time to being ready to accept 
limits for the benefit of the Park.  
The one reported here was just a first round of negotiations and more will be 
needed to understand whether the Khwe of Bwabwata are ready to ask for the 
recognition of biocultural rights, or whether they will rather take the route of 
indigenous right. Until today, their requests framed under the label of indigenous 
rights have been ignored by the Namibian government, both because of its attitude 
towards the Khwe, still  seen as traitors of the country, and because it  sees in 
Bwabwata National Park an important environmental conservation hotspot and the 
sources of income from tourism. 
Whether or not the Khwe will choose the route of biocultural rights will also 
depend on their willingness, as a group, to undertake responsibilities towards the 
Park. As it  was stressed during the workshop and as will need to be stressed in the 
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future consultations, biocultural rights can turn out to be, in their case, a very 
useful tool that comes, however, with a price to pay: the responsibility to promote 
the conservation of the environment. 
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